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Abstract 
If you were Monica Lewinski's mother, how would you describe Linda Tripp? 
Remember that Linda Tripp is the woman who tapped her own phone conversations 
with Monica and then used them to incriminate President Clinton. Marcia Lewis, 
Monica's actual mother, chose the following expression: 'She is like a meddlesome 
witch, a praying mantis." This expression conveys a multiple analogy, a comparison 
in which several sources are likened to a target. In this case, the first source tells us 
that Marcia thinks of Linda as a disagreeable woman who entices youngsters into 
her confidence in order to ensnare them for her own purposes, much like the witch 
who trapped Hansel and Gretel. The second source tells us that Marcia thinks of 
Linda as a creature that ambushes others out of aa inhuman lust for prey. 
This example shows the usefulness of multiple analogies in satisfying certain 
cognitive gods, such as constructing an adequate explanation of Linda Tripp and 
her behavior. Multiple analogies have also proven to be very useful in satisfying 
other kinds of cognitive gods, such as those of philosophers and scientists. However, 
no cognitive model of multiple andogies has yet been proposed or explored. This 
dissertation presents an exploration of multiple analogies as found in the literature 
of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and philosophy with the aim of proposing a 
cognitive model of this interesting mode of reasoning. This model is based upon 
the Multiconstraint theory of analogies, which is extended for the purpose, and also 
contrasted with previous theories of analogy. 
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Chapter 1 
Multiple analogies past and 
present 
But it is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without a third; for 
there must needs be some intermediary bond to connect the two. And the fairest of 
bonds is that which most perfectly unites into one both itself and the things which 
it binds together; and to effect this in the fairest manner is the natural property of 
proportion [analogia]. 
Timaeus, in Plato's Timaeus, 31 b-c. 
1.1 Introduction 
An analogy is a kind of comparison that may occur in many contexts, serve many 
purposes, and take on may forms. Consider, for example, the remarks made by 
Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, on the demand for a law banning handguns 
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in Britain following t h e  shooting of 28 schoolchildren (16 fatally) in Dunblane, 
Scotland in March 1996. The Prince argued against the ban by comparing handguns 
to golf clubs and cricket bats:l 
If a cricketer, for instance, suddenly decided to go into a school and 
batter a lot of people to death with a cricket bat, which he could do 
very easily, are you going to ban cricket bats? 
The Prince's comparison displays a number of features of central importance in 
analogical reasoning. First, the comparison is constructed with a specific purpose 
in mind, namely to weigh against proposals to ban handguns. Such a ban in the 
case of cricket bats would be absurd, the Prince maintains, therefore it would also 
be absurd in the case of small arms. Second, the Prince bases the argument not 
on any obvious similarity between handguns and cricket bats, which look nothing 
alike, but on their (potential) similarity of use. Both, the Prince claims, can easily 
be used to kill people. Third, the Prince's choice of cricket bats for comparison was 
made within a particular context. In fact, he was being interviewed by a BBC radio 
sports reporter when he made the remarks. Thus, sports, especially ones such as 
golf and cricket that are familiar to the Prince, were primed by the circumstances 
of the interview. Fourth, the leisurely and rule-bound air associated with golf and 
cricket contrasts highly with the frantic and unnatural feelings associated with a 
mass shooting. Finally, the Prince mentions cricket for comparison not simply for 
its own sake, but dso on behalf of other sports and sporting equipment, such as 
golf and golf clubs, which might serve the argument just as well. 
From the Toronto Star, 5 February 1997. 
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These sorts of issues arise in the consideration of any analogy. Analogies gener- 
ally serve some purpose, of which persuasion is only one. They are based on deep 
connections between things rather than some simple surface similarities such as 
physical resemblance. The choice of things to compare is not necessarily optima, 
but is often suggested by arbitrary features of the context in which the analogy is 
constructed. The things compared in analogies may carry emotional values that 
make the analogy stronger or weaker. And analogies may involve the compaxison 
of more than two items, if sometimes implicitly. All of these factors weigh in the 
acceptance or rejection of an analogy with respect to its purpose. In the case of 
the Prince's analogy, there are some obvious problems. For example, the Prince's 
argument relies on the similarity of use of handguns and cricket bats. As Alison 
Crozier, whose daughter was killed in the Dublane shootings, points out 
Golf clubs are made for sport, for enjoyment. Guns are made to kill. 
There is no comparison bet ween the two things. 
An analogy premised on the ease with which someone might use a golf club or 
cricket bat in place of a handgun to kill people must be counted as a weak analogy. 
Additional appeals to tennis racquets, croquet mallets and the like would not make 
much difference. 
More plausible applications of analogy to the problems posed by firearms have 
been proposed. Consider the suggestion made by Davidoff (1998) that physicians 
should counsel their patients regarding the potential consequences of firearm pos- 
session. The American College of Physicians surveyed their members on the issue 
of treating firearms violence as an epidemic like, e.g., AIDS or tobacco addiction 
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(Cassel et al., 1998), and issued a position paper on the subject (Ginsburg, 1998). 
Davidoff (1998, p. 235) urges medical practitioners to play a similar role in reducing 
firearms-related injuries as they have done in reducing injuries from other human 
activities with medical consequences: 
But if the only change that comes from reframing gun violence as a 
medical issue is that internists and surgeons begin actively counseling 
their patients regularly on gun safety, the effect on firearm violence could 
be substantial. Our patients looked at us strangely in the 1970s when 
we began asking them whether they used seat belts. "What's that got to 
do with my medical condition?" But clinicians kept at it, and seat-belt 
counseling, along with improved seat-belt technology and mandatory 
seat-belt laws, is now seen as part of good preventive practice. The 
story is much the same with smoking, sexually transmitted diseases, 
and other difficult behavior-related health issues. 
In other words, doctors could begin taking to patients about the risks they expose 
themselves to by keeping fiearms around them, just as they do in c o ~ e c t i o n  
with other medically risky practices such as ignoring seat belts, smoking, having 
unprotected sex, and so on. 
Davidoffs analogy or "reframingn (as he calls it) may be judged in the same 
manner as the analogy offered by Prince Charles. First, it has a specific purpose, 
namely to advocate that medical practitioners counsel their patients about risks to 
their health as a result of having firearms. Such counseling has had positive effects 
in the cases of seat belts, smoking and AIDS, so why not treat firearms possession 
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the same way? More than that, Davidoffs analogy invites us to reconceptualize, 
or "reframe", the whole issue of firearms possession. As with seat belt usage in the 
1970s, the idea of treating firearms as a medical issue appears strange at first. Thus, 
the analogy also serves to give the firearms issue a new conceptual structure which 
includes counseling as a potential mitigator. Second, the argument is not based 
on simple resemblances of firearms to seat belts, viruses or cigarettes. Rather, it 
is the adverse effect of these things on health that makes them comparable. This 
analogy does not hold in virtue of superficial features, but in virtue of similarities 
of cause and effect. Third, of course, Davidoff has selected only medical analogs 
for comparison. As a physician and editor of the Annals of Internal Medicine, he 
is an authority on medical practices and the epidemiological side of firearms use, 
and may therefore expect his opinion to carry some persuasive force. Fourth, the 
seat belt, smoking, and AIDS analogs are emotionally coherent with the issue of 
firearms use. All are taken quite seriously from a medical standpoint, and the air of 
gravity associated with counseling for various, medically risky behaviors transfers 
appropriately to the subject of firearms and the injuries resulting from the use of 
firearms. And finally, Davidoff cites not one, but three analogs to make his point. 
This sort of multiple comparison makes his plea for medical counseling all the more 
effective and convincing. 
All of these aspects of analogy are important in understanding and evaluating 
analogical thinking. Of course, some aspects have received more attention than oth- 
ers in the time since analogies became a subject of philosophical inquiry in classical 
Greece. Currently, much of the research on analogy has been taking place in the 
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field of Cognitive Science, where comprehensive theories and models of analogical 
thinking have begun to emerge. The purpose of this dissertation is to apply some of 
that research to a better undentaading of one aspect of analogy mentioned above 
that has not been fully explored, namely multiple analogies. In a single analogy, 
only one source analog is used to support a comparison. So, for example, when 
Bierce (1958) defines wit as "the salt with which the American humorist spoils his 
intellectual cookery by leaving it out ," he is comparing the activity of writing humor 
(unfavorably) with the activity of cooking and nothing else. In a multiple analogy, 
several sources are used. Thus, Prince Philip compares handguns to cricket bats 
and golf clubs, and Davidoff compares firearms to seat belts, cigarettes, and AIDS. 
The aim of this dissertation is to inquire into the nature of multiple analogies and 
show in what respects they are of philosophical and cognitive interest. 
Before embarking on this inquiry, it is helpful, and intrinsically interesting, 
to examine what philosophers have said on this subject before. The aim of the 
remainder of this chapter is to present a brief review of theories of analogy from 
Plato to Mill; it is Mill's theory that holds sway in philosophical circles today. 
This review is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the subject, but a 
rburn6 of the highlights, pointing out what influential philosophers have had to 
say that is relevant to the subject at hand. Specifically, this review shows that 
although sophisticated thinkers since the time of Plato have demonstrated some 
awareness of multiple analogies, they have done little to include multiple analogies 
in their explicit characterizations of analogy. This odd disparity between theory 
and practice indicates both that multiple analogies are 'natural' cognitive entities, 
CHAPTER 1 .  MULTIPLE ANALOGIES PAST AND PRESENT 7 
i .e. ,  they are commonplace, and that they have tended to escape careful scrutiny. 
So, this review satisfies historical curiosity and also motivates the work presented 
in the rest of this dissertation. 
Section 1.2 examines Plato's view of analogy largely from evidence in the Repub- 
lic, and characterizes that view as a shared-abstraction theory of analogy; 
Section 1.3 presents Aristotle's still-influential proportional theory of analogy, 
and shows that it is also a shared-abstraction theory; 
Section 1.4 reviews Bacon's remuks on analogy, specifically his break with the 
Aristotlean theory and his proposal of a shared-attribute theory of analogy; 
Section 1.5 examines Mill's treatment of analogy, which is similar to Bacon's, and 
his assimilation of analogy to inductive inference by another version of the 
shared-attribut e theory; 
Section 1.8 outlines the origin of the shared-structure theory in the twentieth 
century. concentrating on the work of Keynes? Hesse, Polya, Evans, Winston, 
and Gentner. 
The sections indicate that these researchers concentrated only on some of the p r o p  
erties of analogy discussed above, e.g., the nature of the c o ~ e c t i o n  between analogs 
and the suitability of these c o ~ e c t i o n s  for the purpose of argument. Also, except 
of Polya, these researchers considered only single analogies in proposing their t h e  
ories, although many have used multiple analogies in their practise. This disparity 
between theory and practice illustrates the need for a theory of multiple analogy. 
CHAPTER 1. MULTIPLE ANA LOGlES PAST A N D  PRESENT 
1.2 Plato 
Plato was a prolific user of analogies, at least for the first two-thirds of his career, 
and had clearly thought about what analogies are and what they could be used 
to do. But he does not present us with any extended, theoretical treatment of 
the subject. The statements he did record in his dialogs present a slightly fuzzy 
picture of what analogies are, and a contradictory picture of whether they could be 
recommended for philosophical use. On some occasions, Plato condemns compar- 
isons as  inherently misleading; on other occasions he presents them as a useful and 
commendable tool in the philosopher's dialectical bag of tricks. 
The task of this section is not to sort out Plato's entire view of analogy; further 
inquiry on this subject may be found below in chapter 5 and in (Robinson, 1953, 
pp. 202-22) and (Lloyd, 1966). For present purposes, an indication of Plato's 
view(s) of analogy, especially multiple analogy, will su-ffice. 
Plato provides some very colorful and insightful characterizations of analogical 
reasoning. One of his most interesting treatments of analogy comes in the Republic, 
a dialog replete with analogical arguments, where Plato elucidates the nature of 
analogy by a comparison (2.368d):2 
[Socrates:] "If someone had, for example, ordered men who don't see 
very sharply to read little letters From afar and then someone had the 
thought that the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and 
in a bigger place, I suppose it would look like a godsend to be able to 
2AlI translations of Plato's Republic in this chapter are fmm Bloom (1968), unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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consider the littler ones after having read these first, if, of course, they 
do happen to be the same." 
Socrates convinces his companions to tackle the difficult topic of justice in the 
character of an individual human being by malogy with justice in the character 
of a whole city. He says that the form [idea] of justice is easier to apprehend in 
the case of the city; therefore, he and his friends should begin by considering what 
makes a city just and then proceed, by comparison, to considering what makes an 
individual just (2.369a). 
Here, Plato presents a version of what may be called the shared-abstraction 
theory of analogy. In other words, Plato says that an analogy may be drawn 
between an individual and a city because they both share in a third thing, namely 
the idea of justice. This idea is an abstract property that applies to both the 
individual and the soul. Were there no shared idea (or eidos, the more common 
term Plato uses to mean the same thing; see Republic, 3.402~-d), there would 
be no basis for concluding anything horn an analogy. Also, the fact that Plato 
grounds his model of analogy in his theory of forms (or true ideas) means that 
analogies, so construed, hold strictly for essential properties of their analogs. For 
Plato, each form has an unchanging existence which is realized only fleetingly and 
imperfectly in the everyday world. Thus, a form captures the properties of things 
that always hold true. Since analogies hold solely in virtue of two things sharing 
in one unchanging form, those things cannot be analogous due to accidents or 
coincidences. So, for example, the fact that two stones happen to be the same 
distance from the sea is mere happenstance and does not make them analogous. 
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Of course, there is the practical difficulty of determining what the forms are and 
bow they may be reliably accessed for the purpose of analogical reasoning. Socrates 
states that young philosophers should only be introduced to the forms, by education 
in dialectical thought, starting at age thirty-five (7.539e). That is a long time to 
wait to st art using analogies! 
Besides examining the epistemological legitimacy of analogical reasoning, Plato 
also offers a motivation for it, or perhaps two. First, the letter comparison discussed 
above seems to imply that reasoning about justice by analogy may simply be easier 
than reasoning about it by some other means. In other words, analogy may act 
as a cognitive facilitator. Second, the letter analogy also seems to imply that 
Socrates and his friends may enjoy some confidence in their analogical conclusions 
because those conclusions are based on premises that they can apprehend clearly. 
In other words, since the big letters are easily legible, Socrates and the others may 
feel confident that they understand what those letters are, and may therefore feel 
confident that they understand what the little letters are, despite their difficulties 
in making out the little letters per se. It is not entirely clear whether Plato intended 
to support only one of these motivations or both, but both are consistent with his 
explicit comments on the subject. 
In any case, when Socrates inquires into the nature of justice in the soul, he uses 
an analogy which involves two sources, namely the organization of the city and the 
organization of a flock of sheep. First, Socrates notes that the human soul, which 
is where human character resides, must be divided into three parts by analogy with 
the city, which has three classes of citizens, namely the rulers, the guardians, and 
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the many (4.435b). He argues that the human soul must likewise be divided into 
three corresponding parts, namely the calculating part, the spirited part, and the 
appetetive or ordinary part (4.435b-6b). Each of these parts attempts to direct the 
whole soul according to their individual natures (4.437b-41d). Since justice in the 
city consists in each class minding its own business, justice in the soul also likely 
consists in each part of the soul minding its own business (4.437d-e). 
In the case of the city, the business of the ruling class is to direct the other 
classes, and the business of the guardian class is to obey the rulers and keep the 
many in line. Socrates supports this assignment by raising an analogy between the 
city and a flock of sheep. He states that the spirited part of the soul pursues victory 
at all costs, unless it is overruled by the calculating part, just as a herd dog herds 
a flock of sheep unless its master calls it in (4.440d). In this analogy, the shepherds 
are analogous to the city's rulers, the dog to the guardians, and the sheep to the 
many. By this analogy, Socrates clarifies what he means by each class in the city 
minding its own business. Then, he asserts that the parts of the soul mind their 
own business when, by analogy with the city, the calculating part rules, the spirited 
part obeys and marshals the ordinary part to obey the rulers also (4.441e). 
Thus, the andogicd argument that justice in the soul means a particular pattern 
of ruling and obedience among its three parts depends on two source analogs, the 
city and the flock. The city analog provides the tripartite division and suggests a 
pattern of political organization. The flock analog makes the pattern more specific 
and concrete. Also, the flock analog adds confidence in the conclusion, since the 
pattern of flock organization had already been discussed by Socrates and accepted 
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by the others (3.415d-6c). In its use of common pattern and established sources 
for confidence, this multiple analogy appears to have all the properties that Plato 
claimed for single analogies. 
In his explicit comments on analogy, Plato set out a version of the shared- 
abstraction theory. On Plato's theory, an analogy consists in an idea or pattern 
that is shared by two things. Plato did not comment explicitly on the possibility or 
nature of multiple analogies. The example of the analogy from the city and flock 
to the individual soul indicates that Plato was sophisticated in the use of multiple 
analogies. But, the example does not tell us whether Plato felt that they would 
be subsumed under his concept of single analogies, or whether he simply failed to 
consider the issue at all. Whatever the case, Plato set the precedent for theories of 
analogy and the omission of multiple analogies from those theories. 
1.3 Aristotle 
Aristotle was the first philosopher to provide an explicit analysis of analogy dong 
with its applications in areas such as poetry, rhetoric, logic, and science. The funda- 
mental aspects of Aristotle's theory may be covered by attending to the meaning of 
two terms that he used which correspond to what we call 'malogy', namely propor- 
t ion [analogia] and emmple (paradeigmata]. Fuller reviews of Aristotle's treatment 
of analogy may be found in (Hurlbutt, 1985, pp. 102-7), (Hesse, 1966, pp. 130-56), 
and (Lloyd, 1966). 
Aristotle formalized and generalized the not ion of identical, numerical ratios 
into the following general, and probably very familiar, formula: A : B :: C : D or 
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' A  is to B as C is to D" in plain English. This expression is the formula for the 
secalled 'proportional analogy'. Plato, among may other pre-Aristotlean Greek 
philosophers, implicitly used this notion when thinking about analogies, but re- 
stricted it to numerical ratios such as 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8 or "two is to four as four is to 
eight". In other words, four is twice two and eight is twice four. The quotation 
from Timeaus given at the beginning of this chapter clearly takes analogy in this 
way, as the identity of numerical ratios. But Aristotle generalized this expression 
to cover the case of identical relations holding between any two pairs of objects. 
This generalization is stated in the Topics (1.17.108a6-1 I), where Aristotle gives 
illustrations such as "knowledge is to the thing known as sensation is to the thing 
sensed". In other words, just as knowledge is about facts, sensation is about ma- 
terial objects. The relationship of 'aboutness' is identical in each case. Really, this 
analogy is simply a version of the age-old metaphor between sight and intellect, 
as in the expressions useeing is believingn or "I see what you mean" (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980, p. 48). 
Aristotle applied his theory of proportional analogy in many areas. For instance, 
he noted that many good metaphors seem to be good in virtue of an underlying 
analogical relationship. For example, Aristot le states that since a cup is to Dionysus 
(the god of wine) as a shield is to Ares (the god of war), a cup may be metaphorically 
described as 'the shield of Dionysus' and a shield may be metaphorically described 
as 'the cup of Ares' (Poetics, 21.1457b21-23). The identical relation shared by both 
analogs in this case could be described as x is the implement most appropriate to 
Y 
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Plato ensures that analogies are non-trivial by insisting that they are legitimate 
solely in virtue of a shared form. Thus, no accidental similarities may form the 
basis of an analogy, properly speaking (section 1.2). Aristotle ensures the non- 
triviality of analogies under his account in a different way, via two restrictions. 
First, Aristotle distinguishes analogy from identity. H e  claims that some things are 
completely identical in all essential properties, such as the celestial bodies (Parts of 
Animals, 1.5.644b22-7). Because of this, it would be trivial to assert, for example, 
that celestial bodies are analogous to one another because they are imperishable. 
Thus, it would be trivial to note that imperishability is to the planet Venus as 
it is to the planet Mars. Conversely, Aristotle maintains that some things are 
different in ad essential properties and that it is proper to construct analogies 
between only such things. For example, birds and fish are analogous insofar as 
feathers are to birds what scales are to fish (History of Animals, 1.4.644a10-b17), 
i.e., feathen:birds::scales:fish. By restricting analogies to non-identical relations 
between non-essential properties, Aristotle excludes trivial comparisons from his 
theory of analogy. 
This first restriction still leaves open the possibility that analogies could hold 
between purely accidental properties of things. Aristotle resolves this issue by re- 
lating analogy to induction. In this sense, Aristotle typically speaks of 'example' 
[paradeigmata] rather than 'analogy'. Induction is a form of reasoning that proceeds 
from particular cases to a generalization that is true of all cases. Consider, Aristotle 
says (Prior Analytics, 2.23.681319-22)' those animals that are long-lived, e.g., men, 
horses, and mules. Upon inspection, we notice that each of these animals is bileless. 
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We may conclude, therefore, that all long-lived animals are bileless. Thus we have 
reasoned from an inspection of each case of long-lived animal to a generalization 
true of all of them; this process is ind~ct ion.~ Aristotle claims that reasoning by 
example is similar to induction, except that we reason from one particular case to 
another particular case, leaving the inductive generalization unstated (Prior An- 
a ly t i c~ ,  2.24). So, for instance, we might reason that for the Athenians to attack 
the Thebans is evil, since Thebes is the neighbor of Athens and the example of the 
attack of the Thebans on the Phocians shows that it is evil for a city to attack its 
neighbor. In Aristotle's view, we first reasoned from one case, the attack of the 
Thebans on the Phocians via a non-exhaustive induction to the implicit general- 
ization that all attacks by one city on its neighbors are evil. It follows deductively 
that an attack by Athens on its neighbor Thebes would be evil as well. In this 
way, Aristotle claims that all analogies make an implicit appeal to some unstated 
generalization. By this second restriction of analogies to comparisons covered by 
a generalization, Aristotle includes only inductively plausible comparisons in his 
theory of analogy. 
In the Rhetoric (2.20), Aristotle indicates two things about the use of examples, 
namely that reasoning by example (1) depends on proportional analogies, and (2) 
may involve multiple analogs. Consider the following illustration about the need for 
the Greeks to prevent the Persians from taking over Egypt (1393a31-b3, translation 
from McKeon, 1941): 
We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him 
fact, we have not examined euery long-lived animal, and most actud inductions are not 
exhaustive in this way. Aristotle ignores this problem, however. 
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subdue Egypt. For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he 
had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes, 
again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but once he seized 
it, he did cross. If therefore, the present king seizes Egypt, he also will 
cross, and therefore we must not let him. 
The analogy appears to be cast in the proportional mold: Egypt is to the present 
king of Persia as it was to Darius and as it was to Xerxes. Here, Aristotle uses 
two sources. Many of the other cases of 'example' discussed by Aristotle in this 
section also appeal to multiple sources, each cast (or thrust) into the proportiond 
form. Aristotle does comment on the ways in which multiple examples affect the 
rhetorical appearance of an argument, but does not alter his proportional theory 
to accomodate the use of extra material. Perhaps he thought of multiple sources 
as simply a case of more of the same. 
Aristotle's treatment of analogy represents a significant advance on Plato's treat- 
men t . Aristotle provided a general representation of analogy, the proportional r e p  
resent ation, and distinguished analogy from iden ti ty on the oae haod and coinci- 
dence on the other. He applied his theory to account for andogies in many different 
areas. Like Plato, Aristotle gave a version of the shared-abstraction theory of anal- 
ogy, by stating that analogies ate legitimated by an inductive generali~ation.~ Also 
like Plato, Aristotle appears to admit multiple analogies into his account, but never 
41n the Topics (1.18.108bl0-2), Aristotle states that inductions are constructed from things 
known to be similar by analogy. This claim introduces a circularity into Aristotle's theory of 
induction in the sense that, having made analogy dependant on induction, he makes induction 
dependant on analogy. Perhaps he means to say only that analogies serve as heuristics in guiding 
us to proper, logical inductions. 
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incorporates them into his theory. 
1.4 Bacon 
Following Aristot le, many philosophers of the classical and medieval periods ex- 
amined analogy and analogical reasoning. The Stoic philosophers, for example, 
combined Aristotle's analogy and example under the rubric of analogy, thus giving 
that term roughly the connotation it has to this day (Hurlbutt, 1985, pp. 107-12). 
Medieval philosophers such as Aquinas made analogy a central issue in examining 
the relation between God and his creation (Hurlbutt, 1985, pp. 118-22; Ashworth, 
1992). But the current view of analogy in philosophy may be more directly traced 
to Bacon (1620). Bacon treated analogy largely for its contribution to scientific in- 
duction, and took a view contrary to that recommended by Aristotle. See (Keynes, 
1921, pp. 265-73) and (Leatherdale, 1974, pp. 4-8) for overviews of Bacon's theory 
of analogy. 
Bacon viewed the construction of general theories or 'axioms' as the ultimate 
goal of science. He proposed a specific method for fulfilling this goal. Axioms 
result from a careful process in which the natural philosopher collects aJl instances 
of some phenomenon into specific tables. The fist table receives all the known 
instances that share a particular attribute; this table is known as the table of 
essence and presence (2.11, Novurn Organum). The second table receives all the 
known instances that are identical to each instance in the f is t  table except that 
they luck the attribute in question; this table is known as the table of deviation or 
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absence in proximity (2.12, Novum O r g a n ~ r n ) . ~  When the tables are complete, the 
philosopher examines the first table to see what attributes distinguish its entries 
from those in the second table and infers as an axiom that these attributes are the 
cause of the difference. 
Of course, this procedure begs the question of how the philosopher may recognize 
that attributes are shared among instances in the first place in order to collect 
instances together correctly. Bacon claims that andogy is the basis or '%st stepn 
of this recognition of resemblance (2.27, Nowm O ~ ~ a n u r n ) : ~  
[Such analogies] are those which represent the resemblances and conj u- 
gations of things, not in lesser forms but merely in the concrete. Hence 
they may be called the first and lowest steps toward the union of nature. 
Men's labor therefore should be turned to the investigation and obser- 
vation of the resemblances and analogies of things, as well in wholes as 
in parts. For these it is that detect the unity of nature, and lay the 
foundation for the constitution of sciences. 
In other words, the recognition of resemblances or shared attributes follows from the 
construction of analogies, in Bacon's view. Once constructed, analogies become a 
basis for inductive inference in science. Bacon does not state exactly what he means 
SBacon also describes a table of degrees or comparison that receives all instances in which a 
attribute appears only to a certain degree (2.13, Novum Organum), but this may be omitted for 
present purposes. 
'All translations of the Nouum Organum in this chapter are taken fiom Spedding et al. (l863), 
unless otherwise indicated 
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by analogy, but his illustrations indicate that he has something like proportional 
analogies in mind. 
Bacon does address the issue of the legitimacy of analogies. He urges caution 
in using analogies and maintains that good analogies are those based on "physical 
resemblances, that is, real and substantial resemblances; resemblances grounded in 
nat we, not accidental or merely apparent" (2.27, Nouurn Organum). As examples 
he includes the similar shapes of Africa and South America, which are identical 
in the arrangement of wide and narrow parts, and the similarity of mathematical 
transitivity and the deductive syllogism, which are identical in having a middle 
term: 
a = b  All p are q 
b = c  - All q are r 
a = c  So, all p are r 
Bacon's reference to &real and substantial resemblances" hmdly clears up the issue 
of distinguishing good andogies from trivial ones since he does not state what "red 
and substantialn means in precise terms. He seems to hold that a well-educated 
person will simply know a good analogy when he or she sees one. Nevertheless, 
his statement shows, at least, that Bacon was concerned about the subject and 
recognized that analogies do not concern superficial similarities. 
Bacon provides no discussion of multiple analogies, but some do appear among 
the many colorful and thought-provoking comparisons that he presents in explaining 
his philosophical views. For example, Bacon uses a multiple analogy with light, 
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the letters of the alphabet, and plant seeds to address a potential objection to his 
program of painstaking experimentation in the pursuit of knowledge (1.121, Novum 
Organum): 
To suppose, therefore, that things like these [many, careful experiments] 
are of no use is the same as to suppose that light is of no use, because it 
is not a thing solid or material. And the truth is that the knowledge of 
simple natures well examined and defined is as light: it gives entrance 
to all the secrets of nature's workshop, and virtually includes and draws 
after it whole bands and troops of works, and opens to us the sources 
of the noblest axioms; and yet in itself it is of no great use. So also the 
letters of the alphabet in themselves and apart have no use or meaning, 
yet they are the subject matter for the composition and apparatus of 
all discourse. So again the seeds of things are of much latent virtue, 
and yet of no use except in their development. And the scattered rays 
of light itself, until they are made to converge, can impart none of their 
benefits. 
Bacon argues that, when taken together, detailed and painstaking experiments can 
be expected to yield weighty and fruitful results, just as light rays yield illumination 
when focussed, as letters form words when combined correctly, and as seeds become 
plants when combined with nutrients. 
Bacon's treatment of analogy represents a break with the tradition set by Plato 
and Aristotle. Indeed, Bacon saw Aristotle's logic as a baneful influence on nat- 
ural philosophy (1.54, 63, 96, Novum Organum) and set out himself to undo the 
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damage. He sought to redefine the concept of scientific induction and made anal- 
ogy a fundamental constituent of inductive inference. Specifically, Bacon insisted 
that analogy consists in two things sharing a particular, direct and non-accidental 
attribute, without reference to an inductive generalization. Thus, Bacon proposes 
what may be called a shared-attribute theory of analogy, one in which analogies are 
formed by direct comparison of the attributes of two things unmediated by a third 
item such as a form or an inductive generalization. Bacon does offer a solution to 
the problem of distinguishing good analogies from bad ones, but it seems to rely 
entirely on the observant character of the analogizer rather than any characteristic 
of the  analogy in question. There is no indication that Bacon ever contemplated 
multiple analogies and the appeal to obviousness in his theory of single malogies 
hardly allows for extrapolation to the multiple case. But, like Plato and Aristotle, 
he certainly made use of them. 
1.5 Mill 
Mill is the pivotal figure in the history of analogy in philosophy in the sense that 
it is Mill who transmitted a Baconian account of analogy to the modern tradition. 
North (1981, p. 123) states the situation very aptly: 
Mill was to the nineteenth century what Bacon had been to  the sev- 
enteent h, namely empiricist philosopher and self-appointed arbiter of 
scientific method. . . . Both Bacon and Mill paid attention to analogy, 
in their account of induction, and Mill's passage on the subject was 
especially iduential  in philosophical cirdes. 
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Mill's theory is so similar to Bacon's that Keynes (1921, pp. 265-73) treats both of 
them in t he  same pasage. Although Mill does not mention Bacon in his treatment 
of analogy per se, he does praise Bacon's theory of induction elsewhere (Mill, 1872, 
3.3 §2), so it is likely that he was influenced by Bacon's inductive account of analogy. 
Like Bacon, Mill rejects the Aristotlean theory of proportional analogy and instead 
assimilated analogy to induction. See North (1981, pp. 132-4) for a review of Mill's 
theory from the perspective of modem logic. 
Mill's treatment of analogy is given in book 3, chapter 20 of his System of logic 
(Mill, 1872). He begins by rejecting the proportional analogy apparently because 
he thinks that to point out that two things share one relation in common is merely 
peculiar and inconsequential (Mill, 1872,3.20 51). He proposes instead that analogy 
be based on the number of attributes or features that two things share in common 
(Mill, 1872, 3.20 52): 
Two things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain propo- 
sition is true of either one, therefore it is true of the other. 
In other words, Mill takes analogy to be the inference that some proposition rn (as 
he calls it) is true of item B because items A and B both have features f ,  and m 
is true of A. Mill's formula could be expressed as follows (see also North, 1981, 
p. 132): 
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As Mill points out, this formula covers induction, or Ucomplete induction" when 
the features f are invariably found in both A and B. Analogy is thus simply a 
special case of induction when such an invariable association is not known to hold. 
In this account, Mill codates analogical comparison with analogical inference, 
perhaps a necessary move since he eliminated strictly relational comparison from 
the start. In place of relational comparison as a means of legitimating analogical 
reasoning, Mill gives an analysis of what restrictions, when added to the above 
formula, might make an analogical inference more or less likely. First, Mill stipulates 
that there must be no known connection between f and m. If it is known that 
the presence of features f implies the truth of m, then we have an "invariable 
connection" and therefore a "complete induction" but not an analogy, by definition. 
If it is known that the presence of features f does not imply m, then the truth of 
m(A) must be considered a coincidence with respect to f (A). So the truth of m(B) 
would also most likely be a coincidence with respect to features f (B). Analogies 
based on known coincidences would hardly be convincing. 
Second, assuming the first condition is met, Mill holds that the probability 
that an analogy is robust is increased in proportion with the number of features f 
shared by A and B. Conversely, this probability is decreased in proportion with the 
number of features f not shared by A and B. Mill supports this idea by noting that 
features tend to be present in groups, so that the presence of one feature usually 
implies the presence of others in both A and B. Mill (1872, 3.20 53) adds that the  
similarity or dissimilarity of circumstances in which A and B display features f 
weighs similarly into the probability of an analogical inference. 
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Mill does consider the possibility tha t  we may have specific reasons (less cer- 
tain than has(A, f )  + m ( A ) )  to weight certain features more or less heavily in 
considering the plausibility of an analogy. In his example concerning the likelihood 
of life on the moon and planets based on analogy with the Earth, Mill says that 
the differences between Earth and the other orbs consist "chieflyn in their different 
amounts of light, heat, rotational velocity, density, and gravity; other dissimilar- 
ities are "secondary". Unfortunately, it is not clear how this primary/secondary 
distinction is to be made, nor how it fits into the rest of his theory. Mill's theory 
also implies that confidence in an analogy may be bolstered simply by adding to  
the list of shared features f ,  although this policy of indiscriminant addition hardly 
seems to be sound methodological advice for a practicing scientist. Of course, Mill 
(1872, 3.20 53) states that analogy should serve as a "mere guidepostn so that there 
may be no point in trying to bolster an analogy in the first place. But if analogical 
reasoning is worth doing at all, it is worth inquiring into how it may be done well 
and efficiently. 
Although Mill does note that analogies may suggest conflicting conclusions, he 
does not consider any case in which analogies might support each other's conclu- 
sions. But there is at least one example of a multiple analogy in his writings. 
Consider the following passage in which MilI (1893, 1.1 53) argues that i t  is non- 
sensical to say that some products are more the result of labor than nature, or vice 
versa: 
Some writers have raised the question, whether nature gives more assis- 
t ance to labour in one kind of industry or in mo t  her; and have said that 
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in some occupations labour does most, in others nature most. . . . It is 
impossible to decide that in any one thing nature does more than in any 
other. . . . When two conditions are equally necessary for producing the 
effect at all, it is unmeaning to say that so much of it is produced by 
one and so much by the other; it is like attempting to decide which half 
of a pair of scissors has most to do in the act of cutting; or which of the 
factors, five and six, contributes most to the production of thirty. 
In other words, no sort of priority can reasonably be assigned between two necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions, such as the contribution of nature and labor to 
manufacture, just as no such priority can be assigned to the work of each blade of 
a pair of scissors or each factor of an integer. It is not clear how Mill's theory of 
single analogies should be extended to cover this case. The same features f, two 
necessary and jointly sufficient factors, appear in both scissor and numeric source 
analogs. Should we simply count the features f twice and double the assurance we 
draw from the sources of Mill's analogy? If the same features appear in two analogs 
then, by Mill's logic, they probably appear in many more, which should increase 
the probability of the analogy. But this procedure does nothing to increase the 
number of distinct features in f ,  which was the measure of increased probability in 
the single-analogy case; it simply dows  us to count f several times. 
Like Bacon, Mill broke with the traditional, proportional analogy and instead 
treated analogy as a special case of inductive, scientific inference. Unlike Bacon, 
Mill gave analogy a strictly heuristic fuaction and did not see it as an important 
contributor to inductive inference. Mill proposed a version of the shared-attribute 
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theory of analogy by defining analogy as an inference licensed by a direct comparison 
of shared features. He set restrictions on analogy to help distinguish good ones 
from poor ones, but these involve only counting the number of similarities and 
dissimilarities, a crude and not always practical procedure. Mill did not consider 
multiple analogies in  his theory, nor is it clear how his theory should be extended 
to cover this case. But, like the other philosophers reviewed in this chapter, he did 
make use of multiple analogies on occasion. 
1.6 Shared-structure theory 
Two streams of thought on analogy are apparent in the twentieth century. The first 
st ream is the continuation of Mill's shared-at tribute theory. Mill's theory remains 
popular with many philosophers, particularly logicians and philosophers of science 
who take formal logic as the appropriate model of scientific inquiry. The theory 
of analogy given by Salmon (1984, p. 105), for example, is essentially identical to 
Mill's, Le., 
Objects of type X have properties G, H, etc. 
Objects of type Y have properties G, H, etc. 
Objects of type X have property F. 
SO, objects of type Y have property F. 
Obviously, this statement is very similar to that given by Mill as described in 
section 1.5. 
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The second stream of thought on analogy also derives from Mill's theory but 
combines it with concepts taken from mathematics, science, and artificial intelli- 
gence. The theory resulting from this stream of thought may be called the shared- 
structure theory. Shared-struture theories come in several varieties including the 
Multiconstraint theory, which is treated in some detail in section 2.2. On the shared- 
structure theory, an analogy consists in two analogs that share not attributes (or 
not merely attributes) but also relations and relations among relations. The nature 
of this theory may be clarified by selectively reviewing how thinking on analogy 
has been influenced by ideas from mat hernat ics, science, and artificial intelligence 
over the course of this century. 
Keynes (1921) gave a treatment of analogy which may be treated as a clarifica- 
tion of Mill's. Keynes (1921, p. 223) states that two objects are analogous insofar 
as the same proposition concerning their attributes is true of both of them. Keynes 
makes two innovations important to the later development of shared-structure the- 
ory. First, he introduces a mathematical notation, g ( 4 ,  f ), to represent the propo- 
sition that holds true of both objects, where g is a relation between attributes # 
and f that both objects possess. Second, Keynes (1921, pp. 257-60) discusses the 
importance of cause and effect relations in justifying the conclusion of a material 
analogy-that is, an analogy between physical objects or states of affairs. In the 
material world, a small number of causal laws s&ce to relate a large number diverse 
attributes. Thus, analogies based on a shared causal relation may be asserted with 
some confidence because there are so few alternative causal relations that might be 
present, and these may be eliminated by other considerations. For example, Keynes 
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(1921, pp. 257-8) claims that we may confidently believe the proposition that the 
overt acts of other people are caused by mental states that belong to them by and- 
ogy with our observation that our own overt acts are caused by nothing other than 
mental states that belong to us. In other words, we infer that other people must 
have mental states like ours because we cannot imagine what else would cause them 
to act so much like we do. 
Keynes was primarily interested in estimating the likelihood of conclusions de- 
rived by analogy. Thus he introduced causality not because of its importance for 
organizing other concepts but because its mere presence serves to  increase likeli- 
hood. Hesse (1966) takes up and improves Keynes theory of material analogy by 
revising his treatment of causality in two ways. First, she allows for analogies be- 
tween objects that share several distinct causal relations and not just one. Second, 
Hesse (1966, pp. 77-86) argues that causal relations are important because of their 
predictive power, not because of their small number. If we know that a causes b in 
one domain and that c exists in another domain, then we may be lead to predict 
a d  look for d such that c causes d (Hesse, 1966, pp. 72-4). In effect, causal rela- 
tions play a special role in prompting us to fill out analogies completely, especially 
in scientific research. Hesse notes that in some cases, the presence of shared causal 
relations is sufficient to warrant an analogy-that is, similarity of attributes is not 
necessary. 
Polya (1954, 1957) gives the first dear statement of a shared-structure theory 
of analogy (Polya, 1954, p. 13): "two systems are analogous, if they agree in clearly 
definable relations of their respective parts." There are two important points to 
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note about this definition. First, analogy here depends on the sharing of several 
relations rather than a single relation as in Keynes's theory. Second, on this view, 
analogy consists entirely in similarity or agreement of relations and not on simi- 
larity of parts of relations, meaning attributes, as on Mill's view. Overall, Polya's 
theory appears to be a mathematical adaptation of the Aristotelean proportional 
analogy, which Polya (1954, p. 14) also discusses. The influence of the proportional 
theory is also evident in Polya's (1957, p. 37) description of what it means for two 
relations to "agreen with each other: "we may contract the two . . . statements 
into one that applies equally to both [systems]." Thus, the sharing of relations 
is seen as equivalent to having both systems governed by the same generalization, 
as in Aristotle's theory (section 1.3). However, Polya also appears to have been 
influenced, perhaps indirectly, by Mill. This influence can be seen in his charac- 
terization of analogical inference concerning two geometrical figures (Polya, 1957, 
p. 43): "Knowing that the triangle and the tetrahedron are alike in many respects, 
we conjecture that they are alike in one more respect." 
Polya's theory is of interest here largely because it was an important influence on 
Evans's ANALOGY program, the first computational model of analogy (see Hd, 
1989). Evans (1968) applied Polya's ideas about analogy to the construction of a 
computer program that solved geometric analogy problems of the kind commonly 
found in IQ tests. ANALOGY was given eight geometric figures, A, B, C, and 
1 through 5, and required to determine which of 1 through 5 best completed the 
proportional analogy A : B :: C :?. The program would generate a representation 
of each figure in terms of spatial relations, e.g., inside (PI, P2) to signify that object 
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P1 sits inside object P2. Then, it would generate several rules that would transform 
figure A into B and C into each of 1 through 5. Finally, it calculated the length of 
each rule and picked the figure contained within the longest rule as the best answer. 
The longest rule is favored because it tends to be the most specific rule applicable to 
the problem at hand, and because this preference best matches human performance 
on similar problems. Evans's work is important because it was the first attempt to 
apply artificial intelligence techniques to the problem of analogical thinking. These 
techniques include a rich and concise set of relational representations, i.e., spatial 
representations, and the notion that some rules, i. e., the longest ones, may be more 
important than others in constructing good analogies. 
Winston (1980) applies artificial intelligence techniques to linguistic forms of 
analogical reasoning and learning. He emphasized the importance of matching 
concepts toget her and of abstract information, especially causal information, in 
analogy construction and evaluation. Matching means that the components from 
each of two analogs should merely be aligned into pain, and not that they should be 
subsumed or subsumable under a single generalization. This constraint is a basic 
tenet of any shared-structure theory. Winston also emphasized the contribution 
of causal relations in the following two ways. First, Winston's program awarded 
points to analogies in proportion to the number of shared relations. Since he was 
interested in constructing analogies between story plots, and since causal relations 
occur frequently in story plots, shared causal relations contributed to the score of 
an analogy by sheer weight of numbers. In this sense, Winston's program behaved 
much like Evans's ANALOGY program in prefering structurally rich analogies to 
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structurally poor ones. Second, Winston (1980, pp. 695, 700) states that causal 
relations are instrinsicdy important and that knowledge of causal relations in one 
analog can guide the  process of matching its components with those of another 
analog. His program therefore gave analogies containing matching causal relations 
an extra, bonus score for each such relation. Winston's point here is similar to 
that made by Hesse concerning the utility of causal relations in guiding analogy 
construction, although Winston was apparently unaware of Hesse's work. 
Gentner (1981, 1983), following up on the work of Polya, Hease, and Winston, 
proposed the structure mapping theory, which may be fairly described as the first, 
clearly stated version of a shared-structure theory of analogy. The theory states that 
an analogy between A and B is a set of mappings between the two sets of predicates 
that represent A and B (Gentner, 1983, pp. 157-8). Mappings correspond to the 
matchings described by Winston, but are subject to the following three rules: 
1. Mappings between at tributes are largely or completely ignored; 
2. Mappings between relations, e.g., R(ao, at) to R(bo, b l ) ,  are emphasized where 
3. they enter into systems of relations, e.g., Rt(Rao, &I) to Rf(&, &I)-  
The third rule is called the systematicity principle and stipulates that analogies are 
good analogies insofar as they contain mappings between richly structured, higher- 
order relations. Higher-order relations are often, though not invariably, causal 
ones. Psychological experiments indicate that people End such analogies more 
apt or convincing than analogies which lack mappings between higher-order pred- 
icates (Gentner, 1983, pp. 165-6). The systematicity principle embodies the use 
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of predicate-and-argument syntax in representing the structure of analogical m a p  
pings. Some version of the systematicity principle figures in d l  shared-structure 
theories, including the Multiconstraint theory. 
Polya (1957, pp. 43-4), alone among the above authors, discusses multiple a n a h  
gies. Polya states that multiple analogs may be used to strengthen a comparison 
or to generalize it. Generalization, which Polya holds to be the more important of 
these two uses, amounts to assembling source analogs that are fairly different from 
each other and therefore agree, when they do agree, in broader or more abstract 
relations than would apply to the single analogy case. Such abstract relations may 
then suggest general theorems about the objects to which they apply. It is interest- 
ing to contrast this view with that of Evans, who followed Polya's ideas on analogy, 
at least regarding single analogies. According to Evans, constructing the best sin- 
gle analogy depends upon finding the most specific relation that holds between the 
analogs. But, according to Polya (1957), constructing the best multiple analogy 
depends upon finding the most general relation that holds among the analogs. This 
apparent difference in objectives between single and multiple andogies suggests ei- 
ther that the two kinds of analogy are really very different, or that these notions of 
the purpose of analogies, single and multiple, are oversimplified. One of the major 
aims of this dissertation is to examine the influence of purpose on the nature of 
mu1 tiple analogies in the context of a shared-st ruct ure theory. 
CHAPTER I .  MULTIPLE ANALOGIES PAST A N D  PRESENT 
Summary 
Of the many aspects of analogical reasoning that might be addressed, philosophers 
and other researchers have focussed largely upon single analogies and epistemic 
aspects of single analogies that legitimate analogical inferences. Three sorts of 
solutions me proposed. First was the shared-abstraction theory, elaborated by 
Plato and Aristotle, in which a comparison is licensed not directly by the analogs 
involved but by an idea or generalization that is true of both of them. Second was 
the shared-attribute theory, developed by Bacon and Mill, in which a comparison 
is licensed directly by consideration of the two analogs in question. Third is the 
shared-structure theory which has emerged from the consideration of analogies in 
the empirical and formal sciences. 
Several of the issues connected with analogical reasoning that were raised in 
section 1.1 are not addressed in the theories discussed above. One of these issues is 
the nature of multiple analogies, analogies involving several source analogs. There 
is Little indication that the philosophers and researchers whose work has been out- 
lined above considered this issue, although mmy of them did use multiple analogies 
on occasion. We can only speculate about the reason for this omission, but we can 
do something about it. The remainder of this dissertation constitutes an inquiry 
into multiple analogies from a philosophical and cognitive standpoint. The purpose 
of this exercise is to give a reasonably comprehensive account of multiple anal* 
gies by adapting a current theory of analogy, the Multiconstraint theory, to the 
needs inferred from an examination of many instances of multiple analogies drawn 
from the history of biology, archaeology, and philosophy. The result is, at last, a 
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philosophical theory of analogy in which the use of multiple analogies is given due 
considerat ion. 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation provide the following material: 
Chapter 2 gives a description of the Multiconstraint theory in the case of single 
analogies and extends it to a multiple analogy concerning Coelacanths taken 
from the biological literature; 
Chapter 3 follows up this material with an examination of multiple analogies in 
theories of the evolution of horned dinosaurs and birds, and gives a discussion 
of what this work shows about the place of malogy in evolutionary biology; 
Chapter 4 provides an examination of several multiple analogies from the a r c h e  
ologicd literature, along with a discussion of the implications of this work for 
archaeologists concerned with the role of analogy in their field; 
Chapter 5 presents an account of multiple analogies from Plato's Republic, in 
which multiple analogies figure prominently, and further explore's Plato's 
attitude towards them; 
Chapter 6 unifies the cognitive aspects of this research in the form of a cognitive 
model of multiple snalogies, and summarizes the insights gained into the phi- 
losophy of evolutionary biology and archaeology, and into Plato's philosophy 
as well. 
Chapter 2 
Multiple analogies in Coelacant h 
biology 
All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of analogy, which 
leads us to  expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result 
from similar causes. . . . The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are, 
by this species of reasoning, extended to a l l  animals; and it is certain, that when the 
circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as 
a frog, or fish, it forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all. 
Hume, Enquiry concerning the human understanding, 3 9. 
2.1 Analogies in science 
Analogies play a vital role in many sciences. The importance of analogy to sci- 
entific discovery and explanation in particular has been the subject of extensive 
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philosophical and historical research. For example, consider the discovery of the 
circulation of the blood by Harvey (1628). Prior to Harvey's work, it was thought, 
following Galen, that the blood distributed through the arteries was consumed by 
the body and that the blood collected in the veins was produced by the liver from 
fluids taken into the body by eating and drinking (Pagel, 1967, pp. 127-8). Harvey 
argued, based on his observations of the heart and blood vessals in action, that the 
blood found in the veins was exactly the blood found in the arteries, only depleted of 
nutrients. Harvey describes his discovery as follows (translation from Whitteridge, 
1976, p. 75): 
I began to bethink myself whether it [the blood] might not have a kind 
of movement as it were in a circle. And this I afterwards found to be 
true. , . . 
We may call this motion circular in the same way in which Aristotle 
says that the air and the rain imitate the circular motion of the heavens. 
For the earth being wet evaporates by the heat of the sun; the vapoun 
being drawn upwards condense and being condensed descend again in 
raindrops and wet the e&h. 
Harvey continues on to  compare the circulation of the blood with the circular 
movement of the sun around the earth. From this statement, it appears that the 
analogy between the circulation of the two fluids, namely blood in the body and 
water in the atmosphere, helped Harvey to construct and pursue his new hypothesis 
(see Pagel, 1967, pp. 82-6). Harvey's theory was successll, despite the fact that 
the capillaries connecting the arteries to the veins were not described until 1661 by 
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Warcello Malpighi. 
In archaeology, ethnographic analogies played an import ant role as evidence 
for the human origin of prehistoric artifacts. Until the late seventeenth century, 
prehistoric stone tools were typically classified as fossils and thought to be the result 
of natural processes in the earth, or to have fallen from the sky just as meteorites 
were known to do (Grayson, 1983, p. 5). But, as scholars began to question the 
accepted view of fossils, they began to compare these stone tools with those that 
they found in use among contemporary natives of the Americas. Many scholars 
concluded that Europe had once been populated by peoples who had little or no 
knowledge of metallurgy and made their tools from stone just as the Indians did. 
For example, in 1686 the British antiquarian Robert Plot noted that theories about 
the stone tools manufactured by ancient Britons could be constructed through 
comparison with the stone tools then manufactured by the North American Indians 
(Trigger, 1989, pp. 52-3). The realization that stone could be the basis of a whole 
technology eventually lead to the concept of a stone age, in distinction to a bronze 
age and an iron age, for example (Trigger, 1989, pp. 54-5). 
Around 1838, Dannrin derived the basic concept of the struggle for existence from 
reading Malthus's book An essay on the principles o j  population (1816). Malthus 
noted that human populations grow at an exponential rate, whereas their food and 
other resources grow at only an arithmetic rate, implying that many more humans 
are born than could possibly survive to reproduce. Thus, humans must struggle 
for resources in order to live long enough to have and raise children. Similarly, 
Darwin realized, many more plants and animals are born than their environment 
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can support, so that they must also be engaged in a struggle for resources in order 
to live long enough to produce offspring (see Gould, 1993, pp. 301-2). From this 
analogy, Darwin obtained his idea of the struggle for existence in the biological 
world. 
The importance of single andogies in science demands careful scrutiny and a 
precise and comprehensive form of representation, one which may then be extended 
to the representation of multiple analogies. The purpose of this chapter is to in- 
troduce the Multiconstraint theory as the representation of single analogies and to 
begin applying and extending it to multiple analogies, specifically multiple anal* 
gies occurring in the biological literature on the "living fossiln Coelacanth. To this 
end, the remainder of this chapter presents the following material: 
Section 2.2 introduces the Multiconstraint theory and its account of single analo- 
gies in terms of constraints on the analogical-mapping process; 
Section 2.3 discusses the use of analogy as a technical te rm in evolutionary biol- 
ogy; 
Sect ion 2.4 examines multiple analogies used by biologists in constructing and 
debating theories about the Coelacanth, a rare and inaccessible fish once 
thought to be extinct, and shows how the Multiconstraint theory may be 
used to represent these analogies; 
Section 2.5 reviews the issues that arise from this examination for the Multicon- 
straint theory, C e., the cognitive processes through which multiple analogies 
are constructed and used. 
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The sect ions indicate the importance of multiple analogies to the practise of biology, 
and also indicate how the Mufticonstraint theory must be reconsidered in the light 
of this practise. 
2.2 Single analogies in the Multiconst~aint heory 
A single analogy is a structured comparison between a target and exactly one source. 
Single analogies are the subject of most theories of analogy (see chapter I), including 
the familiar theory of proportional analogy as described by Aristotle (section 1.3). 
A proportional analogy consists of four parts, divided into a source and a target, 
which share an identical relation. The proportional analogy may be summarized in 
the form A:B::C:D, where A and B are the source objects, C and D are the target 
objects, the ":" represents the relation between each pair, and the '::" represents 
the distinction between the source on the left and the target on the right. 
Consider, for example, an analogy given in Plato's dialog The Laws (9.853~-d) 
by the Athenian Stranger. The Athenian feels compelled to apologize for proposing 
to legislate harsh punishments in his hypothetical city, since he holds that the 
citizens of a truly well-governed city would not need the correction of punishment 
to act properly. But, as the Athenian sagely points out, any collection of mere 
mortals will contain some who will require punishment in order to keep them in 
line (translation from Pangle, 1980): 
We're humans, and legislating now for the seed of humans. Therefore, 
there is no blame incurred by our fearing lest one of our citizens be- 
come, as it were, "hornstruckn [ke~asbolos]--so tough by nature that he 
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wouldn't melt. Just as those seeds are unmelted by fire, so these men 
are unmelted by strong laws. 
As Pangle (1980, p. 245n3) notes, the term kerasbolos is applied to beans that are so 
dried out and hard that they would not soften (or &meltn) even when boiled over a 
fire. The Athenian stranger is comparing some recalcitrant man among the citizens 
of the hypothetical city with such a bean. In proportional notation, the analogy 
could be represented as follows: hard-bean:boiling-water::some-marxstrong-laws. 
The analogy does its work by transferring the relation unmelted-by (represented by 
the ":") from the bean domain to the civic domain. The result, if we understand 
unmelted-by as undeterred-by when applied to humans, is support for the propo- 
sition that some men will be undeterred by strong laws, i e . ,  the mere threat of 
legal sanction. This proposition then serves as justification for carrying out harsh 
penalties, in order to teach those men that lawbreaking does not pay. 
But analogies may be more sophisticated, containing more structure and nu- 
ance than those easily represented in proportional notation. Analogies are not 
restricted to four objects A, 8, C, and D. Neither do the relations present in an 
analogy, represented by the &:", need to be identical. 'In the bean/man example, 
Plato pretends that the relation unmelted-by is identical in both plant and human 
domains, even though unmelted-by cannot literally be applied to the human target. 
What he really means, as noted above, is the relation undeterred-by. The relation 
in the source is instead a metaphor for the relation in the target. Also, analogies 
may include not only the relations among basic objects, but also the reasons why 
those relations hold true. In the Republic (6.491d-2a), for example, Socrates gives 
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Source 
hard- bean 
Table 2.1: A representation of the proportional analogy UJust as those seeds are 




unmelted-by (hard-bean, boiling-water) 
a similar plant/human analogy, saying that a poor education may stunt the ethical 
development of a citizen just as poor gardening may stunt the growth of a plant. In 
fact, he explains that poor gardening is the cause of poor growth in plants since the 
needs of the plants are not met, implying that a similar causal relation between lack 
of education and inadequate ethical development holds in citizens. Thus, Soaates 
tells us not only that a relation holds in both domains, but also why that relation 
holds in both domains. There is no way of representing both lower- and higher- 
ievel relations in one analogy using the proportional notation. The Multiconstraint 
theory (MT) of Holyoak and Thagard (1995) addresses these and other issues based 
strong-laws 
undeterred-by (someman,st rong-laws) 
on studies and computational models of human cognition. In the MT, there is no 
restriction on the number of items involved in analogical comparisons, nor on the 
relations among them. In fact, the inclusion of higher-level relations is of central 
importance to the theory. 
In the MT, an analogy may be thought of as an alignment of two conceptual 
structures in a table of predicates of increasing abstractness. Consider for a moment 
the MT representation of the proportional, bean/rnan analogy as given in table 2.1. 
Each row in the  table represents a mapping between the source and the target. The 
rows in the uppermost box (underneath the titles) identify the attribute mappings- 
that is, mappings between the basic features of source and target. So the hard-bean 
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in the source domain corresponds to some-man in the target. The row in the next 
box underneath identifies the relational mapping-that is, the mapping between 
relations that hold true under each domain. So the predicate unmelted-by in the 
source domain, which may be read as  "a hard-bean is unmelted by boiling watern, 
corresponds to the predicate undeterred-by, "some man is undeterred by strong 
laws", in the target domain. 
For a more sophisticated example, consider the analogy that Darwin (1859) 
constructed between natural select ion on the one hand and domestic selection on 
the other hand (Darden, 1983, pp. 152-6, Millman and Smith, 1997). Darwin 
considered the similarities between the breeding of domestic animals and plants and 
the speciatiod of wild animals and plants and used the comparison to help construct 
the concept of natural selection. The pigeon breeder, for instance, takes advantage 
of the inherent variability in his birds to choose and promote desirable features. 
Nature, Darwin claimed, distinguishes variations in wild animals similarly in terms 
of their competitive fitness with the result that the best ones are selected (Gould, 
1993, pp. 355-9). Just as the choosiness of the breeder would lead to new breeds, 
the selectiveness of nature would lead to new species. To a first approximation, this 
analogy may be captured as in table 2.2 (see Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, p. 191). 
In addition to having attribute and relational mappings of the type discussed 
above, this analogy provides a third set of mappings given in the rows of the lowest 
box of table 2.2. These rows identify the system mappings-that is, mappings be- 
tween t he systemic properties in each conceptual structure. The system predicates 
in each domain give an explanation of how their respective relational predicates fit 
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select ( nat ure,old-species) 
I in-order-that (choose,improve-upon) 11 because(fit ter-t han,select ) I 
improve-upon (new- breeds,old-breeds) 
caused(c hoose,descend-fromd) 
ppppp - - - -  
Table 2.2: A representation of Darwin's analogy bet ween domestic selection and 
natural selection. Subscripts distinguish different instantiations of identical predi- 
cates. 
fit ter-t han(new-species,old-species) 
cause, (select ,descend- from,) 
together. The system predicates in the source domain, for example, tell us that 
the cause of the descent of new breeds from old ones is the action of choosing im- 
posed on the old breeds by the breeder (caused), and that the breeder does this 
choosing in order that the new breeds represent an improvement upon the old ones 
(in-order-that). In other words, the system predicates outline the plan of action 
that the breeder carries out (consciously or not) in the course of animal husbandry. 
The system predicates in the target domain tell a similar story. The cause of 
the descent of new species from old ones is the action of select ion imposed on the 
old species by nature (cause,). The new species are also fitter than the old ones 
as a result of this selection process (because). These predicates do not describe a 
plan, as in the domestic choice domain, but rather an erplanation of how new and 
fit species replace their predecessors. In other words, although nature is mapped 
to breeder, no volition or intention is ascribed to it; nature is similar to breeder as 
a metaphor only.' 
At least, this distinction between intentional choice exercised by breeders and unintentional 
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Although it is not perfect, Darwin's analogy is quite reasonable. On the MT, 
the coherence of an analogy is measured in accord with the following three criteria 
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, pp. 2.2-38): 
1. S t ~ c t u r a l  consistency: The extent to which the analogy constitutes an is* 
morphism; 
2. Semantic similarity: The extent to which mappings connect elements that are 
perceptually or semantically similar to each other; 
3. Purpose: The extent to which information built up  in the target conceptual 
structure contributes to the solution of the problem at hand. 
The constraint of structural consistency derives from Gentner's systematicity prin- 
ciple (see section 1.6) and concerns the syntax of the predicates in the analogical 
mappings. It means that, ideally, (i) each predicate in the source is mapped to a 
unique predicate in the target and vice versa, and that (ii) when two predicates 
are mapped, their respective arguments, if any, are also mapped. These constraints 
are treated as sop constraints-that is, their satisfaction is encouraged but not 
absolutely required. When both criteria are completely satisfied, the analogy is a 
structurd isomorphism. 
Darwin's analogy obeys this criterion reasonably well; (i) each predicate is 
mapped to  exactly one other predicate. The final mapping in table 2.2, how- 
ever, violates condition (ii). Neither the pair of first arguments, namely choose and 
selection exercised by nature appezrrs to have been a fundamental step in Darwin's development 
of his theory of evolution (Millman and Smith, 1997, p. 183)- As Randy Harris points out @em 
comm.), Darwin increasingly encowaged an intentional interpretation of natural selection in re- 
visions of the Origins, apparently to court a Natural Theological interpretation of evolution. 
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flter-than, nor the pair of second arguments, namely improve-upon and select, are 
themselves given as mappings elsewhere in the analogy. Rather, choose is mapped 
to select and jitter-than is mapped to improve-upon at  the relational level. In the 
MT, this violation counts against the coherence of the analogy as a whole, but the 
problem belongs more with the  MT than with Darwin's analogy. The predicates 
in-order-that and because both relate an antecedent condition to a consequent one, 
but simply arrange those arguments in the opposite order from each other. In 
the case of in-order-that, the antecedent is the first argument and the consequent 
is the second argument. The order is reversed in the case of because. Part ii of 
this constraint could be generalized as follows: When two predicates are mapped, 
their arguments which occupy corresponding roles are also mapped. With this more 
general statement of structural consistency, this final mapping in Dannrin's analogy 
would be completely acceptable since the antecedent and consequent conditions of 
each predicate do correspond appropriately. Darwin's analogy, as represented in 
table 2.2, meets this extended version of the constraint of structural consistency. 
Like structural similarity, the constraint of similarity is a soft one, meaning 
that dissimilar elements may be mapped together if necessary, especially if struc- 
tural consistency is strong. Darwin's analogy meets the constraint of semantic 
similarity reasonably well. Each mapping pairs predicates of identical or similar 
meaning. The predicates choose and select are very close semantically, although 
Darwin was fairly careful to distinguish the artificial (source) and natural (target) 
domains by restricting the word "choice" to the former and Uselection" to the latter. 
Later, Darwin (1871, p. 916) noted that sexual selection, especially sexual selection 
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resulting from struggles between individuals of the same sex to be chosen as mates 
by individuals of the opposite sex, is even more closely analogous to artificial se- 
lection, apparently because both of these cases involve the actual exercise of choice 
(see also Millman and Smith, 1997, p. 176). In other words, sexual and artificial 
select ion are more strongly analogous than natural and artificial select ion because 
the former two domains involve a mapping between predicates of greater semantic 
similarity. 
The analogy also fulfills its purpose since the target conceptual structure pro- 
vides a powerful explanatory device for evolutionary theory. With the concepts of 
descent and fitness as supported by the analogy, the theory of natural selection can 
explain the similarities and differences among species in terms of descent with mod- 
ification, where particular modifications are imposed by selection pressures origi- 
nating with the struggle for existence. The explanation primarily consists in the 
system mappings of Darwin's analogy, which clarify why new species might evolve. 
The fulfillment of the purpose of an analogy typically depends on the predicates 
contained in its system mappings (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, pp. 34-7). Once 
constructed, the target conceptual structure concerning natural selection can be 
explored and refined on its own, as Darwin and subsequent evolutionists proceeded 
to do. 
The MT may be called a shared-structure theory since it takes analogy to  con- 
sist in a direct comparison of two conceptual structures, and the coherence of the 
analogy depends upon the properties of the structure shared by each analog (see 
sect ion 1.6). Also, the constraints of structural consistency, semantic similarity, 
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and purpose are soft constraints, that is, analogies need not satisfy all of these 
constraints perfectly, especially if relaxing the satisfaction of one constraint to a 
certain degree permits the analogy to better satisfy another constraint. However, 
the coherence of an analogy is also a holistic property of the context in which the 
analogy occurs (Thagard and Shelley, ip). In other words, aaalogies are judged 
good or bad not only by the structure shared by the  analogical mappings them- 
selves but also by how well they fit with other things that are known or believed 
by the analogizer. This connectedness of analogies and their contexts is especially 
apparent in the constraint of purpose, which covers the contribution that analogies 
might make to someone's overall cognitive or epistemic goals. Thus, in the MT, 
the legitimacy of an analogy depends on both its intrinsic properties and how well 
it relates to extrinsic information. 
To date, the MT has been applied to single analogies because it has generally 
been applied to problems whose purpose may be satisfied by use of a single source 
analog. However, some situations call for the use of several source analogs to meet 
the purposes of the analogizer. These multiple analogies and the purposes they serve 
need to be considered. Section 2.4 moves us in that direction, by an examination 
of multiple analogies concerning the Coelacanth. 
2.3 Analogies in evolutionary biology 
Before embarking on an inquiry into multiple analogies in Coelacanth biology, i t  
is necessary for the sake of clarity to make some remarks on the standing use of 
analogy as a technical term in evolutionary biology itself. Similar characteristics 
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in two given organisms are said to be analogous where they are the result only of 
similar selection pressures. For example, the aquiline shape of fish and whales are 
analogous characteristics because they are similar in form and are both the result 
only of similar forces of natural selection-that is, natural selection for locomotion 
through water. The emergence of analogous characteristics is often referred to as 
convergent evolution. 
However, organisms may also share similar characteristics due to inheritance 
From a common ancestor. Such characteristics are said to be homologous. For 
example, the opposable thumbs of humans and apes are homologous characteris- 
tics because humans and apes retained them from a common ancestor that had . 
opposable thumbs. Homologous characteristics are often referred to as examples 
of patallel evolution. For present purposes, homology may be taken simply to 
designate characteristics shared by common descent, whereas analogy designates 
non-hornologous characteristics shared by response to similar select ion pressures.2 
In this technical sense, analogies in evolutionary biology generally indicate sim- 
ilar adapt at ions. Constructing analogies among living organisms is not so impor- 
tant since evidence concerning their adaptations is obtainable through observation 
in v i v a  [n the  case of organisms that are extinct or otherwise difficult to observe 
at first hand, analogy construction becomes very important. Indeed, andogies are 
often the primary source of insight into the lives and adaptations of such species. 
Explanations of the adaptations of rare or extinct organisms, therefore, provide ex- 
- - 
20n  the history of the onalogy/homology distinction, see (Kitcher, 1993, pp. 14-5) and (Bowler, 
1996, pp. 46ff). Although the distinction is conceptudy useful, it is often difficult in practice to 
distinguish the relative contributions of inheritance and convergence to the similarity of any two 
characteristics (Lauder, 1986; Zuckerkand, 1994). But this difliculty may be ignored here. 
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cellent examples of analogical reasoning in both the biological and cognitive senses. 
The Coelacanth is an instance of just such a rare organism whose attributes scien- 
t is ts have explained using multiple analogies. 
2.4 Coelacanth: The living fossil 
First described by Agassiz in 1836, species of the order Coelacanth (technically 
Coelacanthini) flourished from roughly 375 million years ago until 80 million years 
ago, and were thought to have gone extinct with the dinosaurs (Thornson, 1991, 
p. 75). The discovery of a modern Coelacanth, Latimeria chalumnae, off South 
Africa in 1938 and then a population off the Comores Islands in 1952 created 
a worldwide sensation in "the fish that time forgot" (Smith, 1957)? The close 
relationship of the Coelacant h to primitive land vertebrates makes it important 
for evolutionary studies (Gorr and Kleinschmidt, 1993). The rarity and obscurity 
of Latimeria poses many biological questions, including where does it live? and 
how does it reproduce? The uses of multiple analogies to answer these questions is 
discussed in this section. 
The first question concerns the home range of Latimeria, Ce., the depth at 
which it Lives. The Coelacanths caught off the Comores have all been taken by 
native fishermen using long lines dropped from drifiing canoes. It is difficult to 
know exactly how deep the lines drop (Smith, 1957, p. 242) and the lines are of 
a uniform length and therefore sample only one stratum of ocean water. So the 
1998, a population of Coelacanths were found in Indonesia (Erdmann et d., 1998), but 
that population has yet to be studied closely. 
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fact that all Coelacanths are caught at that stratum does not answer the question 
(Thornson, 1991, p. 136). Comparative studies of Coelacanth eyes and body oils do, 
however, provide an answer. Analysis of the pigment in the rod cells of Latimen'a 
eyes shows that they best absorb light at a wavelength of 473nm (Locket, 1980, 
p. 289). This wavelength is very close to that best absorbed by the eyes of the deep 
sea shark Centroscymnus (472nm) and the "oil fishn Ruvettvs (474nrn). These 
wavelengths correspond to the light that furthest penetrates oceanic water (470- 
476nm), which indicates that d l  three fish are adapted to see in the same deep 
stratum. Since Centroscymnus and Ruvettvs both live roughly 200 to 300m deep, 
then Latimeria mostly likely does as well. This analogy may be represented as in 
table 2.3. 
Note that the mere similarity among wavelengths does not warrant the conclu- 
sion that Coelacanths live in deep ocean water. Without the system mapping adapt, 
& adapt, to a d a p b ,  the relational mapping inhabit, 9c inhabit, to inhabitc would 
not fulfill its purpose. That is, if pigment absorbency were randomly distributed 
over depths of habitation rather than being an adaptation in accordance with evo- 
lutionary theory, then no conclusion about depth of habitation of the Coelacanth 
could be supported by this evidence. 
This multiple analogy is corroborated by another one, involving the bodily oils 
and fats in Lotimeria's body. In their study of Coelacanth biochemistry, Nevenzel 
et al. (1966) show how the concentration of oils and fats in this  fish is analogous to 
that of other fish which live in deep ocean water (200 to 300m). This concentration 
of oils and fats constitutes an adaptation for neutral buoyancy at  those depths. 
Centroscymnus 1 Ruvettus 
Cent roscymnus I Ruvettus 
rod-pigment, I rod- pigment , deep-ocean-w ater, deep-ocean-w ater, 







penetrater(474nm- 1 ,d-o-w,) 




enable, (have,,see-in, ) 
Table 2.3: A multiple analogy of Centroscyrnnus and Ruuettus with Latimeria regarding eye pigmentation as 
because,(absorb,,penetrate,) 
adapt,(seein,,inhabit,) 
an adaptation to seeing in deep ocean water. 
b 
because, (absorb, ,penetrate,) 
adapt, (see-in,,inhabi t,) 
becausec (absorbc ,~enet  ratec) 
adaptc(see-jnc,inhabi t c )  
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Neutral buoyancy for some depth means that the fish can float Freely there without 
having to expend energy to avoid sinking deeper or rising upwards (Thornson, 
1991, p. 140). Both Centroscyrnnw and Ruuettus have oils and fats that adapt 
them for deep ocean water, so another multiple analogy holds between these fish 
and Lotimeria, and could be represented much as in table 2.3 with oils-and-fats 
and neutrally-buoyant-in substituted for rod-pigment and see-in, respectively. The 
hypothesis supported by these t w o  analogies has recently been confirmed by direct 
observation of living Coelacanths from submersibles (Fricke and Hissman, 1994); 
they do indeed spend their time at roughly 250m depth. 
The second question regarding Coelacanth reproductive biology has also been 
addressed by multiple analogies. This case is of special interest because evidence 
from multiple analogies has conflicted with evidence derived from homology. As 
noted above (section 2.3), homology concerns the pattern of descent of an organ- 
ism, its Ufarnily tree" as it were, and how an organism possesses characteristics by 
virtue of its genetic inheritance. Given that one organism possesses a particular 
characteristic, and in the absence of contradictory information, a biologist may 
conclude that other organisms sharing a common ancestor with it will also possess 
that characteristic. 
Watson (1927) described a f'sil of the extinct Coelacanth h d i n a  that con- 
tained two immature Undina in the rear of its abdominal cavity. Given the position, 
good condition, and similar orientation of the two immature fish, Watson argued 
that they were not prey located in the stomach but rather young Coelacanths ma- 
t wing in t heir mother's reproductive tract. He concluded that Coelacant hs are 
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Ur-Coelacanth 
Rhabdoderma 
Figure 2.1: A rough phylogeny of Coelacanth species. The solid arrows indicate 
the homological explanation of Latimeria reproductive biology as inheri tame (and 
conservation) of reproductive strategy from a hypothetical common ancestor labeled 
"Ur-Coelacanth." The analogy with the shark Hezanchus is indicated by the dashed 
mow. 
uiviporous, giving birth to live young. By homology (see figure 2.1), Latimeria 
should also be viviparous. But viviparity generally implies internal fertilization- 
that is, penetration of the female by the male sex organ-and Latimeria males do 
not appear to possess the proper equipment. 
Schultze (1972) described fossils of two immaturespecimens of the extinct Coela- 
canth Rhabdoderma with clear traces of yolk sacs attached to them. Since these 
specimens were not found in the body cavity of a mature fish, i t  seemed likely 
that they were free-swimming. Freeswimming hatchlings with yolk-sacs imply 
that Rhabdodema was oviparous, laying eggs that later hatch into fry and enjoy 
parental protection until they consume their yolk-sacs and eat on their own (Thorn- 
son, 1991, p. 196). Schultze postulated oviparity for Latimeria by homology. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the lack of internal fertilization in Latimeria, since 
laid eggs may be fertilized by the male simply by shedding his sperm onto them, 
as lungf~h  do (Thornson, 1991, p. 194). Schultze explained away Watson's homol- 
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ogy with Undina by claiming that the immature Undina were prey after all, i.e., 
Undina was a cannibal! 
Griffith and Thomson (1973) disputed Schultze's homological argument on the 
basis of analogy with deep ocean fish of which the shark Hexanchus is exemplary. 
This shark, which lives at the same depths as Latimeria, is ovoviviparous, having 
eggs that are fertilized and hatched within the reproductive tract so that the young 
are effectively born alive. The reason Hexanchus reproduces in this way is that it 
is ureotelic-that is, it has a high level of urea in its bloodstream as an adaptation 
to maintain osmotic equilibrium with the surrounding ocean water. Without such 
a mechanism, the fish would dehydrate and die, just as humans do if they drink 
enough seawater. For various reasons, the ureotelic mechanism does not operate 
until late in fetal development, so immature sharks must be kept inside the mother's 
reproductive tract to avoid direct exposure to the ocean. Like Hezanchus, Latime- 
ria is ureoteiic, so by analogy it should share that shark's ovoviviparity as welL4 
The analogy may also expiain Schultze's free-swimming Rhabdodena hatchlings: 
Thornson (1991, pp. 199-200) recalls seeing gravid (pregnant) female Hezanchus 
sharks shed their immature embryos onto the deck of a ship after being caught, 
a reaction caused by extreme stress. The Rhabdodema hatchlings may have been 
shed similarly by a stressed mother, rather than being born ovoparously as Schultze 
claimed. Gdffith and Thornson's hypothesis was "abundantly confirmedn (Locket, 
1980, p. 284) shortly afterwards when a gravid female Latimeria was dissected 
and shown to have five immature embryos, with yolk-sacs attached, lodged in her 
*Other possible reproductive strategies, such as laying hard-shelled eggs, or maintaining em- 
bryos internally by a pIacenta were ruled out in the case of Latimeria based on previous research. 
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reproductive tract (Smith et al., 1975). 
Griffith and Thornson's analogy does suffer a major difficulty, however. As with 
viviparity, ovovivi pari ty requires internal fertilization, but male Coelacant hs do 
not appear to possess the right equipment, such as the claspers and penetrative (or 
"intromittent") organ of Hexanchus. Thomson (1991, p. 197) seeks to repair this 
disanalogy by reference to a further source analog, a newt that achieves internal 
fertilization without a penetrative organ: 
In the common European newt Tn'turus, for example, the male courts 
the female with elaborate wriggling movements and pheromone secre- 
tions, and she positions herself next to him. He deposits his sperm in 
a gelatinous package, and she slides alongside, places her cloaca over 
the package, and picks it up. The gelatinous material dissolves, and the 
sperm swim up into the oviduct. 
In short, Thomson suggests that pheromones, ritual, and gelatin may substitute 
for the male Latimeria's lack of claspers and a penetrative organ. This repair 
may be represented as in table 2.4. This issue of how Coelacanths achieve internal 
fertilization remains unresolved. 
2.5 Implications for multiple analogies 
A number of issues concerning multiple analogies arise from a consideration of the 
above examples of Coelacanth biology. These issues may be conveniently stated in 











havecl (Coelacan th ,ovovivipari ty,) 
perform.(Coelacan th ,i-f.) 
Table 2.4: A multiple analogy of Tn'turus and Hexanchus with Latimeria. Triturus is used only to repair 
disanalogous mappings between Hexanchus and Latimeria. 
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processes include establishing structural consistency in the presence of multiple 
mappings, corroboration of multiple analogies from other sources including other 
multiple analogies, the use of abstraction and exemplification to select and construct 
multiple source analogs, supplementation of one source analog by another, and 
disanalogy and extension as motives for the introduction of further source analogs. 
2.5.1 Struct urd consistency 
Consider first the process of analogical mapping evident in connection with the 
Coelacanth's depth of habitation (see table 2.3). In this multiple analogy, each 
predicate in the target conceptual structure is mapped to two predicates in the 
source. For example, the predicate inhabitc is mapped to both predicates inhabit, 
and inhabib. By the principle of structural consistency condition i (section 2.2), 
this fact should weaken the overall analogy rather than strengthen it. Yet this 
predicted result contradicts the actual result that the analogy is strengthened by 
the multiple mapping. 
There are a number of options available to redress the situation. The principle 
of structural consistency could be maintained intact by creating two target pred- 
icates i n h a b i b  and inhabikl, one corresponding to each source predicate. The 
two predicates would only be differentiated for the purpose of constructing sepa- 
rate mappings with each source analog. This option is merely ad hoc and without 
any other merit to recommend it. Structural consistency could also be maintained 
intact by handling the two mappings separately in a serial manner. In other words, 
the constraint could be revised to read: Each predicate is mapped to  exactly one 
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other predicate at a time. This solution, although more plausible, presents a cog- 
nit ive oddity much like a person trying to use visual parallax to judge the distance 
to an object by alternately closing one eye and then the other. Other things being 
equal, the tendency of the brain to process information in parallel rather than se- 
rial fashion implies t hat explanat ions of cognitive phenomena should favor pardlel 
models over serial ones. It would seem preferable, then, to revise the principle of 
structural consistency to accommodate processing of multiple mappings in a par- 
allel manner. This revision could be conditioned on the evidential independence of 
the multiple source predicates, as is the case for the evidence provided by each of the 
Centroscymnus and Ruvettus conceptual structures. In other words, the condition 
could be changed to allow for any number of analogs provided those analogs are not 
simply versions of the same thing. For someone to do otherwise, as Wittgenstein 
(1967, 5265) observes of a similar situation, it would be 'as if [he] were to buy 
several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true". 
Clearly, no multiple analogy constructed simply with multiple copies of the same 
source analog would be any better than the corresponding single analogy. Thus, 
the parallel principle would stipulate a constraint like the following: Each predicate 
is mapped to exactly one other predicate in each independent source analog. 
The difference between the serial and parallel statements of the structural con- 
sistency constraint dso depends on how one regards the relation between single 
and multiple andogies. The serial statement works by reducing multiple analogies 
to a series of single ones. The parallel statement works by treating single analogies 
as a special case of multiple ones. (One source analog alone may be considered 
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trivially independent for the purposes of the parallel statement.) It is not yet clear 
which view of the consistency constraint is the best description of how people ac- 
tually process multiple analogies. It is tempting to accept the serial view because 
it takes single analogies to be more fundamental, and single analogies are more fa- 
miliar. But the parallel view is more in keeping with t he parallel-processing nature 
of the MT, and it may appear more acceptable as multiple analogies become better 
understood. Furthermore, the parallel statement is more parsimonious, since the 
serial verison should also restrict its one-at-a-time mappings to independent source 
analogs. Thus, the serial version of the structural consistency constraint is merely 
the addition of a timing condition to the parallel version. Of course, human cogni- 
tion does not always follow the most parsimonious design, so psychological evidence 
obtained in any future experiments on multiple analogies may require this position 
to be retracted. 
2.5.2 Corroboration 
This whole situation is repeated at another level where the corroboration of the 
rod-pigment andogy by the oils-and-fats analogy is concerned. In other words, 
the conclusion that Latimeria inhabits deep ocean water is supported by two mul- 
tiple analogies. Again, this situation raises the prospect of having two identicd 
predicates to  represent one conclusion, or to find some way of interleaving both 
multiple analogies into one representational structure. Fortunately, none of these 
steps appears to be necessary. Unlike multiple mapping, corroboration is an extra- 
analogical cognitive process whereby inferences made by any means are brought to 
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bear in support of some conclusion. In other words, corroboration is a process by 
which analogies (in this case) are used in the service of an overarching explanation 
(Thagard, 1989). Corroboration, then, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
2.5.3 Abstraction and exempmcation 
Two further and coordinate processes involved in multiple analogies are abstractzon 
and exemplification. Abstraction is a process whereby a large number of potential 
source analogs is reduced to a more manageable quantity, Abstraction of this kind 
is evident in both Coelacanth analogies discussed in section 2.4. In the case of rod- 
pigments and reproductive strategies, there are a great number of fish with which 
Latimen'a might be compared, but the task of constructing so many analogies 
is presumably too onerous and redundant to be useful. In both analogies, the 
biologists take advantage of the fact that fish fall into natural, evolutionary groups 
in order to reduce the full set of source analogs to two: one for each group. In 
this way, analogical inference can benefit economically from the quantity of source 
analogs without requiring burdensome or confusing cognitive costs. 
But abstraction itself does not account for the examples discussed above. Ex- 
emplification is also used in the sense that specific fish, rather than averaged or 
idealized ones, axe chosen to exemplify each group of source analogs. In the case of 
rod-pigments, Centroscyrnnus exemplifies the group of deep ocean sharks and Ru- 
vettus exemplifies the group of deep ocean teleosts. Mappings to the target Coela- 
canth are then made with each of these exemplary sources on behalf of their entire 
5These two groups are sharks and teleosts in the pigment analogy, and newts and sharks in 
the reproductive strategy analogy. 
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groups. By means of abstraction and exemplification, then, analogical mappings 
may be constructed that efficiently serve the purpose of maximizing confidence in 
the inference that results from the analogy. 
2.5.4 Supplementation 
There are instances, of course, where abstraction and exemplification alone fail to 
provide a fully satisfactory analogy. Such an instance is provided by the analogy 
of reproductive strategies between Hexanchus and Latimen'a. This malogy implies 
that Latimen'a should have claspers and a penetrative organ, which it is known to 
lack. The use of mating ritual and gelatin by Triturus in place of such equipment 
is brought in as an additional source analog in an attempt to replace these errant 
mappings (see table 2.4). This process of repairing one source with another may 
be called supplementation (Spiro et al., 1989). 
It is difficult to assess the exact extent to which supplementation repairs an 
analogy. Biologists who use it seem to prefer it do doing nothing about problem- 
atical mappings. However, supplementation appears to create a sort of chimzra, 
a fictitious creature possessing a mixture of the properties of known animals. The 
supplementation given in table 2.4, for example, seems to involve a comparison 
between the Coelacanth and a part-newt, part-shark creature. Viewed this way, 
supplementation seems like an insubstantial form of epistemological support for an 
inference based on such an analogy. Perhaps the best response to this dilemma is 
that of Padian (1991, p. 151), who defends supplementation as a means of overcom- 
ing arbitrary, historical limitations encountered in constructing some evolutionary 
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analogies: 
Not all possible structures or adaptive forms that ever existed are still 
extant, including transitional evolutionary forms. The living world pro- 
vides us with only a limited range of organisms for comparison, and 
this range is essentially a random historical artifact. . . . Therefore the 
choice of suitable analogies, and the recognition of their constraints and 
limitations, is to me one of the most salient problems in the application 
of biomec hanical analyses to ex tinct organisms. 
In other words, the problems encountered in constructing an analogy between, say, 
Coelacanths and Hezanchus, may be ameliorated by noting that the natural world, 
by unhappy accident, simply does not provide any better source analogs. Biologists 
presumably cannot be blamed for finding themselves in this circumstance, and 
may therefore be permitted to repair problematic analogies by adding extra source 
analogs and thereby creating chimaeras, provided they can do so without going 
beyond the realm of biological possibility. In other words, nature happens not to 
have created the right analog, so this task falls to the biologist.' The constraints 
that circumscribe biological possibility are up to biologists to determine and are 
therefore not addressed here. 
'There is a curious parallel here with the argument made by Darwin (1859) regarding the 
poverty of the fossil record. Darwin argued that we do not find many f d  of "intermediate 
links" between modern species because geologic, fossil-forming processes preserve a very small 
sample of the organisms alive in any particular era. Similarly, Padian argues that the living 
species which have evolved represent only a very small sample of the organisms that might have 
evolved under other circumstances. 
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2.5.5 Disanalogy and extension 
Finally, reasoning with multiple analogies exhibits an interesting social dimension, 
which may be described in terms of the processes of disanalogy and extension. As 
a form of socially distributed cognition, analogy seems to lend itself to the ancient 
ethical dictum "help your friends and hurt your enemies". This dictum is the 
epitome of ethical conduct offered by Polemarchus in Plato's Republic (1.334b). 
Disanalogy figures in the "hurt your enemiesn half, meaning that it is often used as 
a means of disputing the claims of one's professional competitors. Bonner (1963, 
pp. 276-7) speaks of evolutionary biologists offering analogies and "cringingn at  the 
thought that adversaries will soon counter with many disanalogies. Bonner notes 
that offering strong analogies should prevent this reaction. Griffith and Thomson 
provide an instance of this process when they argue against Schultze's attribution 
of oviparity to Coelacanths on the basis of the resulting disanalogy with otherwise 
similar fish like Hezanchw which, in turn, motivates their development of this 
comparison in its own right. Despite their ubiquity and importance, there are 
currently no theories that address the nature or uses of disanalogies. Unfortunately, 
detailed consideration of this topic lies outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Extension figures in the &help your friendsn half of the social dictum. The fact 
that one biologist offers an analogy encourages his professional supporters to find 
further analogies along the same lines. Thomson, for example, extends Griffith's 
original Hexanchus/Coelacanth analogy in two ways. First, Thomson extends it 
to explain away the free-swimming Rhabdodenna hatchlings described by Schultze. 
He notes that gravid female Hezanchw are known to shed embryos under stress, 
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and that gravid female Coelacanth might therefore also do this (Thomson, 1991, 
pp. 196-200). Thomson also attempted to supplement the Hezanchus/Coelacanth 
analogy by bringing the newt Triturus into consideration. In this sense, extension 
appears not to be a specific cognitive process, but a general professional, social goal 
to which multiple analogies are particularly suitable. 
There appears to be nothing inherently social about disanalogy or extension; a 
biologist might well posit disanalogies or extensions of his own analogies. But these 
processes lend themselves naturally to social distribution for two reasons: (1) They 
fulfill the social goals enjoined by the  ethical dictum "help your friends and hurt 
your enemies", and (2) they reflect the fact that there are simply too many potential 
source analogs for any one penon to keep in mind. On the second point, the 
distribution of knowledge in the scientific community implies that analogical sources 
should come from all quarters, and therefore that multiple analogical reasoning 
should be, in some respects, socially distributed. 
2.6 Summary 
Analogies have long been recognized as important to  the process of scientific dis- 
covery and explanation. Biologists such as Darwin have used analogies to construct 
their theories of evolution. Modern biologists continue to use analogies when devel- 
oping and debating theories concerning the evolution of particular organisms such 
as the Coelacanth. Moreover, the Coelacaath debate shows the importance of mul- 
tiple analogies to scientific discourse, and reveals different ways in which multiple 
analogies may serve cognitive goals. 
CHAPTER 2. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES 1N COELACANTH BIOLOGY 65 
Multiple analogies give rise to epistemologicd issues that are simply not evident 
from a consideration of single analogies. These issues may be discussed in terms of 
the cognitive processes involved in the construction and use of multiple analogies. 
The processes of abstraction aad exemplification show how scientists may make 
profitable use of multiple source analogs in order to construct more convincing 
analogies without going into redundant or confusing detail. In other words, these 
processes fulfil the purpose of utilizing all the supportive analogs available to biol- 
ogists by referring to certain organisms that may be thought of as representative of 
the entire biological groups to which they belong. The process of supplementation 
enables biologists to compare organisms to one another in the face of any accidental 
inadequacies with the use of any one, particular analog. Supplementation, then, 
is a method of fulfilling the purpose of a single analogy where no suitable single 
andogy can be constructed. 
The relationship between multiple analogies and disanalogies brings attention 
to the problem of disanalogies and the lack of any theory concerning them. It also 
points to t h e  socially distributed nature of science, since the pattern of multiple 
analogies and disanalogies in the Coelacant h literature suggests that scientists, as 
a group, act in accord with the dictum "help your friends and hurt your enemiesn. 
Multiple analogies may arise through a process of extension for the purpose of 
satisfying the "help your friends" half of this mode of conduct. 
The nature of the multipleanalogies explored in this chapter also raises technical 
issues for theories of analogy such as the MT. In particular, multiple analogies 
c d  for clarification of the constraint of stmcturd consistency. The structural 
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consistency condition, specifically the requirement for one-to-one mappings, may 
be restated to allow for the processing of several source analogs in serial or parallel 
fashion. The question of which revision to accept first requires that the relationship 
between single and multiple analogies to be reevaluated. In an inherently parallel 
theory such as the MT, the parallel revision is the most natural one to  adopt. 
The M T  is a shared-structure theory of analogy which may be extended to ac- 
count for the issues raised in this chapter. Predicates from multiple source analogs 
may simply be placed into many-to-one mappings with the target analog where 
those sources are independent of each other. In cases where all the source analogs 
are similar, this situation simply increases confidence that the target conceptual 
structure is well-founded. In cases where some source analogs are dissimilar, this 
situation may be described as an attempt to repair the dissimilarity by supple- 
mentation. These situations may be accounted for in the M T  by allowing multiple 
mappings to be put in place in the appropriate way. This apparently simple ex- 
tension enables the MT to capture the important processes through which multiple 
analogies fulfil the purposes that cannot be met by single analogies. In other words, 
this extension enables the MT to describe those aspects of scientific epistemology 
that are important in scientific fields such as evolutionary biology but that are not 
evident when only single analogies are considered. 
Chapter 3 
Multiple analogies from the 
Mesozoic 
All flesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field. 
The grass withers, the flower fades, when the breath of the Lord blows upon it. 
Isaiah 40.6-7 
3.1 Analogies and evolutionary theory 
The Coelacanth is a classic example of what Darwin (1859, p. 151) called a "living 
fossiln. Living fossils are scarce in both senses of that term: They are rare and 
they live in out-of-the-way places. For these reasons, biologists must often resort 
to analogies when reasoning about the Lives and adaptations of Coelacanths. As 
might be expected, the problems are even more acute in the case of reasoning 
about dead fossils, organisms that are truly extinct. But the lives and adaptations 
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of extinct organisms may be just as interesting as those of living ones. Also, the 
study of extinct organisms offers special insights into the course of evolution and 
the demands to be met by evolutionary theory. Therefore, any consideration of 
multiple analogies in biology should include studies of extinct organisms. 
Famous among extinct organisms are the Mesozoic ceratopsiaos or "horned 
dinosaurs" and the Archaeopteryx or the first bird. Archaeopteryx lithographica was 
first discovered in a limestone quarry at Solnhoffn, Germany in 1861, only two years 
after the publication of Darwin's On the origin of species. It immediately became 
an important case study for the new theory of evolution as applied to the fossil 
record (Bowler, 1996, pp. 261-80). It still remains the oldest and most primitive 
fossil bird known. Triceratops, the first ceratopsian dinosaur ever identified as such, 
was first described in 1889 by 0. C. Marsh who originally mistook it for a bison 
(Dodson, 1996, pp. 6-7). Its large neck frill and formidable facial horns make it one 
of the most easily recognized of dinosaurs. The frill and horns, which look so out of 
place on what should be a docile herbivore, remain the focus of public admiration 
and professional at tent ion. 
Chapter 2 presented the MT as an account of single analogies, and proceeded to 
extend it as an account of multiple analogies based on examples of multiple analogies 
concerning the Coelacanth. This chapter builds upon the results of chapter 2 based 
on examples of multiple analogies concerning ceratopsians and Archaeopteryz. This 
new material reinforces the points made in chapter 2 but also adds new ones as 
they arise. 
Section 3.2 discusses multiple analogies and their role in the development of t h e  
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ories about ceratopsians; 
Section 3.3 examines the nature and role of multiple analogies in t h e  debate over 
Archaeopteryx and its relation to modern birds; 
Section 3.4 reviews the implications proceeding from the previous two sections for 
the nature of multipie analogies, especially the use of visual representations 
in multiple analogies, the contribution of multiple analogies to evolutionary 
biology, especially to the building of evolutionary scenarios, and the fecundity 
of multiple-analogy construction as a research strategy. 
These sections complete the picture of multiple analogies in evolutionary biology 
sketched in chapter 2. 
3.2 Ceratopsians: The horned dinosaurs 
The ceratopsian or "hornedn dinosaurs possess some very characteristic and striking 
cranial accoutrements, namely the large bony frills projecting upward from the back 
of their skulls, and the horns and knobs growing from a variety of locations on the 
frill and the face. A different configuration of frill, horns and knobs characterizes 
each species of ceratopsian. The Tn'ceratops as rendered by Charles R. Knight 
remains the classic image of a ceratopsian, using its bony frill and horns to ward 
off two marauding Tyrannosaurus rex (see Czerkas and Glut, 1982, pp. 80-1). This 
image, shown in figure 3.1, clearly illustrates the original explanation of the 
and horns functioning as a means of defense against predators. 
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Figure 3.1: Triceratops squares off against two Tyrannosaurus rez, from a mural 
by Charles R. Knight for the Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago (Photo 
CKST). 
But, as Farlow and Dodson (1975, p. 353) note, this explanation is incoherent 
with the explanation of similar cranial equipment in many modern organisms (see 
also Molnar, 1977, p. 176). In many large, modem mammals, horns are used for 
intraspecific combat-that is, dominance contests among males within a species- 
and sexual display-that is, to impress potential mates. In fact, the theory of sexual 
select ion suggests that new species may arise simply because the males (typically) 
in each of them possesses a vaziation on the sexud ornamentation of their common 
ancestor. Females of different groups may come to prefer different variations in 
their mates, thus causing the groups to diverge into species. This process may act 
rapidly and upon many variations at once and can therefore result in many different 
species which are distinguished largely by their external appearance alone. This 
fact would explain why there are so many funny-looking varieties of ceratopsians 
in the fossil record (Sampson, 1995, p. 40). These comparisons suggest a different 
picture of ceratopsians than that dram by Knight. 
CHAPTER 3. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES FROM THE MESOZOIC 
LfXAPJOs ~ M X O M M N 3  
Figure 3.2: Sample modern and fossil organisms grouped in rows according to sim- 
ilarities of horn shape and structure (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, p. 357). Combat 
behavior (Type 1,2 ,  or 3) of the fossil ceratopsian may then be inferred by analogy. 
A, chameleon; B, rhino; C, steer; D, North American mountain goat; E, Monoclo- 
n i w ;  F, Torosaurus; G, Protoceratops andrewsi. Not drawn to scale. 
Farlow and Dodson challenp the original interpretation of ceratopsian head- 
gear as a defense against predators by noting the disandogy of that interpreta- 
tion with the behavioral significance of the headgear of modern ungulates (hoofed 
mammds). The obvious way to reduce this disanalogy is to pursue the potential 
analogy between the two types of organisms. Farlow and Dodson first correlate the 
idiosyncratic features of various ceratopsian skulls with similar features in mod- 
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ern organisms. Such correlations are suggested by simple visual inspection of head 
forms, as shown in figure 3.2 (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, p. 357). In this figure, 
various modern organisms, i.e., lizards and ungulates, are grouped in rows accord- 
ing obvious similarities in headgear, with representative ceratopsim skulls placed 
on the right-hand side of each row according to the same criterion. 
Their second step is to infer behavioral significance from the analogy suggested 
by each row in figure 3.2. Farlow and Dodson adopt a threefold distinction among 
types of intraspecific combat that was originally developed to describe ungulate 
behavior (see also Molnar, 1977, pp. 176-80). Type 1 combat usually involves two 
animals standing parallel to each other, head to flank, and swinging their heads 
and horns laterally against their opponent's side. This kind of combat behavior is 
displayed by some iguanas, North American mouutain goats, chamois, and, spec- 
tacularly, by giraffes. Type 2 combat involves a face-teface confrontation in which 
opponents lock horns and commence shoving or wrestling. Bison and steer exhibit 
this kind of behavior, as well as certain chameleons and the marine iguana. Type 3 
combat also includes face-to-face confrontations, but with considerable fencing and 
evasion rat her than locking horns. Many modern deer and anteltpo employ this 
style of combat, as do rhinos. Given that many ceratopsians can be placed in the 
same groups as these mammals on morphological grounds, it may be inferred that 
they engaged in the same types of combat. 
Their third step is to pursue the Wunctional comparisons" (Farlow and Dodson, 
1975, p. 356) or uexpectations" (Molnar, 1977, p. 176) implied by the second step. 
For Farlow and Dodson, this step chiefly involves producing adaptive explanations 
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for the variations in ceratopsian frills and horns. Fortunately, the theory of combat 
types employed in the second step above also comes with a ready-made, evolu- 
tionary explanation, namely that the elaboration of cranial headgear is part of an 
evolutionary trend towards the cephalization of combat and display (Molnar, 1977, 
pp. 166-7). In other words, ornaments for sexual display often become concentrated 
on the head, especially in quadrupeds. 
Type 1 combat is taken to be the primitive condition among ceratopsians and 
is explained as a displacement of combat equipment from the teeth to the face in 
general (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, pp. 356-7). The bony frill of early ceratop 
sians may have evolved primarily as a display item, to signal sexual maturity to 
mates, and to intimidate rivals. From primitive forms, ceratopsians evolved into 
two distinct lineages, each specializing in a certain form of combat and display. 
One lineage developed long frills combined with long brow horns over the eyes and 
a short nasal horn on the nose. In these species, display probably comprised tilting 
the head forward so that the long frill would rise vertically high into the air and 
the brow horns would project past the face. Combat would have been of type 2, 
in which each antagonist could catch the other's projecting horns on his own and 
commence shoving and twisting without severe risk of being stabbed (Farlow and 
Dodson, 1975, pp. 357-8). The other lineage of ceratopsians developed short frills 
and short brow horns, but a long nasal horn. In these animals, combat would have 
been of type 3, in which the risk of a stabbing injury would be more immediate since 
the long nasal horn of each combatant could not have been as reliably neutralized 
by his opponent as is the case with long brow horns (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, 
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p. 358). In both of these lineages, the cranial accoutrements represent a response to 
the needs of sexual display and the determination of social rank without requiring 
potentially lethal combat. The non-lethal nature of these forms of combat allows 
both winners and losers to continue living in the same herd, a situation that is 
often to their mutual advantage. The morphological similarity between ungulates 
and ceratopsians suggests that the analogy between them extends to the level of 
adaptive explanation.' 
A portion of this analogy is given in table 3.1. The chameleon, steer, and 
Torosaurus analogs described there represent the species that perform type 2 com- 
bat. The evolutionary explanation linking this method of combat to the long brow 
horns of each species may be read from the system mappings of each domain. The 
fact that a chameleon, for example, has such horns enables it to perform type 2 
combat, which contributes to discouraging its rivals. Female chameleons are im- 
pressed by this result, which confers reproductive privileges on the male. Thus, the 
performance counts as an adaption for impressing female chameleons. Also, the 
explanation of horns and frills as display/intraspecific-combat equipment suggests 
that ceratopsians, like many modem organisms, should show marked sexual dimor- 
phism. In other words, one sex (usually the males) should possess this equipment 
to a much greater degree than the other (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, p. 357). Recent 
finds of ceratopsian fossils suggests that they follow this pattern as well (Sampson 
et d., 1998). 
Recently, Sampson (1995) has suggested a fourth step to add to the ceratop 
'Some ceratopsian morphology does not fit quite so cleanly, but Farlow and Dodson (1975, 
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becausel (discouraget ,performt) 
causet (discourage, ,impresst) 
adapt (performt ,impresst) 
Table 3.1: The chameleon/steer/ Torosaurus component of the multiple analogy as given in the middle row 
of figure 3.2. This table represents the outcome of step 3 of Farlow and Dodson's procedure of functional 
comparisons. 
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sian/ungulate analogy.* A s  noted above, Farlow and Dodson identify ceratopsian 
lineages with combat types. Sampson (1995, p. 40) generalizes this move by invok- 
ing sexual selection as an explanation for all the andogies considered here: 
Every animal species has its own particular system by which individual 
animals recognize and select mates, and many use visual cues. Were 
these cues to diverge between two populations (resulting, for example, 
in two horn types) because of mate competition, the groups might no 
longer recognize each other as the same species, and consequently stop 
interbreeding. 
What Sampson presents, in effect, is a general schema or evolutionary scenario 
which gives a single explanation of the links among morphology, behavior and 
evolution in all the cases considered above, whether mammal, reptile, or dinosaur. 
The above discussion suggests that the following constraints apply to the con- 
struction of multiple analogies concerning ceratopsians: 
1. Organisms are grouped into rows based on visual similarities in their headgear, 
and into columns based on their evolutionary affiliations. Each slot in the 
resulting table is occupied by organisms that meet these criteria. 
2. A representative member of each slot is used to exemplify the relevaat group. 
3. A distinct function, e.g., combat of type 1, 2, or 3, is associated with each 
row in the source domains and is mapped to  the corresponding row in the 
target domain. 
*Sampson (1995, p. 39) slso suggests that the second step could be extended to include beetles 
in with mammals and Lizards, but does not go on to explore this additional source analog. 
CHAPTER 3. MULTIPLE A NA LOGlES FROM THE MESOZOIC 77 
4. Explanations for each function, in terms of adaptations consistent with the 
theory of sexual selection, are mapped from the source domains to the target 
domain. 
This recipe generalizes the MT schema in which a single source analog is retrieved 
from memory (cf. step 1 above), and attribute (2), relational (3), and system (4) 
mappings are established. The contribution of visual representations to the analogy 
construct ion process is discussed further in section 3.4.1. 
3.3 Archaeopteryx: The first bird 
Since i t  is the oldest bird-related fossil organism known, Archaeopteryz represents 
the closest approach to the first avians (birds) that evolved the ability to fly. The 
phylogenetic relationship of Archaeopteryx to other organisms, especially dinosaurs, 
continues to be controversial (Hecht et al., 1984; Shipman, 1998), but the signifi- 
cance of A rchaeopteryz for constructing scenarios of the evolution of avian flight is 
most important here. Broadly speaking, there axe two competing theories. The ar- 
boreal theory states that A rchaeopteryz's ancestors developed flight capabilities by 
climbing trees, leaping from limb to limb or leaping out of the limbs and gliding or 
parachuting to  the ground. The cursorial theory states that Archaeopteryz's ances- 
tors developed flight by running along the ground and then leaping into the air and 
flapping. Work on these theories typically involves comparisons of A rchaeopteryz 
anatomy to that of other flying, gliding, and parachuting creatures such as bats, 
birds, fish, frogs, insects, lizards, pterosaurs, and squirrels, t o  name a few (for a f d  
list, see Schder, 1984). 
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Generally speaking, arguments in favor of the arboreal theory seek to interpret 
the anatomy of Archaeopteryz as adapted to tree-climbing, and also ill-adapted to 
taking off from the ground. The classic development of the arboreal theory is that 
of Heilmann (1927) (see Bowler, 1996, pp. 277-80). Heilrnann (1927, pp. 100-5) 
compares the claws on the wings of Archaeopteryz to the claws on the wings of 
nestlings of several modern species of birds, most especially the Hoatzin, a South 
American relative of the cuckoo. Hoatzin chicks are equipped with claws on each 
wing which they use, along with their beaks, to clamber around the trees above 
their nests. Heilmann (1927, p. 101) notes that the shape and proportions of the 
wing bones in Hoatzin hatchlings closely resembles those in the homologous bones 
of Archaeopteryz , rendering both "well fitted for climbingn : 
The hand of either is much longer thm the arm and forearm; the pro- 
portions of the first and second digits also correspond. This is surely 
no mere coincidence. . . . That [Archaeopteryz], therefore, has been able 
to climb the branches in nearly the same way as the Hoatzin-nestling, 
seems very probable indeed. 
But, while Hoatzin hatchlings climb well, they cannot fly, partly because they do 
not develop flight feathers on the section of their wings nearest to their bodies until 
they mature (Heilrnann, 1927, p. 105). Since some aidoil in that section would seem 
to be necessary for A rchoeop teryz to fly, Heilmann proposes that Archaeopteryz 
probably had a patagium-a fold of skin-connecting the inner wing to the side of 
the body, by analogy with flying mammals: 
Such a fold of skin is the first to appear when the evolution of a "flyingn 
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mammal sets in, and therefore it does not seem unlikely that an incipient 
patagium was present in some forerunner of birds, in due time giving 
place to the fully developed wing of feathers. 
Heilmann adds that ostrich and chicken hatchlings have small patagia which he 
claims are vestiges that they inherited from Archaeopterp. But there is no evidence 
that ostriches and chickens inherited this condition from A rchaeopteryz as opposed 
to having evolved patagia independantly. Thus, the ugunen t  that A rchaeopteryz 
had patagia rests solely on the analogy with flying mammals. 
However, there is a flaw in the Archaeopteryz/mammal analogy. As Heilrnann 
(1927, pp. 198-9) later admits, the patagium in flying mammals always connects 
their forelimbs to their hindlimbs. This situation is fine for flying mammals since 
they descended from quadrupeds that use all four limbs for locomotion. But the at- 
tachment of wings to legs would interfere with the separate use of fore and hindlimbs 
in Archaeopteryz since it probably descended from bipeds that use legs for locome 
tion and arms for manipulation. It would be like a human playing basketbdl with 
the arms and iegs on each side fastened together with rubber bands. Heilmann in- 
stead suggests a comparison with the frilled gecko, which has a patagium or "flank 
wing" not attached to  its limbs (Schaller, 1984, p. 339). Figure 3.3 reproduces 
Heilmann's concept of the predecessor of Archaeopteryz, known as proauk, with 
its geckdike patagia in place. Heilmann (1927, p. 199) concludes that an ancestor 
of Archaeopteryr may have had a mammal-like patagium, but that it was quickly 
replaced by descendants with patagia that more closely resemble those of the frilled 
gecko. 
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igure 3.3: Proauis, the hypothetical ancestor of Archaeopteryz, reconstructed by 
:eilmann (1927, p. 200) with patagia like the fr'ied gecko. This creature also 
?pears in the Rite of spring sequence of the Disney film Fantasia in 1940. 
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Heilmann's analogy between Archaeopteryz and Hoatzin nestlings is two-fold. 
On the positive side, the similarity between the claws and wing bones of Hoatzin 
nestlings and adult Archaeopteryzes supports the hypothesis that Archaeopteryx 
was arboreal in habit. On the negative side, the analogy suggests that Archaeopteryz 
did not have enough flight feathers to allow it to fly. Hoatzin hatchlings, after all, 
cannot fly precisely because their patagia prevent them from developing the neces- 
sary feathers on the portion of their wings next to their bodies. When they mature, 
the patagia disappear and the feathers develop. But most biologists, including Heil- 
mann, believe that Archaeopteryz could fly, if not with the greatest facility. So, 
Heilmann repairs the HoatzinlArchaeopteryz analogy by adding a further source 
analog, namely the  frilled gecko, which possesses patagia connecting only its fore- 
limbs to its sides, thus providing an airfoil for improved lift without encumbering its 
arms by a connection with its legs. Table 3.2 gives a representation of Heilmann's 
composite analogy. 
The cursorial theory of the origin of flight is most notably developed by Ostrom. 
Ostrom attacks the analogies proposed by Heilmann and others, and develops anal* 
g ia  between Archaeopteryz and theropod dinosaurs, modern ground birds, and 
modern birds of prey. Ostrom (1974) criticizes the ArchaeopteryzlHoatzin hatch- 
ling/gecko analogy on two grounds (see also Gauthier and Padian, 1984, p. 194). 
First, the analogy implies that the wings of Archaeopteryz were adapted to serve 
two locomotory functions at one time, both climbing and flying. Ostrom (1974, 
p. 35) counters that the two activities are unrelated fiom a functional, anatomi- 
cal standpoint, and thus on general principle would not both be subserved by one 
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anatomical structure. Second, Ostrom (1974, pp. 35, 38-9) instead argues that the 
anatomy of Archaeopteryz is much more similar to  that of its theropod, dinosaur 
relatives, such as Omitholestes, Veloczraptor, and Deinonychus, which are gener- 
ally agreed to be cursorial predators, and which Ostrom (1969) himself had first 
de~cribed.~ Ostrom (1974, p. 34) draws particular attention to the similar shapes 
and proportions of the forelimb claws of all these organisms, claiming that they are 
adaptations for grasping and holding prey. 
The hindlimb claws of Archaeopteryz are also similar to those of the theropods, 
as well as modem cursorial birds. Archaeopteryx has a reversed hallux-it's 'big toe' 
points backwards-like modem birds, and is of similar proportion to the other claws 
as observed in modern ground birds and in contrast to perching birds (Ostrom, 1974, 
p. 36). The relative shortness of the reversed hallw is therefore consistent with 
a cursorial adaptation. Ostrom (1974, p. 37) illustrates these feature comparisons 
with a diagram showing Archaeopteryz hindlimb claws in an arrangement with 
those of modern birds (figure 3.4). Each column III shows the bird's middle 'toe,' 
and column I the hallux. The shape and relative length of the Archaeopteryz 
claws compares most closely with those of the ground birds, and are significantly 
different than those of the other birds. These similarities and dissimilarities in shape 
and arrangement imply that the feet of A~chaeopteryz were adapted for cursorial 
locomotion, just as the feet of chickens and pheasants are. By the same token, 
they imply that Archaeopteryx was not adapted for perching or treetrunk climbing. 
3The phylogeny of Archueopteryr and its relation to the theropod dinosaurs remains in some 
dispute. Burke and Feduccia (1997) maintain that Archaeopteryx is not related to the theropods. 
The truth of this matter may, however, be set aside for present purposes. 
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horny claws) &om the feet of selected Figure 3.4: Terminal phalanges (without 
bird types compared with those of four specimens of ~rdzaeo~teryz  (Ostmm, 1974, 
p. 37). The columns display the middle "toen (111) and the hallux (I) of each bird. 
The four Archaeopteryz feet are moat like those of ground birds and unlike those 
of all the other birds, ground predators in particular. The horizontal lines equal 5 
cm on the scale of each claw. 
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Ostrom (1974, p. 36) also argues that the dissimilarities with the feet of cursorial 
predators such as the secretmy bird and the road runner imply that Archaeopteryz 
could not grasp prey with its feet, a function which could thus fall to the claws on 
the wings. 
Having discussed anatomy, Ostrom (1974, pp. 34-5) explains the evolution of the 
flapping behavior of Archaeopteyz as the result of a predatory strategy of pursuing 
prey animals over the ground and trapping them between its wings. In effect, some 
Archaeoptelyx ancestor would have curtained the prey off with its extended wings 
and wing-feathers in order to gasp the prey with its forelimb claws or its mouth. 
The motion of the wings in this maneuver would resemble the arm motions of a 
person pursuing and swatting a By by clapping his hands together in front of him. 
Extending and grasping motions concatenated in this way approximate the flapping 
motions of bird flight and might have enabled the organism to take briefly to the air. 
Selection pressure for full flying capabilities would then take over. Ostrom (1974, 
pp. 34-5) draws an analogy between this hypothetical strategy and the activities 
of fighting cocks and certain predatory birds who use their wings to flail at each 
other or at prey; Ostrom (1974, p. 28) provides a photograph of a red-tailed hawk 
attacking a banded water snake as an instance of the behavior to which he is 
referring. 
Ostrom disputes the analogies suggested by Heilmann, pointing out that Heil- 
mann's conclusion goes against general principle. Ostrom instead develops a cur- 
sorial theory based partly on analogies bet ween t he forelimbs of A rchaeopteryz and 
related theropod dinosaurs, between the hindlimbs of Archaeopteryl~ and modern 
CHAPTER 3. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES FROM THE MESOZOIC 86 
birds, and bet ween the predatory behavior of A rchaeopteryz's ancestors and mod- 
ern birds. 
Analogies have continued to play an important role in theories on t h e  origin 
of avian flight. Yalden ( 1984) for example, disputes Ostrom's diagram displaying 
similarities between Archaeopteryx claws and those of ground-dwelling birds by 
presenting a similar diagram with claws of his own selection. Yalden (1984, pp. 96- 
7) argues that comparisons between the claws of Archaeopteryx and those of the 
trunk-climbing vertebrates 
suggest a moderately close analogy with the cobego Cynocephalus [a 
squirrel]. The curved claws, their orientation, the elongated limbs, and 
the general matomy of the hand all conform to that analogy at least as 
well as to Ostrom's predatory analogy, and the shilrpness of the claws 
fits a tree climbing analogy better. 
Feduccia (1 993) pursues this and related comparisons further. 
Rayner formulates several objections to Ostrom's cursorial hypothesis. Rayner 
(1991, p. 200) notes that there are no modem analogs to Ostrom's proposed animal 
that feeds with its wings while running. Also, while Ostrom's cursorial scenario 
explains the use of wings for generating lift, it does not explain how the wings came 
to be used to generate thrust-a service provided by the legs in running (Rayner, 
1984, p. 280). Instead, Rayner offers a scenario for the evolution of avian Bight by 
comparison with a scenario for the evolution of Eght in bats. Bat evolution can be 
asserted with greater confidence than bird evolution, partly due to confidence in 
the interpretation of the bat fossil record and partly due to the close analogy be- 
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tween ancestral bats and modem gliding mammals such as flying squirrels. Despite 
their obvious anatomical differences, Rayner (1991) cites experimental evidence to 
the effect that birds and bats share very simi1a.r aerodynamic qualities. Ultimately, 
Rayner proposes a "compromisen scenario in which Archaeopteryx figures as a cur- 
sorial predator that achieved flight by taking off downhill or running into the wind. 
This scenario suffers, in turn, from the lack of a modern analog, an organism ob- 
served to  fly in the fashion that Rayner proposes. Rayner (1984, p. 283) does note 
that the Kwoolly flying squirrel Eupetaurus of the Himdayas lives above the tree 
line and and glides among rocks." The difficulty with this source analog is that Eu- 
petaums evolved its gliding behavior below the tree line and later moved up. Thus, 
its behavior would count as an evolutionary preadaptation, whereas his proposal for 
Archaeopteryz would count as an adaptation. A mapping between adaptation and 
preadaptation would tend to weaken his proposed analogy. 
The debate over A rchaeopteryz and the evolution of avian flight reveals sev- 
eral interesting aspects of the role of multiple analogy in evolutionary biology. 
Archaeopteryz's fossil anatomy is ambiguous as to whether it was adapted to an 
=bored or cursorial (or mixed) habitat. Supporters of the arboreal theory, such 
as Heilmann, concentrate on the wing claws of Archaeopteryz and cite analogs 
among modern tree-climbing birds and mammals. Supporters of the cursorial the- 
ory, such as Ostrom, cite homology-the phylogenetic relationship bet ween t her* 
pod dinosaurs and Archaeopteqz-to explain the data in favor of the arboreal 
theory and cite analogs among modern cursorial birds to support their alterna- 
tive scenarios. The Literature on Archaeoptetyz provides an excellent example of 
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how multiple analogies may be used positively to construct or support one's own 
theory and negatively to exploit disanalogies in competing theories (sect ion 2.5.5. 
The development of multiple analogies in the Archaeopteryz literature has become 
more sophisticated, with increasing stress laid on the confidence in the correctness 
of composite source analogs evidenced by Rayner. The distribution of analogies 
over the whole literature illustrates the epistemological dificulties involved in con- 
structing analogies in the presence of so many potential source analogs and, by the 
same token, shows how such difficulties may be handled by distributing analogy 
construction socially within a group of scientists. 
3.4 Implications for multiple analogies 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present material that is in some ways very similar to that 
presented in section 2.4 regarding the Coelacanth. But these sections also confront 
us with a variety of issues not dealt with previously. These issues may fall into two 
categories. The first category concerns cognitive issues such as the use of visual 
representations and the analogical comparison of entire evolutionary scenarios. The 
second category concerns issues in the philosophy of biology, e.g., the nature of 
scenario building and the fecundity of multiple-analogy construction as a research 
practise. It would be convenient to deal with these subjects in order, cognitive 
issues f i s t  and biological second, but the content of each issue requires a different 
approach. The issue of visual representations is dealt with first in section 3.4.1 
(cognitive), then scenario building in section 3.4.2 (biology), followed by multi- 
stage analogies in section 3.4.3 (cognitive) and the issue of fecundity in section 3.4.4 
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(biology). 
3.4.1 Visual representations 
Many aspects of the ceratopsian and Archaeopteryz analogies lend themselves in 
some ways to visual representations (pictures in the mind's eye, as it were), as 
opposed to verbal or propositional representations typically given in the tables 
above. Indeed, the use of visual representations in sciences such as evolutionary 
biology is to be expected since much of the evidence for evolutionary explanations 
concerns large material objects with important visual features. The occurrence of 
visual mental imagery in other sciences such as physics and chemistry has been 
studied by a number of scholars; see Miller (1984), Root-Bernstein (1985), and 
Giere (1996). We might expect cognitive processes to use the original medium of 
representation where that representation is most appropriate, provided that it is 
capable of meeting the demands made on it. The important attributes of fossils are 
often visual in nature, so we may expect visual imagery to be the representation of 
choice for reasoning about them (Shelley, 1996; Thagard and Shelley, 1997). 
Some aspects of visual representation are closely comparable to verbal represen- 
tations. R e c d  Watson's observation of two immature Undina inside the abdominal 
cavity of a mature Undina horn chapter 2. Watson claimed that they were young 
gestating inside their mother because they were situated in the back of her ab- 
dominal cavity, because they both appeared to be in good condition and because 
they both rested in the same orientation. Schultze disputed this conclusion and 
maintained that the two fish were in fact inside the larger fish's stomach, implying 
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that they were prey. Griffit h and Thomson supported Watson's original hypothe- 
sis. The basic data offered in these disputes is visual, concerning the appearance, 
orientation, and position of the young Undina inside the larger one. The position, 
for example, of the two young Undina might be represented as a sort of visual 
mental image, a picture of them as they lie within the ribs OF the larger fish. The 
question of whether or not they are in the digestive or reproductive tract of the 
larger Undina could be considered by the mental operation of constructing what 
could be called a mental movie, a visual reconstruction of showing how young fish 
trapped inside a larger one that died would have been deposited on the sea floor 
and fossilized. Alternatively, spatial predicates might be used, e.g., inside-of(1ittle- 
fish,digestive-tract) (see Larkin and Simon, 1987). The two systems appear to be 
equally well suited to the task at hand, therefore this kind of visual information 
could be usefully dealt with by translating it into a predicate-and-arguments style 
represent at ion. 
The visual representations employed in the ceratopsian and Archaeopteryz ex- 
amples seem to inform their respective analogies to a larger degree. Figures 3.2 and 
3.4 indicate that the arrangement of the visually salient attributes of the analogs 
into graph or tablelike structures may constitute a step in analogy formation and 
explication. The shape, location, and orientation of horns and claws are indis- 
pensable data in judgments of their gross similarity and their analogy of function 
and adaptation. These physical resemblances are most easily represented visually, 
whether in visual mental images or in drawings on a sheet of paper. 
The choice of representation at higher relational- and system-level mappings 
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may vary. Representations concerning, say, the proportions of skeletal components 
to one another might be given as verbal predicates, but even system-level concepts 
such as cause may b e  represented visually. For instance, the chameleon / steer 
/ Torosaums analogy can be represented by predicates (see figure 3.1), or it can 
be represented by a visual mental movie of two steer shoving each other over a 
potential mate and substituting two Torosaulvs males instead, in which case the 
relevant causal relations are represented by the scene showing the outcome of the 
contest. The system-level mappings follow from visualizing the process of intraspe- 
cific combat and its consequences. 
People vary quite a bit in their visual cognitive abilities, so that the possibility 
raised above might seem incredible to people who do not experience vivid visual 
mental imagery. But such abilities do exist. Grandin (1995, pp. 2 0 4 ,  an autistic 
person with a Ph.D. in Animal Science, tests the animal-handling equipment that 
she designs by running through it in her imagination: 
I visualize my design being used in every possible situation, with dif- 
ferent sizes and breeds of cattle and in different weather conditions. . . . 
When I do an equipment simulation in my imagination or work on an 
engineering problem, it is like seeing it on a videotape in my mind. I can 
view it from any angle, placing myself above or below the equipment 
and rotating it at  the same time. 
Grandin (1995, p. 143) dso visually runs through the equipment from the per- 
spective of the cattle, envisioning what they would see on their way through. Roe 
(1951, pp. 461-2), in her study of visual mental imagery used by academic r e  
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searchers, gives an account of a biologist who conjures up mental movies of the 
Cretaceous in order to watch how events develop. From the st at istics she gat hered, 
Roe concludes that the use of visual imagery is typical among biologists and other 
scientists whose jobs involve reasoning about the visual attributes of large objects. 
It is quite possible, then, that the multiple andogies such as those constructed 
regarding ceratopsians were generated visually. 
Holyoak and Thagard (1995, pp. 113-4, 194) note that visual representations 
may enhance analogy construction, but restrict their consideration to proportional 
analogies. But if, as the ceratopsian example suggests, multiple analogies may 
work with visual representations at a higher level of abstraction, then the extent 
of visual analogies needs to be re-evaluated. So, for example, sequences of visual 
mental images, or mental movies, may be used to represent causal relations in 
analogy construction just as predicates such as cause do in verbal representations. 
Consider the visual analogy presented in figure 3.5, taken from the fiont of a recent 
Christmas card. The figure portrays two analogous physical processes juxtaposed 
in one scene. The scene itself might be represented as a proportional analogy: Just 
as a man's car might run out of gas, so Santa's reindeer might run out of hay. But 
the analogy only makes sense if higher-level information is considered, namely that 
gas enables a car to run, just as hay enables a reindeer to run (or fly). C o ~ e c t i n g  
the event depicted on the card with its causes requires the viewer to  consider the 
process of Santa's predicament: running into trouble, landing his sleigh, unhitching 
the empty reindeer, tucking it under his arm, and heading down the road in search 
of hay for the reindeer to eat. This sequence is based upon the stereotypicd process 
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Figure 3.5: A visual analogy taken &om the fkont leaf of a Christmas card. The 
scene juxtaposes similar events fiom two andogous sequences representing the 
causes and outcomes of transportation difficulties. 
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a person might go through when his car runs out of gas: he pulls over, removes an 
empty jerry can from the trunk, and heads down the road in search of a gas station 
for gas to fill the can. In a visual representation, the causes linking one event to the 
next could be encoded in the manner of either man's actions. Santa's angry look, for 
example, informs the viewer that Santa's situation is not one that he intended to be 
in. Thus, his situation must have been caused by a misfortune or oversight. People 
are adept at reading such abstract information from these cues; thus, abstract 
information could be represented in terms of the manner and attitudes of objects in 
a visual image and read off when necessary. Multiple analogies may be constructed 
using visual images with mappings constructed between sirnilax representations of 
this kind. The multiple analogies depicted in figure 3.2 are far more telegraphic 
than figure 3.5, making it difficult to judge the extent of visualization involved 
in their construction, but the two figures show a suggestive congruence in their 
juxtaposition of animals prepared for similar activities. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.4 also indicate the importance of graphic representations to 
the structuring of analogies. In both figures, graphic representations of source and 
target anatomical features are situated within a system of columns and rows. In 
figure 3.4, the primary graphic dimension is vertical, with distance &om the center 
being used as a rough index of adaptive distance compared to Archaeopteryz. In 
figure 3.2, rows serve to group similar features together into a sort of ascending 
order of combat types. Columns separate the source domains on the left fiom 
the ceratopsian target domain on the right. These graphic representations appear 
to encourage Gestdtist tendencies to complete figures, thus encouraging complete 
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consideration of the visual features that participate in each analogy. Gestalt princi- 
ples generally concern the grouping of similar objects together and the completion 
of paxtially filled-in figures, both of which can make obvious contributions to ma- 
logical reasoning. Conversely, unfilled locations in a figure are potential cause for 
concern; certainly the two unfilled locations in the "lizard" column of figure 3.2 do 
not add confidence in the lizard/ceratopsian component of the analogy proposed 
there. 
Another advantage of graphic representations is the ease with which multiple 
source analogs are added: One need only add more rows or columns with new 
categories of animal. The ability to do so supports the general chaxacter of the 
analogy. In terms of the processes of analogy construction, this additive quality 
supported by graphic representation gives the analogizer the ability to construct 
complex analogies in a serial, piece-by-piece manner. (Recall the recipe used by 
Farlow and Dodson, section 3.2). In section 2.5.1, it was argued that multiple 
analogies are constructed in pardel. This situation holds so long as the cognitive 
load caused by paallel processing does not exceed the performance limit of the 
analogizer. In other words, parallel processing is fine until i t  becomes to confusing, 
or costly in cognitive terms. As Donald (1991, p. 329) argues, people tend to 
use cognitively external representations, which he c d s  t he  eztemal memoty field 
(EXMF), such as drawings, when their own working memory capacity is insufEcient 
to carry out a 9hought projectn: 
Humans do not think complex thoughts exclusively in working memory, 
at least not in working memory as traditionally defined; it is far too 
CHAPTER 3. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES FROM THE MESOZOIC 
limited and unstable. In modern human culture, people engaged in a 
major thought project virtually always employ external symbolic ma- 
terial, displayed in the EXMF, as their true 'working memory." They 
use their biological working memory system, along with their perceptual 
apparatus, more as an iterative data-crunching device, or a processor of 
visual analog images. 
In other words, people will tend to iterate serially back and forth through the steps 
of a major thought project using external aids to memory, such as the carefully 
arranged drawings made by Ostrom (figure 3.4) and Farlow and Dodson (figure 3.2). 
The cognitive advantage of these externd representations, then, is that each source 
analog and its relation to the target (and the other sources) may be considered one 
at a time, thus making possible the careful construction of an effective multiple 
analogy. 
The way in which visual and verbal representations are made to work together 
is fairly direct in cases of spatial information such as inside-of: One can be trans- 
lated into the other without much difficulty. In other cases, translation between 
visual and verbal representations is not so direct. In the instance of causal informa- 
tion, translation from visual to verbal may be accomplished by harnessing people's 
ability to read such information from perceptual scenes to the task of reading that 
same information from visual mental images. This procedure is essentially the one 
suggested by Donald for the use of drawings as external forms of working memory 
storage. In short, visual and verbal representations, as they appear in multiple 
analogies, may be relatively separate from one another and are combined by the 
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ways in which they divide the cognitive load involved in a "major thought project". 
This situation suggests that comparisons and other low-level activities involved in 
the construction of multiple analogies do not occur cross-modally. That is, detailed 
comparative activity undertaken in one modality, either visual or verbal, tends to 
remain in that modality. Processes involving both modalities interact at a high 
level of abstraction. 
Visual representations appear to have made an important contribution to the 
multiple analogies described in this chapter. Visual mental imagery is important in 
virtue of the fact that it is the visually salient attributes of the anatomical features 
of ceratopsians and Archaeopteryz that are the items of concern for evolutionary 
biologists. Some aspects of visual representations, such as spatial relations, are not 
very different from the predicate representations discussed in chapter 2. But the 
use of visual mental imagery to represent higher-level, causal information is very 
different. The use of visual imagery also extends to the use of external memory 
storage, e.g., drawings. Drawings lend themselves well to the construction of mul- 
tiple analogies since they facilitate the construction of tables to which columns and 
rows may be added iteratively as needed. The use of visual imagery is typically 
concerned with visually salient attributes and relations and is combined with verbal 
representations at  a high or abstract level using a perceptual process of reading off 
verbal information from the visual image. 
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3.4.2 Evolutionary scenarios 
Multiple analogies in evolutionary science dso participate in other, higher-level 
forms of representation, namely the scenario. Scenarios, which are also called mod- 
els, historical-narrative explanations (Bock, 1984), or Darwinian histories (Kitcher, 
1993), have been the subject of much controversy since the at tack by Popper (1960) 
on the scientific status of "historicismn in general and evolutionary biology in par- 
ticular (1974). Scenarios are an obvious way to represent hypotheses about the 
evolution of organisms, but are often criticized as being merely "just-so" stories 
beyond confirmat ion or falsifiability (Gould and Lewontin, 1978). Certainly, if 
scenarios are ruled out as forms of scientific explanation, then much of the work 
in evolutionary biology and similar disciplines such as geology (Gould, 1987) and 
cosmology (Brush, 1996) do not qualify as scientific. 
A number of evolutionary scientists have discussed scenarios in terms of the 
constraints that apply to constructing them properly. These constraints serve to 
maximize "congruence" between the information about a particular set of organisms 
a d  the theory of evolution in general. Here is a five-step schema proposed by 
Padian (1987, p. 5):' 
1. Defme the adaptation under consideration in functiond terms, and define the 
group(s) in which it appeaxs as monophyletic units; 
2. Analyze the group(s) phylogeneticdy, emphasizing (a) their relationship to 
other groups and (b) the relationships of taxa within the group; 
4Very similar formulations are given by Bock (1984, p. 202) and Gans (1985, p. 2). 
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3. Use phylogenetic analysis to determine the sequence of appearance of char- 
acters presumed to be related to the adaptation under consideration; 
4. Compare these adaptations asd their sequences of origination in other taxa. 
Distinguish characteristics necessary to the adaptation from those that are 
associated with the adaptation by virtue of their appearance in a given taxon; 
5. Consider additional lines of evidence (e.g., genetic, biochemical, physical, 
populational, etc.) that may bear on the evolution of the adaptation, as  a 
test of the phylogenetic-functional scenario. 
In other words, biologists should pick out an adaptation to focus on, construct the 
phylogenies or family trees of organisms possessing the adaptation, examine the 
trees to see how the adaptation evolved in each case, compare the results for each 
family with those for other families, and consider any further, relevant evidence. In 
practise, this sequence of steps cannot always be adhered to in the order presented 
by Padian, partly because the identification of an adaptation in step 1 (especially in 
extinct organisms) may depend on analogies to modern organisms in step 4 (Padian, 
1991, p. 158). Because step 4 can influence the phylogeny constructed in previous 
steps, Bock (1984, p. 202) prefers the term pseudophylogeny for the 'family trees' 
produced by steps 1 and 2. 
For current purposes, the correspondence of Padian's recipe to actual practice 
is less important than the representation to which it gives rise. The result of 
such a procedure is essentially an annotated family tree of a group of organisms. 
The annotation breaks the tree up into stages, each of which tracks episodes in 
the career of an organic character or the species tha t  possess it. The organisms 
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identified with each stage "must be viable and must be able to interact with their 
presumed environments" (Bock, 1984, p. 202). This criterion applies to steps 1 and 
2 above. Transitions from stage to stage are labeled as to the nature of change 
involved, ie., as adaptations, preadaptations, vestiges, etc (see Gans, 1985, pp. 4- 
5). This criterion applies to step 3 above. To this point, felicity of the scenario 
to phylogenetic (homological) information has been emphasized. Now, analogicd 
information becomes most relevant. 
On the relevance of analogy to each stage in the proposed scenario, Bock (1984, 
p. 202) notes that it is desireable, but not absolutely required, to be able to cite 
known organisms as analogs for the organisms proposed for each stage in an e v e  
lutionary scenario. If no analogous organisms can be cited, then the scenario is 
counted as seriously, if not fatally, flawed. He emphasizes that this point is espe- 
cially important for the purpose of evaluating rival scenarios, one of which enjoys a 
number of such analogs while the other scenario enjoys none. Basically, the avail- 
ability of good analogs counts towards the viability of the organisms associated with 
each stage of the proposed phylogeny. A lack of analogs counts against viability. 
The existence of many analogs further increases confidence in the scenario (see also 
Gans, 1985, p. 7). 
The conflicting hypotheses over the reproductive biology of Latimeria provides 
a simple example of scenariebuilding in action; see figure 2.1. The scenario consists 
simply of one stage, namely the inheritance of a single reproductive strategy &om 
a hypothetical ancestor (labeled "Ur-Coelacanth" in figure 2.1). The scenarios put 
forward by Watson and Schultze depends on all three Coelacanth species conserving 
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the same, homologous trait of viviparity or ovoparity, respectively. The scenario 
put forward by Griffith and Thomson relies on multiple analogies with modern 
organisms, exemplified by the shark Hezanchus. 
A scenario for the evolution of ceratopsian dinosaurs proposed by Farlow and 
Dodson (1975, p. 354) is displayed graphically in figure 3.6. The scenario matches 
the theory of combat types to ceratopsian phylogeny: Each group of ceratopsians 
is associated with one type of intraspecific combat. The "primitiven group is ass* 
ciated with Type 1 combat, the 4ong-frilledn group with Type 2 combat, and the 
Ushort-frilled" group with Type 3 combat. The types of frills and horns belonging 
to each group count as adaptations for the different types of combat, and the phy- 
logeny is arranged parsimoniously so that each kind of adaptation arises only once. 
Farlow and Dodson omit any lines of decent from the figure in order to emphasize 
the fact that it is derived from comparisons (step 3 in Padian's scenari+building 
recipe discussed above) rather than motivated by more direct evidence (steps 1 and 
2). New discoveries have altered the details of ceratopsian phylogeny somewhat, 
but the three groups identified by Farlow and Dodson continue to be recognized as 
such (Dodson, 1996, pp. 252-9). 
The avian-fight scenario proposed by Ostrom (1979) is shown in figure 3.7. 
The phylogenetic relationship pictured there is essentially one of direct inheritance: 
Archaeopteyx, at the bottom of the figure, has adapted the insect-catching char- 
acteristics of its ancestor to the function of flapping flight. The figure is nicely 
constructed to emphasize visual simplicity of the proposed adaptations of A r- 
chaeopteryz. As Ostrom (1979, p. 55) notes, "it is not diff idt  to visualize how 
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Figure 3.6: Rough phylogeny of ceratopsian dinosaurs from the Judithian, Edmon- 
tonian, and Lancian periods of the Upper Cretaceous (Farlow and Dodson, 1975, 
p. 354). The phylogeny distinguishes three groups of ceratopsians: a "primitive" 
group, labeled A through C in the central column; a "long-frilledn group D through 
H in the left-hand area; a ushort-fiiiedn group I through M in the right-hand area. 
Lines displaying phylogenetic relationships were deliberately omitted by Farlow and 
Dodson to express uncertainty on details of inheritance. 
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Figure 3.7: The reconstruction by Ostrom (1979, p. 55) of the evolution of flight 
in Archaeopteryz. The top half of the figure depicts a proto-Archaeopteryz us- 
ing its feathers as aids to catching insects. The bottom half of the figure shows 
Archaeopteqm in a sirnilax pose for the purposes of comparison, although Ar- 
chaeopteryx was likely capable of flying after its prey. 
advantageous these paired 'insect nets' [wings] would be in snaring leaping insects, 
or even in batting down escaping flying insects." Unfortunately, there are no mod- 
em analogs to this proposed scenario, which considerably weakens its force. 
The evolutionary scenarios discussed in this chapter may be understood as in- 
staatiations of a general schema for evolutionq explanation. Here is a verbal 
representation of this schema (see also Brandon, 1990, pp. 165-76): 
Ezplanation target 
0 What cause brings about a particular characteristic in a given species? 
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Explanatory pattern 
The descent of the species from its ancestors is given in its phylogeny. 
The scenario identifies stages in the phylogeny. 
The characteristics of the species at each stage tend to enable those 
species to  survive and reproduce. 
The species at each stage inherit their characteristics from their ances- 
t o r ~ . ~  
Any changes in inherited characteristics are caused by selection pres- 
sures. 
The terns given in boldface type are variables to be filled in for any particular 
instantiation of this schema (see Thagard, 1996, p. 66). The best scenario, and 
therefore the best explanation for the explanation target, is the scenario that best 
satisfies the conditions connected with each of the variables. Some conditions are 
particularly important in this respect. What counts properly as a conserved or 
derived characteristic (condition 4) means identifying a characteristic as an un- 
modified inheritance, adaptation, preadaptation, vestige, etc, with a l l  the conditions 
which apply to making such an identification (see Shelley, 1999). Assessing the vi- 
ability of species (condition 3) is also an important and non-trivial task. Any of 
conditions 1-5 may be supported by analogies where they are applicable, although 
3 is the condition most emphasized in practice where analogy is concerned. 
- 
5Brandon (1990, pp. 1714) refers to this information as trait poluriCy. 
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There is no condition stated on the number of stages into which a scenario 
must be divided. A fixed rule is probably out of the question, but the number 
given in practice seems to be inversely proportional to the confidence with which 
the characteristic in question can be identified (condition 5). A scenario divided 
into many stages includes fewer species and their changing characteristics in each 
stage. Conversely, a scenario divided into few stages includes more species and their 
characteristics in each stage. If a characteristic and the selection pressures acting 
on it can be confidently identified, then it can still be picked out from among many 
others in a scenario of few stages. If not, then a scenario of more stages is needed 
to isolate the characteristic in question from dl the other characteristics. 
The evolutionary-scenario schema given above differs from the sort advocated 
by Ki tcher (1993) in one important respect. Kitcher views evolutionary explana- 
tions as  arguments, and therefore views scenario schemata as abstract argument 
patterns (Darden, 1991, p. 197). This view requires that some conditions within 
the explanatory patterns laid out by Kitcher (1993, pp. 27-8, 44-7) be made to 
follow from other conditions by connectives like there fore. Instantiations of such 
schemata constitute deductivestyle demonstrations that the distribution of char- 
acters in a species follows in some way from the distribution of characters in its 
ancestors under the influence of certain selection pressures. 
The schema given above is not an abstract argument pattern. This schema aims 
at providing scenarios rather than arguments, where a scenario is a representation 
showing how well certain hypotheses about natural history can be  subsumed under 
the theory of evolution (see Darden, 1991, p. 197). In other words, a scenario is a 
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means for measuring the fit between information about individual species and the 
theory of evolution in the large. Arguments about what follows from what assume 
more importance where theoretical issues rather than details of particular family 
trees are at stake. For present purposes, the most important difference between 
the two types of schemata is that argumentative patterns do not admit analogies, 
single or multiple. None of the support rendered by analogies to evolutionary ex- 
planations appears in the argumentative schema, which relies strictly on deductive 
or probabilistic inferences. In the subsumptive schema described above, analogies 
may be applied to the fulfillment of the given conditions as circumstances war- 
rant. This property alone makes the subsumptive schema a better account of the 
scenariebuilding described above, where analogies are clearly important. 
Multiple analogies play an important role in scenario building as i t  is described 
in this sect ion. The more analogs that can be offered in favor of the viability of an 
organism at a stage in a scenario, the better. Of course, such multiple analogies 
are not constructed by a simple addition of sources. Consider the processes of ab- 
straction and extension, by which many analogs are represented by exemplary ones 
(section 2.5.3). Supplementation is another process important in scenario building, 
where the viability of a reconstructed species is supported by comparison with a 
species constructed from pieces of observable ones (sect ion 2.5.4). Thus, scenari* 
building in terms of the above schemais one of the most important purposes fulfilled 
by multiple analogies in evolutionary biology. 
It is interesting to note that this kind of relation between multiple analogies 
and scenarios does not appear to be confined to evolutionary biology. Much the 
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same relationship holds in the domain of political decision making, as shown by 
Khong (1 992). In this domain, multiple analogies contribute to decisions among 
several policy options. Khong discusses how the analogies of Munich, Korea, and 
Dien Bien Phu collectively contributed to President Johnson's decision in 1965 to 
escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam by committing 100,000 ground troops to fight 
in that country. This opt ion was just one of several available scenarios for American 
involvement in Southeast Asia at the tirne. Thus, the relationship between multiple 
analogies and scenarios is not confined to evolutionary science. 
3.4.3 Multi-stage analogies 
The importance of analogies to justifying the viability of proposed stages of e v e  
lutionary scenarios is emphasized by Bock (section 3.4.2). But step 4 of Padian's 
scenariebuilding procedure suggests a broader application of analogy: Not only 
should comparisons be made at each stage of a scenario, but between sets of stages 
in different scenarios. R a p e r  (1984, pp. 284-6), for example, pursues a detailed 
analogy between the evolution of flapping flight in bats fiom gliding flight in ancient 
bats to the evolution of flapping flight in birds (section 3.3). The upshot of this 
comparison is the suggestion that a sequence of gliding to flapping stages should 
be expected in both scenarios. Essentially the same logic is employed to support 
the claim that a gliding stage occurred in the  evolution of the pterosaurs or Vying 
reptiles" (Padian, 1991). 
Multi-stage analogies should not be confused with the multiple andogies dis- 
cussed above. Multi-stage analogies are simply analogies, single or multiple, that 
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concern the generality of evolutionary scenarios as a whole. If Padian and Rayner 
are correct about the stringency of the  constraints on the evolution of flapping flight 
in vertebrates, then a gliding stage should indeed be expected in all relevant scenar- 
ios. Such a result would be an important contribution to evolutionary theory. As 
such, multi-stage analogies are worthy of mention for their potential contribution 
to the theory of evolution, but there no obvious, special connection between them 
and multiple analogies as there is for scenario building. 
3.4.4 Fecundity 
Goldman (1992, p. 195) defines five measures of the epistemic benefits of social 
practises, including fecundity: The fecundity of a practise is its ability to lead 
to large numbers of true beliefs for many practitioners. A similar measure may 
be defined for analogies: The fecundity of an analogy is its ability to lead to the 
satisfaction of more goals for many analogizers. Multiple analogies are evidence of 
the fecundity of individual analogical comparisons. 
Multiple analogies reflect the fecundity of analogical reasoning in two ways. The 
first way is by extension (section 2.5.5). When biologists suggest additional source 
analogs in support of the analogies of their collegues, they satisify their social goals 
and demonstrate the fecundity of the analogies in question. Thus, the extent to 
which an analogy admits additional source analogs is one measure of its fecundity 
as defined above. 
The second way in which multiple analogies reflect the fecundity of analogical 
reasoning is by schema application. Gick and Holyoak (1983) show that people are 
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better able to solve problems by analogy if they are fist  presented with several sim- 
ilar problems and corresponding solutions. It appears that people tend to abstract 
the common elements of the solved problems into a schema and then proceed to ap- 
ply that schema to the unsolved problem. Similarly, multiple analogies sometimes 
encourage the formation of schemata which may then be applied to novel aspects 
of the source and target domains of the original multiple analogy. 
Consider the following example. In his general survey of dinosaur/ungulate 
analogies, Molnar (1977) pursues the Popperian scheme of Rudwick (1964) for 
making inferences to function from fossil morphology. Rudwick (1964, pp. 32- 
4) recognizes the need for analogical comparison, but insists that it is limited to 
clues arising from superficial resemblances, and nothing more. Calling inferences 
based on analogy upseud~methodsn, Rudwick (1964, p. 33) insists on the deduction 
of functions from first principles, despite the potentially excessive requirements of 
such a method: 
Al l  we need, ideally, is a knowledge of the operational principles involved 
in all actud or conceivable . . . mechanisms possible in this universe. 
The idea of deducing naturd history from first principles is reminiscent of the boast 
ascribed to Archimedes that he could move the Earth with a lever if given the right 
place to stand. 
Although Molnar follows Rudwick's suggestion and presents many of his argu- 
ments in the form of deductions, he arrives at basically the same conclusions as 
Farlow and Dodson. Not surprisingly, Molnar makes frequent use of non-deductive 
arguments in his exposition, including a number of further analogies. Interestingly, 
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Molnar (1977, p. 180) concludes his article by suggesting that Farlow and Dodson's 
multiple analogies could be expanded: 
It is tempting to analogize the later protoceratopsids (e.g., Montanac- 
eratops) with the surviving primitive bovids [cattle] and the ceratopsids 
with the larger, more advanced bovids in terms of horn development. 
Because such primitive bovids are usudly forest-dwelling forms, and 
the more advanced ones plains-dwelling, such an analogy would suggest 
similar habitats respectively for the later protocertopsids and ceratop 
sids. 
In other words, Molnar is tempted to apply the pattern of ceratopsian/ungulate 
analogies elaborated by Farlow and Dodson but to issues of habitat in addition to 
issues of sexual selection. If ceratopsians and modern ungulates are analogous in 
their adaptations to sexual selection, then they might also be analogous in their 
adaptations to living in forests or plains. What Molnar appears to be doing, then, 
is forming a schema from Farlow and Dodson's multiple analogy and applying it 
to another problem with the same sources and target. To the extent that multiple 
analogies lend themselves to this kind of practise, they may be considered fecund 
by the definition given above. Since single analogies have a lesser tendency to lead 
to schema formation, they may be considered less fecund than multiple analogies. 
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3.5 Summary 
The ceratopsian and Archaeopteryx examples indicate the importance of multiple 
analogies in scenario construction in evolutionary biology. The two examples are 
very different in some ways: Multiple analogies seem to have been decisive in chang- 
ing the scientific explanation of ceratopsian horns and frills, but they have simply 
stimulated the controversy over evolutionary explanations of the origin of £light 
in Archaeopteryz. In the former case, multiple analogs all appear to support the 
same conclusion, namely that the outlandish headgear of male ceratopsians arose 
as a result of sexual selection rather than for defense against predators. In the 
latter case, multiple asdogies appear to support both of the competing arboreal 
and cursorial explanations of the origin of flight in Archaeopteryx. But the different 
outcomes in the two examples serve to highlight the importance of the contribution 
of multiple analogies to theory construction and evaluation in each case. Where 
multiple analogies point in one direction, theory change occurs in that direction. 
Where multiple analogies point in opposite directions, controversy continues. 
Both examples also highlight the contribution of visual mental imagery to the 
construction of multiple analogies. Visual mental imagery may be realized in a 
predicate-and-arguments form encoding spatial relations in a manner similar to 
the verbal representation now most prominent in the Multiconstraint theory and 
other theories of analogical t hiding. However, visual imagery may also comprise 
more strictly visual forms of representation such a visual appearance or even visual, 
mental movies. The salience of visual information in the application of evolution- 
ary biology to particular species, e.g., the shape of bones, their relative spatial 
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layout, and how they might interact during locomotion, seem to prompt the use 
of visual imagery when evolutionary explanations are constructed. This fact may 
explain why evolutionary biologists are often found to be visual thinkers. Multiple 
andogies may be constructed with visual imagery much as they are with verbal 
representations. 
However, the cognitive demands of dealing with multiple visual mental images 
are very high and mental images tend to be unstable. For these reasons, graphic 
visual representations may also participate in the construction of multiple analogies. 
Graphic representations are external versions of mental images and seem to function 
as an extension of working memory. Graphic representations are not unstable, and 
may be used to put separate images into significant arrangements, as demonstrated 
in figures 3.2 and 3.4. 
Mental and graphic images may be used to store high-level or abstract infor- 
mation, at least in a form that may be read off into verbal representation. It is 
probably a t  this level that verbal and visual representations interact, rather than 
being interleaved in any particular low-level cognitive process. A high-level connec- 
t ion between visud and verbd cognitive processes is compatible with the view put 
forward by Crick (1994) that the neocortex of the brain (the frontal lobe) functions 
as an integrator of information from the higher levels of the perceptual cortices 
such as the visual cortex. In other words, low-level processes involved in vision and 
audition do not interact directly; high-level ones interact through the intermediary 
of the neocortex. 
It was argued in chapter 2 that the constraint of purpose controlled the use of 
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multiple source analogs in analogy construction. The ceratopsian and Archaeopteryx 
examples discussed here support this position. These examples show the impor- 
tance of analogies and multiple analogies in particular to the purpose of scenario 
building. Once the constraints on scenario building are properly understood, it 
becomes clear that multiple analogies tend to play a central role in determining 
the plausibility of one scenario over another. This fact has been appreciated by 
evolutionary biologists but has not been much discussed in the literature on the 
philosophy of biology. But it is necessary to understand where multiple analogies 
fit in t he  grand scheme of evolutionary explanation in order to understand the de- 
tails of abstraction, exemplification, supplementation ete, as they arise in particular 
cases. Here, the grand scheme of evolutionary explanat ion is scenario building. 
Another issue in the philosophy of biology concerning multiple analogies is their 
fecundity as  a means of pursuing the goals of evolutionary science. Multiple analo- 
gies may be described as fecund in two ways. First, the process of extension taken up 
in chapter 2 shows that multiple analogies are fecund in the sense that they show 
how more researchers may construct more analogies. Second, multiple analogies 
may be considered fecund in the sense that they lend themselves to the forma- 
tion and application of schemata. Such schemata may then be applied by other 
researchers in the construction of further analogies. These facts support the conclu- 
sion that multiple analogies are an effective social practise in evolutionary biology. 
Having undertaken a study of multiple analogies in evolutionary biology in some 
depth, it is now necessary to add some breadth to this research by examining the 
nature and role of multiple analogies in other areas, such as archaeology. 
Chapter 4 
Multiple analogies in archaeology 
The archaeologist who ha[s] ventured into ethnography would need to guard against 
basing all his assumptions on one contemporary culture. The point is that these assump 
tions must be based on a whole range of possibilities, not on any single ethnographic 
model. 
Karl Heider 
4.1 Analogies in archaeology 
The use of analogies in archaeology has been both widespread and controversial. It 
is easy to underst and why analogies should be widely used by archaeologists: Those 
archaeologists who set themselves the task of constructing hypotheses concerning 
bygone cultures naturally resort to comparisons between those cultures aad the 
ones that the archaeologist may find (or read about) today. The number of possible 
explanations for some array of bones, ruins, rebe,  aad discarded tools is very large. 
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Some process by which modern day cultures generate similar arrays seems like an 
obvious place to begin the work of understanding the culture that left it. 
As noted in section 2.1, the antiquarians who first became interested in archae- 
ological issues used analogies for just this kind of reconstruction. For example, 
in 1699, Edward Lhywd (a protege of Robert Plot) drew an analogy between the 
stone arrowheads made and used by contemporary North American Indians and 
arrowheads of unknown origin found on the ground in the Scottish Highlands. Not- 
ing the physical simiiarities between the two kinds of arrowheads, Lhywd proposed 
that the Scottish arrowheads were of ancient, human origin and used for hunting, as 
they were among the natives of North America. Describing his excursion through 
the Highlands to a friend, Lhywd says that he was "most divertedn by such arrow- 
heads in use as amulets among the Highlanders, who believed them to be made by 
malicious elves and fired at men and animals from the sky (Gunther, 1945, p. 425): 
I doubt not but you have often seen of those Arrow-heads they ascribe 
to elfs or fairies: they are just the same chip'd flints the natives of New 
England head their arrows with at this day; aad there are dso several 
stone hatchets found in this kingdom, not unlike those of the Americans. 
. . . These elf mow-heads have not been used as amulets above thirty 
or forty years; but the use of the rest is immemorial: whence I gather 
they were not invented for charms, but were once used in shooting here, 
as they are still in America. The most curious, as well as the vulgar 
throughout this country, are satisfied they often drop out of the air, 
being shot by fairies, and relate many instances of it; but for my part, I 
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must crave leave to suspend my faith, until1 I see one of them descend. 
Lhywd and other antiquarians used the analogy with North American Indians to 
reject not only the "vulgarn elf theory for stone arrowheads found in Europe, but 
also the more widely accepted theory that such items were the result of natural 
processes in the air or ground. This example typifies the role of analogy in archae- 
ological thought . 
But some archaeologists have raised objections to the pervasive use of analogy 
in their field. Some object that the reconstruction or explanation of particular, 
bygone cultures is not a primary goal of their profession, preferring instead the 
inference of laws or general principles governing human cultures. Gould (1980, 
p. x), for example, considers analogy to be part of the "intellectual wreckagen of 
traditional archaeological reasoning and proposes instead that 
The first element of any convincing approach to ethnoarchaeology in- 
volves establishing a basis for uniformitarianist kinds of generalizations 
about human behavior that are not subject to dteration or amend- 
ment. . . . 
Gould suggests that such generalizations would describe ways in which the natural 
environment invariably constrains human behavior and human material remains. 
However, Gould's objection is based in part on his strict adherence to a shared- 
attribute account of analogy (see Wylie, 1982), and should be considered with this 
point in mind. 
Other archaeologists object to analogies because of their exclusion fiom logical- 
positivist theories of science. Binford (1967a, p. 235) states that 
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The basic form of archaeological argument, or of any argument which 
seeks to formulate general propositions, should be logicedeductive. 
In the same vein, Binford (1967b, p. 10) suggests that analogy serves, at most, 
to 'provoke certain types of questions" which may be properly investigated in 
the logicedeductive manner. Here, Binford contends that if archaeology is to be 
scientific, and since analogies are not a proper part of scientific reasoning (following 
Popper), then archaeology must eschew analogies or at least exciude them from the 
so-called context of justification. 
Finally, some archaeologists simply observe that analogies are not a source of 
logically valid inferences and point to cautionary tales that demonstrate how anal* 
gies lead to conclusions known to be false on other grounds. Heider (196?), for ex- 
ample, indicates how the material culture of the Dani people of New Guinea would 
tend to mislead archaeologists who might interpret that culture by comparison with 
familiar analogs. Heider (1967, p. 62) concludes with a plea for the use of multiple 
analogies in archaeological interpretation: 
. . . the archaeologist who ha[s] ventured into ethnography would need to 
guard against basing all his assumptions on one contemporary culture. 
The point is that these assumptions must be based on a whole range of 
possibilities, not on any single ethnographic model. 
In other words, archaeological conclusions should be informed by several relevant 
source analogs, not just the first one that the archaeologist considers. Unfortu- 
nately, Heider does not clarify how this sort of multiple comparison is to be accom- 
plished. 
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Clearly, archaeology is fertile ground for anyone interested in issues of analogical 
reasoning. Because of the central place that analogy has assumed in archamlog- 
icd research, the luchaeological literature is well stocked with good examples of 
analogies in action. Many of these examples are, in fact, examples of multiple 
analogies suitable For investigation here. Because of its important similarities and 
differences with evolutionary biology, an examination of multiple analogies in ar- 
chaeology can be expected to indicate the generality of the account of multiple 
analogies given in chapters 2 and 3. The most obvious similarity between the two 
disciplines is that they both involve the explanation of past events as evidenced by 
material remains. It is this common situation that makes analogical comparisons 
bet ween past and present so important in both fields of research. The most obvious 
difference between archaeology and evolutionary biology is the lack of a unifying 
theory in archaeology corresponding to the neDaxvinian synthesis in evolutionary 
science. Thus, although archaeologists are faced with a similar situation as evolu- 
tionary biologists, they do not have the same recourse to unifying concepts such as 
adaptation when generating hypotheses. In archaeology, then, multiple analogies 
must be constructed with less assurance that appropriate, system-level concepts 
are available. 
In addition to the issues that archaeological examples raise on the nature of ana- 
logical reasoning, the controversy in archaeology over the place of analogy indicates 
that analogical reasoning raises important issues on the nature of archaeology. This 
part of the philosophical tradition in archaeology has examined various problems 
inherent in analogical reasoning and produced a range of recommendations, from 
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abandoning analogy to expanding it to multiple analogies. But, in the absense of 
any account of multiple analogies, the significance of this last recommendation has 
gone unexarnined. With the account of multiple analogies developed here, however, 
the importance of multiple analogies to theoretical issues in archaeology may be 
addressed at last. 
This chapter is aimed at constructing a dialog of sorts between archaeology and 
philosophy on the subject of multiple analogies along similar lines to the dialog 
conducted between biology and philosophy in the previous chapters. The purpose 
of this dialog is to explore the nature and role of multiple analogies in archaeo- 
logical reasoning, and to examine the implications that multiple analogies have for 
philosophical issues in archaeology. 
Section 4.2 describes multiple analogies used in t h e  explanation of marks on pre- 
historic Peruvian pots; 
Section 4.3 presents multiple analogies constructed for research into the signifi- 
cance of figurine legs from Neolithic Greece; 
Section 4.4 discusses a multiple analogy used to defend a hypothesis that early 
North Americas did hunt mammoths; 
Sect ion 4.5 addresses the implications of these cases for the Multiconstrain t theory 
in the areas of visud representation, target concept specificity, and supple- 
mentation, while 
Section 4.6 presents the implications of reasoning by multiple analogy for philo- 
sophical issues in archaeology. 
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The result is an increased understanding of the nature of analogical reasoning for 
both philosophers and archaeologists. 
4.2 Peruvian pots 
A cogent and straightforward example of a multiple analogy in archaeology is pr* 
vided by Donnan (1971). The example concerns the significance of odd marks or 
incisions found on the necks of Moche clay pots excavated along the north coast of 
the Peruvian Andes. Examination and excavation of 26 Moche (A.D. 100-800) sites 
yielded a copious collection of, among other things, utility-grade clay pots. These 
pots were made of coarse clay and showed signs of having been used over a fire, but 
showed no indications of having been decorated in any way. Most likely they were 
meant not for display, but for the routine storage and preparation of food. 
Roughly ten percent display curious marks on their necks. The marks are small 
and inconspicuous, highly variable, and apparently made without care with a blunt 
instrument or a fingertip. The marks are also always confined to a single, small 
area on the neck of each pot on which they occur. Similar marks on clay pots from 
archaeological digs in other areas have yet to be reported. The question is simply: 
What is the meaning, if any, of these odd marks? 
Donnan suggests a solution in terms an analogy with pots made by modern 
potters in central Peru. He reports that modem potters in this area put very similar 
marks, called signdes, on the necks of their coarse pots under two very particular 
circumstances. The first circumstance is illustrated by the potters of the village of 
Tarid which is a center of local ceramic production. On some occasions, the potters 
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sharing a single facility, either a kiln or storage shed, belong to separate economic 
units, e.g., families. In order to distinguish their pots from those belonging to other 
economic units using the same facility a t  the same time, one or all pasties mark 
their own pots with signdles. After the pots are ready, each potter can identify his 
own and market them separately. 
The second circumstance is illustrated by traveling potters who visit isolated 
communities in the hinterland, such as Quihuay, to make and sell pots.' After tak- 
ing sufficiently many orders for pots, the potters then produce and deliver them. 
On occasions when potters from different economic units travel together, they typ- 
ically fire their pots in the same kiln in order to save on fuel costs. In order to 
distinguish their pots from those of other potters fired in the same lot, one or all 
parties mark their own pots with signdles. After the pots are ready, each potter 
can identify his own and deliver them appropriately. 
This analogy may be represented as in table 4.1. The most important part of the 
analogy for present purposes is the set of system mappings. The system mappings 
in each domain briefly describe a plan of action for sharing pot production facilities 
while keeping the pots of different potters separated. The potters incise signciles 
on their pots in order that (e-g., in-order-thatqo) the signdles may serve to identify 
those pots later on. Such an identification enables (enable,) the potters to separate 
their pots from the pots of others. This separation, in turn, contributes to the 
ultimate goal (in-order-thatql) of sharing fuel. The plans employed at Quihuay and 
Taricl are essentially the same, except that there is a wider range of things than 
'Some of these pot ten are actually from Taricii, and make the rounds of remote villages in the 
spring. 
Quihuay I Taric6 11 Moche 1 










inciseq(pot ters, ,pots, ,signdles,) 
identify,(signdes, ,pots,) 
separate, (potters, ,pots,) 
shareq (potters, ,fuel) 
in-order-thatqo(incise,,jdentify9) 
enable,(identify,,separate,) 
in-order-that,, (separate, ,share,) 
incise,(pot ters, ,pots,,marks) 
identify,(marks,pots,) 
separa th  (potters, ,pots,) 
share, (potters, ,facilities,) 
in-order-thatmo(incise, ,identifym) 
enablh(identifym ,separate,) 






incise,(pot terst,potst ,signtilest) 
identifyt(signdlest ,potst) 
separate: (potterst ,potst) 
sharet (potters: ,facilitiest) 
in-order- thatto(incise( ,identifyt) 
enablet (identifyt,separatet) 
in-order-thattl (separatet ,share,) 
Table 4.1: A representation of the Quihuay+Taric&/Moche analogy given by Donnan (1971). The analogy 
imputes to the Moche a similar plan to that employed in Quihuay and Taricb for sharing production facilities 
while distinguishing pots. 
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fuel to share in  the latter location. This plan is then imputed analogically to the 
Moche. 
Donnan's analogy appears to be a strong one by the standards of the MT, 
the only difficulty being one of justifying the use of both the Taricii and Quihuay 
source domains instead of either one alone. Donnan (1971, p. 464) is quite clear 
about the reason: The activities of potters at Quihuay and Tarici take place under 
physical and economic circumstances that an archaeologist must regard as distinct. 
As noted above, in Quihuay the potters travel to their customers and take orders, 
whereas in Taricii the potters await their customers at a fixed location. But, in both 
cases, similar marks are made on the pots. It is curious, then, that Donnan draws no 
conclusions about the physical and economic practices of the Moche, whether Moche 
potters traveled the countryside (call this proposition 'A') or stayed in town ('B') or 
both ('A or B'). He says only that his analogy uprovides an interesting hypothesis 
which could be tested when more data are made available" (Donnan, 1971, p. 466). 
The disjunction A or  B seems a little indefinite, which might explain why Doman 
stopped short of imputing it to the Moche it in the target of his analogy. This 
observation suggests that multiple analogies may be (1) favored when the use of 
several analogs permits the recognition of important distinctions (relevant to the 
field in question, e.g., archaeology), and (2) limited in scope so that no disjunctive 
or indefinite predicates need to appear in the target analog. 
Two further aspects of this analogy require comment. First, the connection 
between the sources and target gains credence due to the strong visual similarity of 
the modern signtiles with the marks found on Moche pots. Doman (1971, p. 466) 
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remarks that 
when the [modern] potters were shown ancient marks on fragments of 
Moche cooking vessels, they invariably identified them as signciles. . . . 
In other words, the appearance of the  marks together with their position on the 
pots immediately reminds potters of signdies. Donnan also observes that the pot- 
ters show no surprise at the age of the Moche vessels, suggesting the possibility of 
a continuous tradition of signdes in the region. But Donnan also observes, cor- 
rectly, that his analogy is quite strong whether the tradition is continuous or not. 
Although not well captured by predicates such as those in table 4.1, visual similar- 
ities are often important in the construction of analogies (Holyoak and Thagard, 
1995, pp. 113-4, 194), particularly in archaeology (Shelley, 1996). 
Second, Donnan (1971, p. 466) draws attention to a further similarity between 
the Moche and present-day Peru, namely that marks or signtiles are only infre- 
quently found on pots. Most cooking pots past or present bear no such mazks at 
all. Probably, this situation results because potters do not often share their facil- 
ities, although D o ~ a n  does not explicitly address this point. But, if this point 
were addressed, i t  might be possible to extend the analogy represented in table 4.1 
to include the reasons that potters have to share facilities, and the infrequency 
with which those reasons apply in practice. Or, since the present analogy stands 
well on its own, it might be better to construct an additional analogy with the 
new information. The two analogies could then be linked in some other way than 
inclusion in one structure, perhaps by independently supporting predicates in the 
target, Moche domain. 
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4.3 Greek figurine legs 
Another example of a multiple analogy involving clay artifacts is given by Talalay 
(1987). This example concerns the possible function of 18 unusual clay fragments 
found by archaeologists in five sites belonging to the Neolithic Peloponnese. The 
fragments appear to be clay replicas of individual, female legs with protruding 
buttocks, a painted or incised pubic triangle, incisions indicating a hand on the 
upper thigh, and simple, painted patterns of chevrons and stripes (Talday, 1987, 
pp. 162-3). Traditionally, the legs have been interpreted as broken-off parts of 
Mother Goddess figures, but there is no evidence of any torsos to which the legs 
might once have been attached. But there is good evidence that each leg was once 
half of a pair of legs and that, in fact, these pairs of legs were manufactured i n  order 
to be broken apart (Talalay, 1987, p. 163). The question is: Why would anyone do 
that? 
Historical and ethnographic analogies suggest that such objects might have been 
tokens which served to (1) seal a contract, or (2) attest to the identity of its bearer 
for special recognition. As Taiaiay notes, the ancient Greeks sometimes used the 
term symbolon to designate an object that may be split in half in order to seal an 
agreement or to facilitate later recognition. Examples of the former kind (1) are 
mentioned by Herodotus and appear to correspond to clay plaques excavated from 
the Athenian Agora. The plaques were cut in half along an irregular line so that 
each half could be joined only with its original partner. Possessors of such half- 
plaques could thus be uniquely identified as parties to a particular deal. Euripides 
uses the term symbolon in the second sense (2) in the Medea, where Jason offers 
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a number of them to Medea so that, once in exile from Corinth, she can expect 
hospitality from people who recognize them as tokens of their friendship with Jason. 
Similarly, the classical Romans used tesserae hospitalis to describe tokens that 
were split up between friends so that those friends or their descendants might 
recognize each other and treat each other accordingly (2). Both Cicero and Plautus 
provide examples. 
Non-western examples also exist for both uses of split tokens. The now obsolete 
Japanese term warifv was used to designate the tearing of pieces of material or pa- 
per in two in order to record an economic transaction (1). Each half was retained 
by one of the two parties involved as proof of their part in the deal. A similar prac- 
tice allegedly exists in the American mafia, in which a bill of large denomination, 
carrying matching serial numbers at either end, is torn in two. Each party to a 
deal keeps one half as a promissory note that the rest of the transaction will be 
completed at  the proper time md place (1). 
In ancient China, bronze figures such as lions or cats were cast in two pieces in 
order to identify messengers. The leaders of two groups would each keep one half 
of such a figure. When messengers were sent from one to the other, the messenger 
was given one half of a figure which could then be matched with the other half 
upon his arrival. The figure thus served to identify the messenger as legitimate 
(2). A common dramatic device in fairy tales of the Far East concerns two children 
who are separated at birth and each given one half of a unique object. When the 
children grow into adults, they are reunited under unusual circumstances and their 
relationship is proven by matching the halves of the object back together (2). 
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Part of Talalay's analogy may be represented as in table 4.2. Talalay actually 
presents six source analogs, three for each of her basic divisions of (1) contractual 
records and (2) tokens of recognition; the Mafia source is of type 1, while the fairy 
t d e  source is of type 2. There are several important points to note about this 
analogy. 
First, this example of multiple analogy shows a greater divergence of attributes 
than that of signtiles and Peruvian pots discussed above (section 4.2). It is only at 
the relational, and especially the system levels where the correspondences become 
very close. This situation is the natural result of the wide variety of contexts on 
which Tdalay has drawn. This variety has its pros and cons (Talalay, 1987, pp. 166- 
7). On the one hand, it suggests that the phenomenon is widespread and therefore 
applies readily to Neolithic Greece in particular. On the other hand, it suggests 
that the phenomenon has many diverse manifestations and therefore provides only 
vague conclusions. In her summary, Tdalay (1987, p. 166) expresses this vagueness 
as a disjunctive conclusion: 
In each instance, the object served either as a contractual device or 
as an identifying token between individuals or groups, symbolizing an 
agreement, obligation, friendship, or a common bond. 
In table 4.2, this vagueness is captured by the use of very general predicates in 
the target domain, e.g., recogn~(second-partyp,bond)  where recognize and bond 
might have a variety of meanings in specific instances. The upshot of this situation is 
that a coherent analogy may indeed be constructed, but in somewhat non-specific 
terms. Vagueness is indeed the price for the sort of disjunctive conclusion that 
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recognizepl (second-partyp, bond) 
becausefl(mat &,,part-of*) 
becausepl (match,,part-ofpl ) 
becausep2(keep~,recognizew) 
becauseps(keeppl ,recognizepl ) 
at test-to,(match,,bond) 
belong-tor 1 (second-chiId,fat her) 
becausejo(matchl,part-ofis) 
beca~se,,,~(keep~~,agree-to~) 
becausem3(keepml ,agree-to, l )  
attest-tom(match,,deal) 
Table 4.2: A representation of the analogy constructed by Talalay (1987) to the target of Neolithic clay legs 
found in the Peleponnese. 
be~ause~~(keep~~,belong- t lo) 
becausels(keep 1 ,belong-to 11) 
attest-to j(match j,father) 
CHAPTER 4. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES IN ARCHAEOLOGY 
Donnan was evidently anxious to avoid. 
A second point to note regarding the analogy represented in table 4.2 is that 
it captures only the logical or paradigmatic inforrnat ion from each source domain 
considered and leaves aside the narrative or syntagmatic information that is dso 
given in each case. That is to say, although each source analog is provided in the 
form of a short anecdote describing a prototypical sequence of events involving two 
parties acting on a mutual understanding, the source columns in table 4.2 describe 
no sequence of events at all. This selectiveness is appropriate since Talalay is solely 
in pursuit of the soci~econornic junction of the Neolithic clay legs, and not in 
pursuit of whatever activities might have accompanied their use. There is certainly 
potential for confusion here. In the Eastern fairy tale, for example, the splitting and 
subsequent reunion of the two halves kept by each child parallels the splitting and 
subsequent reunion of the children themselves. However apt, this analogy of motifs 
is irrelevant to Talalay's purpose and, if included in table 4.2, would only serve to 
weaken the coherence of the analogy where the problem at hand is concerned. 
4.4 Clovis mammoth harvesting 
A ha1 example of reasoning with multiple analogies in azchaeology concerns the 
possible role of human hunters in the extinction of the mammoth in North America. 
Mammoths became extinct in North America roughly 11,000 years ago, at about the 
same time that the "Clovis hunters" are thought to have swept across the continent. 
Clovis points, or stone spearheads similar to those found at Clovis, New Mexico, 
are sometimes found in association with the archaeological remains of mammoths, 
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suggesting that the owners of the spears used them to kill the mammoths. Perhaps 
human hunting was the factor that brought about the mammoths' extinction. 
Before any such general hypothesis can be evaluated, the hypothesis that hu- 
mans harvested mammoths at all must be examined. The simple association of 
Clovis points with mammoth remains does not prove that the spears were used to 
dispatch the mammoths. The association could be accidental, or the mammoth 
might have been scavenged rather than hunted. But there are analogies with the 
hunting of elephants in modern Africa which suggest that mammoth hunting is a 
definite possibility (see Kelley and Hanen, 1988, pp. 338-43). For example, tribes 
such as the semi-nomadic Efe pygmies and the village-dwelling Lese still hunt ele- 
phants in the Ituri Forest in the Congo and therefore suggest themselves as andogs 
of ancient mammoth hunters (Fisher, 1992). One problem with these analogies 
is that these modem hunters typically break open the femurs and humeri of the 
elephants in order to extract the fat and marrow stored in them. Marrow is sought 
out by the elephant hunters because it tastes good and supplies needed dietary 
fats that are scarce in animal muscle tissues. Yet there is very little evidence that 
the Clovis hunters ever broke open mammoth bones in search of marrow (Haynes, 
1991, pp. 292-3). Thus, the comparison of mammoth hunting with elephant hunt- 
ing seems to produce a significant disanalogy that weighs against the hypothesis 
that the Clovis people hunted or harvested mammoths at all (Haynes, 1991, p. 304). 
Haynes (1991, pp. 304-9) attempts to overcome this disandogy by developing 
a multiple analogy mapping non-human carnivores and different modern elephant 
hunters to Clovis hunters. First, Haynes (1991, pp. 304-8) notes that t h e  degree to  
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which large carnivores consume a carcass depends upon the difficulty they have in 
obtaining their next meal. When the prospects for another meal are low, carnivores 
tend to clean their plates, whereas when prospects are good, carnivores tend to eat 
what they like and leave the rest. North American wolves display this behavior 
when their typical prey, bison, deer, and moose, are vulnerable (Haynes, 1991, 
p. 306): 
Wherever North American wolves find hunting easy, they often wan- 
der away from prey herds and carcasses to explore other parts of the 
landscape. They may choose to risk losing contact with prey and even 
voluntarily abandon uneaten meat because they have the security of 
knowing that if more meat cannot be procured, then at least they can 
return to the old carcass sites. Spotted hyenas in southern Africa have 
the same kind of security during very dry seasons; when ungulates are 
weakened by drought conditions and stasvation, hyenas are content to 
nibble at the carcasses of elephants, as a result of which many carcasses 
remain largely intact. 
Haynes (1991, p. 308) proceeds to suggest that the Clovis hunters may similarly 
have made light use of mammoths when those mammoths were under stresses such 
as drought. Like modem elephants, a drought or late winter freezeup would have 
weakened the mammoths and caused them to congregate at sources of water, mak- 
ing them especially vulnerable to predation in numbers. Clovis hunters encoun- 
tering groups of mammoths under such conditions might have dispatched them 
with relative ease and utilized them lightly due to their abundance. This analogy 
CHAPTER 4. bf ULTIPLE ANALOGIES IN ARCHAEOLOGY 132 
would tend to explain why archaeologists typically find the largely intact remains 
of groups of mammoths at Clovis &killn sites. 
Haynes (1991, pp. 308-9) adds that there are examples of modern elephant hunts 
by humans in which the carcasses are lightly utilized: at elephant culls designed to 
reduce elephant populations within a specific region. At these events, whole herds 
of elephants are shot dead within seconds. Carcass use is very light-generally 
restricted to the removal of lower jaws and tusks-because the hunters have other 
sources of food and do not subsist on elephant meat or marrow. Thus the femurs and 
humeri of the elephants are left intact. If Clovis hunters similarly killed mammoths 
en rnasse and butchered them quickly, then they would leave groups of intact 
skeletons just as archaeologists have found. 
The analogy developed by Haynes may be represented as in table 4.3. The 
mappings at the system level describe a scenario in which wolves and hunters are 
able to kill large numbers of elephants, mammoths, or bison because the animals 
are weak and clustered toget her. The fact that they kill so many prey animals easily 
enables the predators to ignore the marrow contained in the femurs and humeri of 
their prey. Thus, since they prefer other forms of food anyway, the predators ignore 
the marrow altoget her, leaving the marrow-bearing bones intact for archaeologists 
to find many years later. 
Unlike the analogy by Tdalay discussed in section 4.3, this analogy concerns 
the explanation for a series of events, which is why it is given in terms of physical . 
requisites, e.g., enable, and causes. The purpose of this exercise is to infer a plau- 
sible scenario that would result in collections of many mammoths without broken 
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cluster-at,,, (many-mammoths,water- holes) 
weaken,(freeze-u p,many-mammoths) 
kill, (hun ters,,many-mammoths) 
ignore, (hunters,,marrow-bonesm) 
prefer, (hunters,,fresh-meat,) 
enablemo (cluster-at, ,kill, ) 
enableml (weaken,,kill, ) 
e n a b l h *  (kill, ,ignore,) 
cause, (prefer, ,ignore,) 
Table 4.3: A representation of the analogy between wolves and elephant cullers with Clovis hunters from 
Haynes (1991). Note that the elephant cull domain is left deliberately incomplete. 
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marrow bones. The analogy constructed by Haynes provides just such a scenario 
by plausibly supporting the predicate ignore, in the target, Clovis domain. If the 
Clovis hunters did ignore marrow bones when they killed many mammoths, then 
the result would be  just the kinds of remains that archaeologists do, in fact, find. 
From this we may conclude, at least, that the Clovis hunting scenario built up by 
the analogy is a plausible explanation for the findings made by archaeologists today. 
Another important point to note about the analogy represented in table 4.3 is 
that the elephant source domain is only partially complete. In fact, this incom- 
pleteness reflects the fact that only some of the information about modern hunters 
engaged in elephant culls is relevant. Elephants are not culled because they are 
weak or because they cluster around water holes. They axe culled simply because 
there are too many of them. We are invited to consider only the fact that these 
hunters ignore the elephant marrow bones because this fact suggests that humans 
will act in the same way, out of a motive similar to that of wild carnivores such as 
wolves. In effect, the elephant source domain is used mainiy to substitute hunters 
for wolves, and elephants for bison. This substitution allows Haynes to sharpen his 
conclusions in two ways: (1) to address humans specifically rather than predators 
in general, and (2) to describe those humans hunting elephants, which are much 
more similar to mammoths than bison are. By making these substitutions, Haynes 
makes his target analog as specific as possible to the task at hand, thus enhancing 
its suitability for his purposes. 
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4.5 Implications for multiple analogies 
The above discussion indicates that multiple analogies are indeed part of the prac- 
tice of archaeological inference. But several issues regarding the nature of reasoning 
by multiple analogy remain vague. The remainder of this section provides a dis- 
cussion of some specific points that were not addressed in the  examples discussed 
above. In particular, this section addresses issues concerning the role of visual 
mental imagery, specificity, and supplementation in multiple analogies. 
4.5.1 Visual imagery 
Like many biologists, archaeologists often seem to be visual t hiders-that is, they 
are disposed to  think about things by imagining them in their "mind's eye" (sec- 
tion 3.4.1). This fact is not surprising for people in a discipline that demands the 
interpretation of multitudes of macroscopic objects, like bones, stone tools, pot 
shards, and so on. The shape, orientation, and relative position of solid objects 
may be important data for an archaeologist to explain in the process of construct- 
ing a theory. The examples of multiple analogy discussed above seem to show the 
influence of these cognitive demands. 
In the cases of the Moche pots (section 4.2) and Greek figurine legs (section 4.3), 
the physical appeaance of some object is itself the thing to be explained by the ar- 
chaeologist. In table 4.1, for example, the predicates signdes and marks represent 
the physical attributes that require explanation. Visually, as Donnan points out, 
the marks on Moche pots are very similar to the modern aigndes, which suggests 
that they might all be explained as the result of similar processes. This similarity 
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is not captured by the verbal representations marks and signdes, which do not 
much resemble one another at all. Thus, the representation of this analogy given 
in table 4.1 probably fails to capture what Donnan actually had in mind when he 
considered the problem. The M T  recognizes the role of visual similarity in attribute 
matches as in this case, but the details of how visual similarity may be represented 
(as required for a computer model) are not yet clear. A number of cognitive models 
of visual representations and procedures have been put forward, e.g., shape gram- 
mars (Leyton, 1989, 1992), array theory (Glasgow and Papadias, 1992), and graph 
grammars (Thagard and Shelley, 1997), but none of these frameworks has been 
applied to models of analogy. Adapting current models of analogy to use these 
representations (or vice versa) would undoubtedly shed some Light on the whole 
issue, 
Visual imagery is also not confined to the represent at  ion of static, physical 
properties such as the shape. Physical processes may also be visualized in progress. 
In Talalay's analogy among split objects, the processes of splitting and fitting back 
together may be represented in action in the mind's eye. In other words, rather than 
having the representation match,, one might simply imagine a shadowy mafia figure 
tearing a thousand dollar bill in half and then later matching the halves together. 
This sort of representation could be thought of as a mental movie as opposed to 
a mental word. Psychological research indicates that both visual and linguistic 
representations are activated in the process of reading, depending on whether the 
reading material is concrete or abstract (Paivio, 1983). The same may well be true 
of analogy construction, depending on whether one is interested in the vertical or 
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horizontal directions as out line below. 
The vertical direction of an analogy concerns the associations within each d e  
main, such as the mafia column in table 4.2. Verbal representations are better 
suited for this direction in the sense that systemlevel predicates such as because 
are almost inherently abstract, making it somewhat difficult to conceive of them as 
represented by mental movies. What is the visual representation of because? The 
horizontal direction concerns mappings between domains, where visual represen- 
tations may still b e  appropriate. The visual similarity between mental movies of 
match, and match,, for example, are quite adequate to sustain a mapping between 
them for the purposes of perceptual similarity. The ability of people to  use different 
cognitive representations, at least from visual to verbal, according to the demands 
of the task at hand has been demonstrated in experiments on problem-solving 
(Kaufmann, 1990). The same ability appears to be operative in the examples of 
archaeological reasoning discussed above. 
Visual imagery may be especially important for analogical reasoning with muC 
tiple sources. One of the limitations of using visual imagery is its very concreteness. 
Visual images, mental or physical, typically represent details about the appearance 
of objects that may prove to be ultimately irrelevant to completing any particular 
task, at least where the use of single images is concerned (Finke, 1989; Chambers 
and Reisberg, 1992). But, as the Gestalt psychoIogists noted in the ease of visual 
percept ion, similar elements of an image tend to  be percieved as belonging together 
in a group. For example, by the principle of common fate, objects that appear to 
undergo the same movement in the same way are perceived as belonging to  a single 
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unit. If this principle may also be applied to mental movies such as match, and 
match,, then the common fate of the banknote and the figurine legs would make 
those objects appear to belong together. In other words, a mapping between the 
mental movies of match, and match, would be made in which common fate counts 
as semantic similarity. Since the principle works for several objects as well as for 
two objects, multiple mappings are as easy to create as single ones. Perhaps other 
Gestdtist uni t-forming principles could be used to represent perceptual similarity 
in visual images and mental movies. 
In this circumstance, then, the presence of visual details facilitates rather than 
hinders the process of analogy construction. Details tend to make sundry objects 
within an image more distinct from one another, which makes comparisons with 
similar objects in other images easier. Objects shared among several images stand 
out even more for this same reason. Thus, the relative wealth of information in 
imagery seems to aid the identification of properties shared by several source do- 
mains. In the analogy put forward by Talalay, for example, the visual similarity of 
acts of breaking or tearing objects in half across six different sources probably aided 
Talalay in aligning the broader activities in which those acts occurred. In other 
words, noting the visual similarity of the acts of breaking an object in halves and 
then matching those halves from several domains may well have been the cue for the 
construction of analogies among those domains. The remainder of this construction 
process might then cmsist of aligning the other objects found upon inspection of 
each object-breaking scene. e.g., the characters doing the breaking and matching. 
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4.5.2 Specificity 
Wylie (1985, p. 98) notes that the use of multiple sources may contribute to the 
strength of an analogy by increasing confidence that the presence of some feature in 
all domains is not merely a coincidence. On this view, the motivation for expanding 
an analogy in the horizontal direction is the same as that for expanding it in the 
vertical direction. Recall Mill's view (section 1.5) that the strength of an analogy 
is proportional to the absolute number of features shared by the source and target. 
Cast in terms of the MT, this principle would state that the strength of an analogy 
is proportional to the number of mappings or rows that it conveys. Wylie suggests 
that the strength of an analogy is also proportional to the number of sources or 
columns that it conveys. 
There are, however, a couple of difficulties with this tentative principle. The 
first limitation is simply that a very large number of sources would tend to cause 
confusion in the mind of the analogizer. In other words, the utility of multiple 
sources is subject to  the number which an archaeologist can keep straight in his 
mind (or computer). The second and more serious limitation is the vagueness that 
multiple sources might introduce into the target. In the models of analogy discussed 
in chapter 1, only mappings between identical features axe contemplated. But, as 
is the case in the MT, most actual analogies contain mappings between similar 
but non-identical features. The result is that, in order to be coherent with a l l  the 
predicates in the multiple source domains, some predicates in the target domain 
may be vague or broadly defined. In short, there is a potential trade-off between 
the specificity of the representation of the target and the number of sources given 
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in an analogy. 
Effects of this trade-off are evident in the pot and figurine leg analogies discussed 
above (sections 4.2 and 4.3). In his discussion of their pots, Donnan avoids drawing 
any conclusions about whether the Moche potters located themselves centrally or 
whether they traveled around taking orders for their wares. Each of the two sources 
he describes support only one alternative, meaning that his conclusion, were it 
included in the target domain, would have to be coherent with both possibilities. 
It seems that such a non-specific conclusion is undesirable enough to cause Donnan 
to avoid the issue altogether, which leaves him with a very strong analogy strictly 
concerning the sharing of potting facilities. 
Talalay takes a different approach, including a luge  number of somewhat di- 
vergent sources in her analogy. As a result, her conclusion is somewhat vague, 
stating that the clay legs of the Neolithic Peleponnese functioned as (1) symbols 
of a contractual undertaking or (2) means of future recognition. These concepts 
are similar, but not identical, and are therefore represented in the target by the 
broad notion of a bond. But the sacrifice of specificity in this representation may be 
warranted by the specificity retained by the predicate match, (table 4.2). In other 
words, Talalay's purpose was to motivate the conclusion that the figurine legs were 
intended to be split into matching halves, a concIusion that cannot otherwise be 
regarded as obvious. The sources that she gives remain very coherent where the 
concept of match is concerned, so the support of six sources is worth the resulting 
vagueness elsewhere in the analogy. 
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4.5.3 Supplementation 
An important exception to the trade-off relationship described above (section 4.5.2) 
is given by Haynes (section 4.4). Haynes does not add the elephant cull source 
simply to increase the number of sources in favor of his hypothesis, nor to make 
his conclusion less specific. Rather, this source is added to overcome some specific 
dissimilarities bet ween his main source and the target domain. 
Initially, Haynes draws a single analogy between carnivores such as wolves and 
prehistoric humans in the hunting of bison and mammoths, respectively. But hu- 
mans and wolves are not simply comparable where their motivations and general 
psychology are concerned, nor do mammoths and bison present quite the same 
chdlenges to either predator. The semantic dissimilarities in the relevant m a p  
pings leave the single analogy somewhat weak as a result. The dissimilarities are 
partially hidden by the use of predicates like ignore and prefer to describe both 
human and animal actions and motivations in table 4.3. In effect, their appli- 
cation tends to aatbropomorphisize the wolves, whose mental states may not be 
adequately or appropriately described in predicate notation. But it is difficult to 
give any description of the mental states of animals in English without resorting 
to such metaphors. To overcome these dissimilarities, a human source analog is 
offered in only enough detail to address the problem. 
This process of using one source to repair another may be called supplementation 
(see section 2.5.4), and it appears to be a generally useful strategy for building up a 
composite source out of components that are inadequate when considered on their 
own (Wylie, 1985, p. 106). Some archaeologists, e.g., Gould (1980) (see section 4.1), 
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have claimed that reasoning by analogy limits them to construing each past culture 
solely in terms of some present one, thus making it impossible to understand past 
cultures that are unlike any culture of today. The process of supplementation in 
multiple analogies clearly enables the archaeologist to overcome this objection, just 
as the same process helps biologists to overcome the limitations of the fossil record 
(section 2.5.4). 
4.6 Analogies in archaeological theory 
The points addressed above highlight qualities of multiple analogical inference that 
demand the attention of philosophers and cognitive scientists. But the discussion 
so far does not fully reveal the contribution that a cognitive theory of analogy such 
as the MT can make to those people interested in issues of archaeological theory 
and practise. In other words, it remains to show to archaeologists what the above 
discussion implies about archaeology. The remainder of this section addresses this 
point, looking specifically at the coverage of the term analogy and the advantages 
in clarity gained by adopting a more adequate theory of the subject, as well as a 
special difficulty facing archaeologists who seek to use multiple analogies. 
As noted in sect ion 4.1, analogy has had a varying career in archaeological theory 
and practice. For one thing, the term analogy has been used to cover a variety of 
facts about the nature of archaeological inference. Some archaeologists have made 
very strong claims about the centrality of analogy to archaeological epistemology. 
Chang (1967, p. 230), for example, states that 
Indeed, in a broad sense, archaeological reconstruction is analogy, with 
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or without explicit ethnological recourse. 
Similarly, Ascher (1961, p. 317) states that "the most widely used of the tools of 
archaeological interpretation is analogy", while Hodder (1983, p, 9) comments that 
"all archaeology is based on analogy.. . ." Of course, these statements do not gibe 
with the description of analogy given above. Not every inference made by arch- 
ologists is an analogy. Chang, Ascher and Hodder mean simply that all inferences 
about the past are informed by knowledge of the present and that comparisons 
between the two are therefore inevitable. But these varying uses of analogy illus- 
trate the need to be clear about what sense of the term is under consideration. For 
current purposes, analogy refers to an inference based on a structured comparison 
and distinct from deduction, say, and as represented in human cognition. 
Mill's model of analogy and analogical inference has had the most influence in 
archaeology, as it has in philosophy. Recall the version presented by Salmon (1984) 
(section 1.5): 
Objects of type X have properties G, H, etc. 
Objects of type Y have properties G, H, etc. 
Objects of type X have property F. 
So, objects of type Y have property F. 
As it stands, this characterization of analogy is very limited. In fact, it is equiv- 
alent to the construction solely of attribute mappings in the MT, and leaves the 
relational and system mappings unrepresented. Of course, Salmon (1984) is well 
aware that relations between features, as well as causal connections, are relevant to 
the construct ion and evaluation of analogies, but these considerations are omitted 
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from the definition. The practical result of such inadequate formal definitions has 
been to license archaeologists to present as analogies comparisons that amount only 
to lists of shared features. This situation does encourage the use of multiple sources 
in analogy construction, since it is relatively easy to find many objects that simply 
share some set of features. But these analogies are typically weakened by the lack 
of consideration for relational and system mappings. 
Of course, it is unfair to lay the whole blame for this situation at the door of 
current, formal definitions of analogy. As Wylie (1985, pp. 65-7) points out, the 
tradition in l 9 t  h century archaeology was to construct analogies by simply listing 
shared features. This habit eventually helped to bring that form of archaeology into 
disrepute. However, the current tendency to give such lists is Likely to be partly a 
holdover from these former days. But with the increasing sophistication of cognitive 
theories of analogy, archaeologists would be well advised to turn to theories such 
as the MT for a more adequate model of analogy construction. As the above 
discussion shows, this theory can be made to provide for explicit representations of 
entire analogies, whet her single or multiple. 
Another methodological difficulty confronting archaeologists when constructing 
analogies is the  diversity of explanatory schemata that might be relevant to any 
particular case. This point is most clearly made by briefly comparing analogies 
in archaeology with analogies in evolutionary biology. Recall the multiple analogy 
given in table 2.3. The system-level mappings describe the adaptive relationships 
among the rod-pigments in the eyes of various fish and their depth of habitation. 
Having eyes that  best absorb light at wavelengths of 472 and 474 nrn enables the 
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fish Centroscymnus and Ruuettus to see in deep ocean water (200-300m) because 
that is the only sort of light which penetrates to such depths. Thus, being able to 
absorb light at those wavelengths counts as an adaptation to inhabiting deep ocean 
water. Since the Coelacanth Latimeria chalumnae has eyes that best absorb light 
at a similar frequency, biologists infer by multiple analogy that the Coelancanth 
lives at a similar depth. The combination of system-level relations in each domain 
is really just a pre-fabricated template, as it were, provided by evolutionary theory 
to help decide when something may count as an adaptation. This same template 
may be applied to many other situations. The point here is that evolutionary 
theory provides a set of worked-out concepts like adapt that biologists may apply 
in appropriate circumstances. 
Archaeologists, although faced with similar sorts of problems as biologists, are 
not in a similar position. Rather than having one unified theoretical framework 
to apply, archaeologists may select their unifying concepts from any number of 
interpretive theories such as culturehistoricd archaeology, Marxist archaeology, 
functionalist archaeology, feminist archaeology, Neo-evolutionist archaeology, New 
archaeology, etc. (see Trigger, 1989), any of which may suggest results contradic- 
tory to the others. Some archaeologists, e.g., Gould and Watson (1982), suggest 
that analogies would be improved by selecting explanatory concepts from only one 
of these possible areas, but many prefer to consider the alternatives that each area 
provides. But the lack of a unified theory does make archaeological analogies vul- 
nerable to disputes over theory selection. An archaeologist may be accused of using 
entirely the wrong system relations when constructing an analogy, and the use of 
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multiple sources only multiplies the opportunities to level such charges. There is 
no obvious cure for this particular problem, but it points to yet another trade-off 
that archaeologists must face when using multiple analogies: Increasing the number 
of sources also means increasing the number of theoretically-motivated challenges 
that may be raised against the analogy as a whole. Such a difficulty may be par- 
ticularly acute where some analogical sources are used to supplement others, as in 
the Clovis-hunter example (section 4.4) where biological and cultural sources were 
combined without comment on the appropriateness of putting together representa- 
tions from both of those categories. In similar circumstances, Walker and Shipman 
(1996, p. 137) comment that human and animal comparisons help to free them from 
"homocentrism". Perhaps this sort of argument is a line of defense that could be 
developed. 
Finally, it is appropriate to comment on the relevance of multiple analogies to 
the positivist distinction bet ween the 'context of discovery" and the "context of 
j ustificat ionn, introduced into the archaeological discourse by the New Archaeology 
of the 1960s (see Wylie, 1985, pp. 86-8). Archaeologists such as Binford (1967b) 
sought to secure the scientific status of archaeology by applying models of scientific 
inquiry from positivist philosophers of science. Such models included a rigid dis- 
tinction between a phase of inquiry in which hypotheses are generated (the ucontext 
of discoveryn) and a phase in which those hypotheses are evaluated (the Ucontext 
of justificationn). The two phases were regarded as  independent, meaning that 
no data used to generate a hypothesis could then be offered as evidence that the 
hypothesis is correct. Also, justification was held to require the deduction of predic- 
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tions from hypotheses, which, of course, precludes the use of analogical reasoning 
in this phase. Thus, the New Archaeologists tended to restrict analogical reasoning 
to the context of discovery, in which the uncertainty inherent in analogy could be 
accepted, however unwillingly. 
It has been shown elsewhere that this distinction between the contexts of discov- 
ery and justification is untenable (see Wylie, 1985, pp. 87-8). But it is worthwhile 
noting that multiple analogies also appear to weigh against this distinction. From 
the examples discussed in this chapter, it appears that sources may be added to 
analogies for t he  purposes either of hypothesis generation o r  confirmation. In the 
case of Donnan's analogy of Moche and Peruvian pots (section 4.2), both Quihuay 
and Tarici sources seem to have been considered at the time of hypothesis gen- 
eration. Both sources apply to a single area and time, and both even involve the 
same people, and thus would have naturally suggested themselves at one time. The 
other cases, Talalay's and Haynes's analogies (sections 4.3 and 4.4) seem to have 
been the result of a deliberate search for further confirmation of a hypothesis that 
was already formed in the Light of earlier analogizing. Thus, the formation of these 
multiple analogies bridges the discovery/justification gap. This situation creates a 
dilemma in which either multiple analogies or the discovery/j ustification distinction 
must go. In this case, the distinction is the clear loser. The occurrence of multiple 
analogies in archaeological reasoning suggests that confidence in one's conclusions 
cannot be neatly divided into two separate phases of research. 
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4.7 Summary 
Analogies have always been important to archaeological research and continue to be 
so. Due to this importance, the field of archaeology is fertile ground for philosophers 
and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of analogy and the ways in which it 
applied for scientific inference. In some respects, archaeologists find themselves in a 
similar situation to evolutionary biologists. Both often construct hypotheses about 
the past based on comparisons with the present. Also, researchers in both fields 
base their reconstruction on objects excavated from the ground. This similarity 
of situation produces some similarities of practice. For example, both archamlo- 
gists and evolutionary biologists appear to  find visual mental imagery useful when 
constructing multiple analogies. Also, both kinds of scientists find the process of 
supplementation useful in overcoming the limited supply of modern analogs upon 
which they must base their analogies. 
In other respects, however, archaeologists and evolutionary biologists are in a 
very different situation. The theory of evolution provides a set of abstract concepts 
that biologists may rely upon for constmction of multiple analogies. There is no 
such unifying theory in archaeology. Thus, archaeologists face greater difficulty in 
constructing convincing multiple analogies. In order to overcome this difEculty, ar- 
chaeologist s often use several source analogs to bolster confidence in t heir analogies, 
but then face the trade-off of thereby introducing ambiguities into their conc1usions. 
In other words, archaeologists must pay carefd attention to their sources in order 
to control the specificity of their condusions. 
This chapter also shows that archaeologists interested in the epistemological 
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issues raised by their discipline can benefit by viewing these issues from the vantage 
point of cognitive theories like the MT. Applying the MT to analogical reasoning 
in archaeology helps to clarify what may be covered by the term analogy and to 
redress the inadequacies of older theories of analogy as descriptions of archaeological 
practise. In addition, the examination of multiple andogies given in this chapter 
serves to clarify theoretical issues in archaeology arising from the combination of 
sources in multiple analogies, and ernphasises the inability of positivist theories to 
capture the contribution of analogical reasoning in archaeological science. 
This chapter also supports the position that multiple analogies have an impor- 
tant place in scientific reasoning in general. But, of course, multiple analogies are 
not confined to the sciences. To support the position that multiple analogies, as 
such, are a general phenomenon of philosophical interest, it is necessary to examhe 
their occurence in other fields. Perhaps the best way of undertaking this task is to 
examine the role of multiple analogies in philosophy itself. Given the vastness of 
the literature involved, it would be impractical to attempt a general survey, so the 
method adopted in chapter 5 is to go to the source, namely Plato. 
Chapter 5 
Multiple analogies in Plato's 
Republic 
Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a 
condition of life very different from the original one, in which it was placed. Trees perish 
in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of 
climate is often fatal. What reason then t o  imagine, that an immense alteration, such 
as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body and all its organs of thought and 
sensation, can be effected without the dissolution of the whole? 
Hume, On the immortality of the soul, pp. 34-5. 
5.1 Analogies in Plato's philosophy 
Despite the fact that he condemns analogies as inherently misleading, Plato he- 
quently resorts to them in order to support inferences or move the convemation 
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along. In fact, analogical reasoning plays a more important role in the middle 
dialogs than the met hod of hypot hesis-in which a proposition is provisionally 
adopted as true in order to explore its faults and merits-even though Plato claims 
that the method of hypothesis is his preferred one (Robinson, 1953, p. 202). 
The ubiquity of analogy is sometimes indicated by the characters in the dialogs 
themselves when, for instance, they tease Socrates for resorting to analogies so 
often. For example, when Socrates introduces the analogy of the state to a ship 
(the &ship of staten), Adeimantus remarks on the use of yet another analogy with 
a bit of sarcasm (6.487e-8a):' 
[Socrates:] "The question you are asking," I said, "needs an answer 
given through an image." 
[Adeimantus:] "And YOU, in particular," he said, "I suppose, aren't used 
to speaking through such images." 
"All right," I said. "Are you making fun of me after having involved 
me in an argument so hard to prove? At all events, listen to the image 
so you may see still more how greedy I am for images." 
As Robinson (1953, p. 221) notes, Plato uses the term 'image' [eikbn] to describe 
every major analogy in the Republic. The term generally refers to paintings or 
other reproductions, but is broader in meaning and may be  rendered as "likeness" 
or Uprojection" when it is used to designate a comparison. Socrates is also teased 
about his fiequent use of images in the Symposium (221e-2a), when Alcibiades 
'AII translations from the Republic in this chapter are from Bloom (1968), unless otherwise 
noted, 
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drunkenly praises Socrates to the guests at Agat hods celebratory party (translation 
from Hamilton and Cairns, 1963): 
[Alcibiades:] Anyone listening to Socrates for the first time would find 
his arguments simply laughable: he wraps them up in just the kind of 
expressions you'd expect of such an insufferable satyr. He talks about 
pack asses and blacksmiths and shoemakers and tanners, and he always 
seems to be saying the same old thing in just the same old way, so 
that anyone who wasn't used to his style and wasn't very quick on the 
uptake would naturally take it for the most utter nonsense. But if you 
open up his arguments, and really get into the skin of them, you'll find 
that they're the only arguments in the world that have any sense at all, 
and that nobody else's are so godlike, so rich in images of virtue, or so 
peculiady, so entirely pertinent to those inquiries that help the seeker 
on his way to the goal of true nobility. 
Here, Alcibiades refers to Socrates' habit of comparing human ethical and political 
virtues to the skills [techni] of craftsmen such as blacksmiths, shoemakers, etc. 
These images of virtue sound outlandish at first, but are ultimately very persuasive, 
certainly to Alcibiades. This kind of attention paid to analogies indicates their 
importance to the dialect i d  process in the middle dialogs. 
Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers since Plato's time have paid much at- 
tention to Plato's analogies, but their reactions have been circumscribed by the 
theory of analogy used for the purpose. Like Aristotle, most philosophers have 
applied the proportional theory of analogy to this issue, a theory which states that 
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analogies are four-part structures within a particular system of relations hips that 
may be represented in the form A:B::C:D or "A is to B as C is to Dn in English (see 
section 1.3). Given the inadequacies of this theory as an account of analogy (chap 
ter 2)' the result is an inadequate understanding of Plato's analogies. In particular, 
application of the proportional theory prevents us from understanding Plato's use 
of multiple analogies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze examples of multiple analogies from 
Plato's Republic. Multiple analogies are common in this dialog; indeed, many of 
the major analogies presented are mu1 t iple analogies. Recall the analogy bet ween 
the organization of the human soul on the one hand and the organization of a city 
and a flock of sheep on the other hand from section 1.2. Lessons learned from the 
previous chapters are applied to produce a better understanding of the multiple 
analogies given by Plato, and to find out what Plato's multiple analogies can tell 
us about multiple analogies in general. This chapter also takes advantage of the 
opportunity to discuss Plato's own awareness of such analogies or at least the issues 
raised by them. 
Section 5.2 presents Plato's comparison of the soul to eyes, ears, and pruning 
knives; 
Section 5.3 treats Plato's analogy between the health of the body and the justice 
of the state; 
Section 5.4 provides a discussion of Plato's comparison of poets to painters and 
t ragedims; 
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Section 5.5 reviews the issues raised in the previous sections concerning the na- 
ture of multiple analogies, including complementation and narrative repre- 
sentation, specificity, and supplementation; 
Section 5.6 presents evidence of Plato's awareness of multiple analogies in the 
Republic. 
This chapter gives modern scholars a better appreciation of some of Plato's analo- 
gies, of Plato as a sophisticated creator of analogies, and of the cognitive aspects 
of multiple analogies in the domain of philosophical thinking. 
5.2 The function of the soul 
A fairly straightforward example of a multiple analogy occurs in Book I of the 
Republic. Socrates, having been challenged by Thrasymachus to show that justice 
is more desirable than injustice, provides three arguments, the last of which relies 
on a multiple analogy (1.352d-3e). Thrasymachus has already agreed that justice 
is a virtue (1.350d); now Socrates wishes to argue that a virtue is the condition 
that allows a thing to work well. Specifically, Socrates wishes to argue that justice 
is desirable because it enables the soul to function in the way that is proper to it. 
Socrates undertakes the argument by first asking Thrasymachus about the 
proper functions (or "workn) of eyes, ears, and pruning knives (1.35%-3a):* 
2To be precise, Socrates b t  asks Thrasymachus about the proper function of a horse, but 
Thrasymachus does not understand the question and Socrates never expIicitly returns to that 
analog. 
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[Socrates:] "Look at it this way: is there anything with which you could 
see other than eyes?" 
[Thrasymachus:] "Surely not ." 
"And what about this? Could you hear with anything other than ears?" 
"By no means." 
"Then wouldn't we justly assert that this is the work of each?" 
"Certainly." 
"And what about this: you could cut a slip from a vine with a dagger 
or a leather-cutter or many other things?" 
uOf course." 
"But I suppose you could not do as fine a job with anything other than 
a pruning knife made for this purpose." 
"True. 
"Then we shall take this to be its work?n 
"We shall indeed." 
Socrates then points out that each object is able to perform its work because each 
possesses a particular virtue: sight for eyes, audition for ears, and what might be 
called knifeness for pruning knives (1.353b) Thrasymachus then admits that each 
object only works well when it is in possession of its virtue, and poorly otherwise 
3Actually, only sight is named explicitly. Plato evidently does not wish to discuss any particular 
virtues at this point in the dialog (Bloom, 1968, p. 337). 
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(1.353~-d). Socrates then returns to his target, the soul, and gains Thrasymachus' 
assent to  the proposition that living [ten] is the work of the soul, and that the soul 
too must possess a virtue to do its living, i.e., it must possess the virtue of justice 
(1.353d-e). Also, in the course of this argument, Socrates also develops the thesis 
that injustice is a vice of the soul. 
This analogy may be represented as in table 5.1. Socrates' argument can be read 
off by examining the system mappings of each domain. These mappings describe a 
characteristically Platonic position that everything has exactly one ideal function 
and that each function is subserved by one essence proper to it alone. In the case of 
eyes, Socrates holds that there exists a virtue of the eye (sight) that enables seeing 
to be the work of the eye (see Bloom, 1968, p. 337). The activity of seeing may be 
considered to be the work of the eye because it is peculiar to the eye and because 
it is subserved by sight, the virtue of the eye. Similarly, Socrates continues, living 
may be considered to be the work of the soul because it is subserved by justice. 
Since Thrasymachus has already granted that justice is a virtue of soul, it must 
therefore be justice that enables the soul to do its work of living. 
In terms of table 5.1, then, the proposition that Socrates wishes to support is 
enable,. When it is granted that justice is the virtue that enables the soul to do its 
work of living well, it follows that we should all want our souls to possess justice, 
since we all want to live well, and that all whose souls do not possess justice do not 
live well (1.353da). 
There are two points to note about this analogy. F is t ,  it displays a certain 
vagueness where the virtues are concerned. As Bloom (1968, p. 337) points out, 




































b e ~ a ~ S ~ ~ ~ ( ~ O r k - ~ f ~ , p ~ ~ l i ~ - t ~ & )  
becausek 1 (work-ofk,eubservek) 
CHAPTER 5. I11ULTlPLE ANALOGlES IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC 158 
Socrates says nothing about exactly what each virtue consists in. Thrasymachus 
volunteers that sight is the virtue of the eye, but Socrates avoids the subject by 
saying that he is not yet ready to consider what each of the virtues in question 
are (1.353~). Sight counts as the virtue of seeing (and audition as the virtue of 
hearing) because it is the corresponding psychologicd faculty, i. e., sense. But 
there is no such faculty of pruning. Of course, by virtue of a pruning knife, Plato 
means its excellence [aret i ] ,  and a pruning knife may be said to be an excellent one 
because it possesses the appropriate qualities, but the fact remains that none of 
these qualities could ever be called a faculty. This ambiguity in the source analogs 
makes it unclear what sense of virtue is to be understood by the virtue of justice 
in the target analog. Based on the parallels of sight and audition, justice should 
mean a sense of justice, perhaps an intuitive moral faculty of the sort discussed by 
Moore (1903). Based on the pruning knife parallel, justice would appear to be the 
sort of mutual mastery among parts of the soul that Socrates later introduces (see 
section 5.3). The presence of distinct interpretations in this analogy tends to make 
the conclusion ambiguous. 
The second point is that Socrates makes this analogy do double duty in the sense 
that, along with virtue, he includes a consideration of vices in his analogizing. Thus, 
blindness is offered (again by Thrasymachus) as the vice of the eye. This situation 
is similar to that of the hedth/justice analog discussed below (section 5.3). Each 
analog has a positive and negative component and the same pattern of argument 
( i .  e., system relations) apply to both components. Such inclusion of polarity (see 
Lloyd, 1966) in analogical arguments is unusual in the general case, but is quite 
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characteristic of Plato at least where analogies concerning justice are concerned. 
The fact that polarity may be used to perform two jobs in one analogy raises the 
question of whether such analogies are in fact multiple analogies. An example of a 
polar analogy in the Republic is examined in section 5.3. 
5.3 Healthand justice 
The nature of justice is a central issue in the Republic. Plato frequently uses 
analogies and multiple analogies in order to explicate his concept of justice. In 
particular, Plato sets out to describe a concept of justice that is comprehensible and 
manifestly desirable. Socrates completes the first half of this project of establishing 
such a concept by a comparison between justice in the human soul with health in 
the human body (Republic, 4.444~-e):' 
[Socrates:] "Surely healthy things produce health and sick ones sickness." 
[Glaucon:] "Yes ." 
'Doesn't doing just things also produce justice and unjust ones injus- 
tice?" 
"Necessarily." 
"To produce health is to establish the parts of the body in a relation 
of mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to 
nature, while to produce sickness is to establish a relation of ruling, and 
being ruled by, one another that is contrary to nature." 
4For a nice summary of this analogy, see Kraut (1992, p. 315nll). 
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"It is." 
"Then, in its turn," I said, '%n't it to produce justice to establish the 
parts of the soul in a relation of mastering, and being mastered by, one 
aoother that is according to nature, while to produce injustice is to 
establish a relation of ruling, and being ruled by, one another that is 
contrary to nature?" 
"Entirely so," he said. 
"Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a certain health, beauty and good 
condition of a soul, and vice a sickness, ugliness and weakness." 
"So it is." 
Socrates compares health and justice insofar as they count as good things for the 
body and the soul, respectively. 
This analogy may be represented as a single analogy between body and soul 
as shown in table 5.2. The system mappings may be read to show that Socrates 
is giving an  explanation of why justice is a virtue of the soul by comparison with 
health as a virtue of the body. A proper mastery among parts of the body causes 
those parts to produce health (causew). This health belongs to the body in virtue 
of the facts that the body is composed of those body parts (becawern) and that it is 
those body parts that produce the health (becauseb1). Furthermore, health counts 
as a uidue of the body because it is a condition in accord with nature (because, J. 
A parallel explanation is also given with regard to vice and sickness. An analogous 
argument supports the proposition that justice is a virtue of the soul. Of course, 
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Table 5.2: A representation of the analogy between health in the body and justice 
in the soul as given in the Republic (4.444~-e). 
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Socrates must go on to argue that justice is choiceworthy because it is a virtue, 
which means he must explore virtue in greater detail (Republic, 4.444e-5c). 
Note, however, the redundancy in each domain of the analogy as given in ta- 
ble 5.2. For each predicate pertaining to health in the body, for example, there 
is a predicate pertaining to sickness. This duplication is a result of the fact that 
Socrates treats health and sickness as  polar or complementary aspects of the human 
bodily condition. In fact, in Socrates' argument, health and sickness are treated 
as analogous to each other. This fact is not captured in table 5.2, where there is 
no explicit recognition of it. In the notation adopted in this dissertation, anale 
gous predicates should be placed in the same row with each other. Therefore, the 
predicates in table 5.2 need to be rearranged to meet this condition. 
The whole structure of the body/soul analogy may be captured as in table 5.3. 
This table gives the same predicates as table 5.2, but divides both source and 
target in two, separating and placing in correspondence those predicates that belong 
specifically with health and sickness on the one hand, and justice and injustice on 
the other. So that they are not duplicated, predicates that are common to both 
divisions are kept in their former positions between the new columns. The table 
now reveals the richness of structure of this analogy. As represented in table 5.3. 
Plato's analogy is clearly a multiple analogy: It has multiple sources, namely health 
and sickness. Plato has constructed this multiple analogy in a very economical 
fashion by taking advantage of the complementary nature of health and sickness, 
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Table 5.3: Another representation of the analogy between health in the body and justice in the soul as given 
in the Republic ( 4 . 4 4 4 4  
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5.4 Plato's condemnation of the poet 
Plato's objections to poets and poetry in the Republic are well known. An im- 
portant component in Plato's argument against admitting poets into the ideal 
city comes in the form of a multiple analogy in the concluding book of the dia- 
log (10.602~-5c). Socrates wishes to show that poets tend to corrupt the souls of 
citizens because their poetry appeals to and strengthens the worst elements of the 
soul at the expense of its best elements. 
Socrates begins with his famous proclamation that imitators are 'concerned 
with something that is third from the truthn (10.602~). This proclamation means 
that a painter, for example, who paints a picture of reins and a bit is merely imi- 
tating the work of the smith who made them md who, in turn, is merely following 
the specifications of the horseman, who actually uses the reins and bit and there- 
fore best understands their true nature (10.601~). Anyone who asked this painter 
about the nature of reins and bits would presumably get third-hand information in 
Socrates proceeds by examining the damage to the soul of a person who relies 
on such third-hand sources for his knowledge of things. Our senses, such as vision, 
may lead us to erroneous beliefs because they allow one thing to appear differently 
under different circumstances, e.g., a stick may "may look bent and straight when 
seen in water and out of itn (10.602c)! People may foolishly believe that a stick 
Why anyone should ask a painter this question is another matter. Presumably it would make 
more sense to ask the painter about the issues of painting reins and a bit. Plato does not address 
this point, however. 
'~lsto's treatment of the connection between perception and cognition in this passage is some 
what perplexing. See Murphy (1960, pp. 239-43) for further discussion. 
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in water has actually changed its shape and is therefore a different stick because of 
the change in its appearance. Such foolish notions may be believed by some people 
because the "ordinaryn part [phaulbn] of their soul has somehow gained ascendancy 
over the "calculatingn part [logistikon] (10.602d-3a). Socrates insists that paintings 
similarly allow-even requires thing depicted to appear different from its true 
nature, of which the painting is a third-hand representation. Therefore, paintings 
misrepresent one thing as many, prompt us to dilute our true beliefs about things 
with many contrary beliefs, and ultimately teach us to ignore the calculating part 
of the soul as merely one source of judgment among many, when it is always the 
best source of judgments (10.603a-d). 
Now Socrates begins his attack on poetry by comparing the poet with the 
painter. He has already established that the poet's knowledge of those virtues 
described in his poems is third-hand (10.598e-601b). He now adds that poetry 
strengthens the ordinary part of the soul in its audience (lO.605a)' explaining that 
this situation is in the poet's interest since most people are naturally ruled by the 
ordinary parts of their souls and poetry naturally appeals to this part (10.603e-5a). 
Socrates now epitomizes the comparison between painters and poets while adding 
another source andog (10.605a-b) : 
[Socrates:] "Therefore it  would at 1s t  be just for us to seize [the poet] 
and set him beside the painter as his ant i~trophe.~ For he is like the 
painter in making things that are ordinary by the standard of truth; 
'Antistrophe is a theatrical term referring to the movement of the c h o w  fiom left to right, 
or to the song they sing during this movement (Bloom, 1968, p. 200n9). Perhaps Plato is here 
referring to the song and punning on the f a t  that the poet produces songs just as the painter 
produces paintings (lO.603b) - For present purposes, it may simply be taken to mean 'counterpart'. 
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and he is also similar in keeping company with a part of the soul that 
is on the same level and not with the best part. And thus we should 
at last be justified in not admitting him into a city that is going to be 
under good laws, because he awakens this part of the soul and nourishes 
it, and, by making it strong, destroys the calculating part, just as in 
a city when someone, by making wicked men mighty, turns the city 
over to them and corrupts the superior ones. Similarly, we shall say 
the imitative poet produces a bad regime in the soul of each private 
man by making phantoms that are very far removed from the truth and 
by gratifying the soul's foolish part, which doesn't distinguish big from 
little, but believes the same things are at one time big and at another 
little." 
[Glaucon:] "Most certainly." 
The poet is like the painter in two ways: (1) the fruits of his labors present third- 
hand facsimiles of things as they are, and (2) his facsimiles appeal to and nourish 
the ordinary part of the soul, thus making that part too strong. Socrates introduces 
a second source analog to explicate the consequences of this inappropriate situation. 
Not only does the poet bring about this situation but, in so doing, he enables the 
ordinary part of the soul to usurp the rule or mastery of the soul that properly 
belongs to the calculating part, just as an unnamed someone does who enables 
wicked men to usurp the rule of a city regime. Because of this unhappy change in 
the souls of its citizens, Socrates claims to be justified in banning the poet from the 
ideal city. Thus, the second, politicd source analog does not merely reinforce the 
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lesson drawn from consideration of the painter, it expands that lesson by comparing 
its consequences with an unhappy change of political power. 
It is not clear from the immediate context if Socrates is referring to any partic- 
ular change in political power or not. What person could make wicked men mighty 
and cause control of the city to be turned over to them? The answer may come 
from the catalog of political changes given in book eight. In particular, Socrates 
there describes the creation of a tyranny in a way that resembles the overthrow 
described above. Socrates claims that tyrannies tend to arise from democracies in 
the following way: (1) a democracy is an excess of civic freedom and therefore en- 
courages dl kinds of civic discord (8.563~-e); (2) the political weakness caused by 
this discord enables the fiercest of its citizens to take over the city, in part by pre- 
tending to befriend the city's many and voracious poor (8.564a-7a); (3) the tyrant 
strengthens his hold on power by getting rid of all his opponents and potential 
rivals, especially the courageous and intelligent men of the city (8.567b-d); (4) the 
tyrant surrounds himself with indecent men as guards, because they are the only 
sort of people he can trust (8.567d-8a). Socrates picks out tragedians, exemplified 
by Euripides, as contributing to this process (especially step 2) by praising tyrants 
in their tragedies, which is in their own interest as they are handsomely rewarded 
by tyrants for doing so (8.568a-d). In other words, the tragedian makes wicked 
men mighty by telling d and sundry that tyrants ate virtuous. It is quite Likely, 
then, that Socrates refers to the tragedian when he speaks in book ten of someone 
aiding in the establishment of a bad regime. 
This interpretation may be represented as shown in table 5.4. Socrates' argu- 
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ment against poets may be read off by concentrating on the system predicates, 
which give an explanation of how poets can be the ruin of the soul. The poet 
strengthens the ordinary part of the soul because he makes poetry, and that poetry 
appeafs to the ordinary part of the soul. The appeal of poetry is explained by the 
fact that it misrepresents the nature of virtues. In these respects, the poet is much 
like the painter Socrates discussed beforehand. The fact that the poet strength- 
ens the ordinary part of the soul enables the  ordinary part to rule the whole soul 
and thereby destroy its calculating part. In this respect, the poet is much like the 
tragedian who enables the tyrant to take over the city and corrupt its courageous 
and intelligent men. 
The use of sources in the analogy is obviously different from those discussed 
above, e.g., in the case of the eye, ear, knife and soul analogy (section 5.2). There, 
each source analog contained a complete set of mappings to the target analog, with 
blank entries being Wed in by implication or counting against the coherence of the 
analogy. Here, each source analog contains only a partial set of mappings to the 
target since each fulfills a slightly different purpose with respect to the analogy as 
a whole. The comparison with the painter serves to explain how it is that poets 
strengthen the ordinary part of the soul. This fact alone is not enough to banish 
the poets outright. The comparison with the tragedian serves to show that the 
consequences of poet's effect on the soul are to make it unjust in the sense that the 
wrong part assumes control. It is for this effect that the poet is to be kept out of 
the ideal city. Because each source analog fulfills a different purpose, the blanks 
that can be seen in table 5.4 cannot necessarily be  counted against the coherence 
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of the whole analogy. 
Of course, the addition of the tragedian serves more than a formal purpose in 
completing the target analog. A tragedian may be considered a species of poet, and 
is therefore already a very similar and appropriate standard of comparison. Also, 
Socrates has already gained assent to a condemnation of tragedians, Homer and 
Euripides in particular. It is much easier to attach a negative affect of dispraise 
to poets by connecting them with tragedians, who have already had this d e c t  
attached to them. In other words, by comparing poets with tragedians, Socrates 
is better able to transfer the feeling of disapproval from one to the other (see 
Thagard and Shelley, ip). Certainly, he  has not generated any displeasure with 
painters adequate to the purpose. Thus, the use of the tragedian source not only 
completes the informational content of the poet target but also helps to convey the 
negative affect that Plato wishes to attach to it.' 
5.5 Implications for multiple analogies 
The above discussion exemplifies the ways in which Plato used multiple analogies to 
explicate concepts and further his arguments. But certain aspects of Plato's use of 
multiple analogies require further and more detailed discussion. The contribution of 
narrative or dialogic form is examined in section 5.5.1, while the effect of multiple 
s ~ l s o ,  since tragedians are associated with the establishment of tyrannies, Socrates may refer 
again to his famous and frequent comparison of the soul to a city when he says that "the imitative 
poet produces a bad regime in the sod . . . ." This analogy has been frequently discussed; see e-g., 
Robinson (1953, pp. 210-2), Murphy (1960, pp. 88-86), Bambrough (1963, pp. 10640), Vlastos 
(l969), Williams (l973), Galis (1974), and Hall (1974). Thus, choosing the tragedian analog with 
its established and unhappy political connection helps the current argument run briskly along 
familiar rails. 
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sources on the specificity of the target is examined in section 5.5.2. The use of 
sources as a supplement to other sources in the service of multiple purposes is 
treated in section 5.5.3. 
5.5.1 Complementation and narrative representation 
Unlike many pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato chose prose instead of poetry for his 
expositions. More particularly, Plato chose to deliver his philosophy in the form 
of stories recounting discussions between Socrates (usually) and other characters. 
This form of presentation has a definite effect on the way in which analogies are de- 
veloped and structured. Specifically, it seems to facilitate the use of complementary 
structures in both the sources and targets of an analogy. 
Table 5.3 shows how complementary concepts may participate in the construc- 
tion of a multiple analogy. One analog, e.g., health, is taken as a model for a second 
one, e.g., sickness. For everything that is predicated of health, a complementary 
predication is made concerning sickness. Both sets of predicates then serve as the 
source for an analogy with the target concerning the soul, which also displays this 
complementary structure. Predicates that have no complements with respect to 
health or sickness are presented independently of both complements. This process 
of complementation is similar to exemplification as discussed in section 2.5.3 in the 
sense that health, in this case, serves as an exemplary representative of a class of 
bodily states. In exemplification, however, the implicit members of each class of 
analogs in the source domains are assumed to be consistent with their exemplar for 
the purposes of the analogy. So, for example, aU members of the deep sea teleost 
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fish are assumed to be similar to their representative, namely Ruvettus, for the 
purposes of the analogy with Coelacanths (section 2.4). In the process of comple- 
mentation exhibited by Plato, the members of the class of bodily conditions are 
not consistent with each other but opposite. 
Opposition, in this sense, is a curious relationship. It means that predicates 
that are semantically dissimilar are placed into the same mappings in the overall 
analogy. For example, the predicates accord-withs and contrary-tob both occur in 
the eleventh row of table 5.3. By the principle of semantic similarity (section 2.2), 
such a situation should count against the coherence of the analogy as a whole. But 
this does not apply to Plato's analogy since the point is simply that health and 
sickness are alike in their opposition to the opposition between justice and injustice. 
This likeness of opposition is apparent in the identity of the system relations in 
which both pairs of opposite concepts participate. So, for example, both accord- 
withb and contrary-tob occur in analogous cause and because predicates. 
It appears, then, that adopting the purpose of using complementary sources in 
an analogy affects how those sources cohere with the whole analogy. Within a corn- 
plement ary st ruct we, semantic opposition bet ween certain predicates is expected 
and, indeed, necessary. Therefore, such opposition counts towards the coherence of 
the analogy as a whole provided it is replicated in both source and target domains. 
This interpretation is further supported by noting that if complementary predicates 
did not hold true of health and sickness, then the coherence of the analogy would 
be weakened. In other words, if health is something in accord with nature but 
sickness-its opposite--is not something contrary to nature, then the bodyfsoul 
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analogy loses coherence. 
The complementary structure of the bodyfsoul analogy given in table 5.3 makes 
it look difficult. Plato, fortunately, used a more efficient representation to construct 
his analogy, namely narrative representation. In the dialog, Socrates always takes 
health as the representative source analog, making his comments first about it 
and then noting afterwards that complementary relations also hold regarding its 
opposite, sickness. Consider a small past of Socrates' discussion of this analogy 
( Republic, 4.444~-d): 
[Socrates:] "Surely healthy things produce health and sick ones sickness." 
[Glaucon:] "Yes." 
'Doesn't doing just things also produce justice and unjust ones injus- 
tice?" 
"Necessarily." 
Socrates' two statements introduce the whole of the seventh row of table 5.3. In 
developing each point of the analogy in a serial, narrative way, it is possible for Plato 
to simply conjoin an extra set of relations in the source and target by exploiting the 
fact that sickness is the opposite of health and injustice is the opposite of justice. 
Thus, although table 5.3 does not represent this fact, the analogy is primady 
between health and justice, with sickness and injustice being developed in a sort 
of secondary or parasitic way, so that the mappings between the latter two sets of 
predicates follow by a kind of transitive construction. This combination of opposites 
and transitive construction allows Plato to build up a richly structured, multiple 
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analogy from only a few basic attributes in an economic and fairly straightforward 
and plausible way. 
Narrative representation seems to especially facilitate the process of multiple- 
analogy construction by complementation (see Shelley and Thagard, 1996). Con- 
sider a similarly structured analogy found in the following Trobriand origin myth 
(paraphrased from Malinowski, 1926, pp. 46-8): 
The world was originally peopled from underground where humanity 
had led an existence similar in all respects to the present life on earth. 
For an unspecified reason, the totem ancestors of the human tribes, 
including the Dog and the Pig, came to the surface via a special hole 
called Obukula near the village of Laba'i. The Dog ate the fruit of 
the noku plant, whereupon the Pig said "Thou eatest noku, thou eatest 
dirt; thou art a low-bred, a commoner; the chief, the guya'u, shall be I." 
And ever since, the Malasi clan, descendants of the Pig, have outranked 
the Lukuba clan, descendants of the Dog. 
The myth states that just as the Dog ate the noku plant and became inferior 
while the Pig pronounced on this act and became superior, people in the Lukuba 
clan, descendants of the Dog, are inferior to people in the Malasi clan, descendants 
of the Pig. Malinowski cites this as a classic charter myth, giving the current 
world order a foundation in a mythical past. The analogical structure of this 
myth is given in table 5.5. The analogy in this narrative is developed in a simila 
manner t o  that developed by Plato: The mythical and current domains are split 
into complementary halves by placing opposites within each domain in alignment 
Table 5.5: A representation of the analogy between mythical history and present social structure among the $ 














causemo (eat,outrank,,#) 1 c a u h l  (proclaim,outran k,,,) 
Malasi 
born-in, (Pig-descendan t ,Malasi) 
out raak, ( Pig-descendan t , Dog-descendan t ) 
cause,o (born-in,outran k, ) I cause, 1 (born-in ,outrank,) 
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with each other. Each opposite is conjoined by mentioning it directly after that 
predicate of which it is the opposite, e.g., t he  Pig's decree is made directly after 
the Dog's eating of the noku plant. 
Narrative representat ion lends itself to the development of multiple andogies 
containing complementary sources. Plato was adept at exploiting this possibility, 
as is shown in this example and also the analogy of the eye, ear, and knife to the 
soul (section 5.2), where blindness, at least, was considered in addition to sight 
as its opposite. The exploitation of polar opposites and transitive construction in 
multiple analogies was a favorite method by which Plato generated and considered 
very richly structured concepts. 
5.5.2 Specificity 
Recall the discussion of specificity from section 4.5.2. Specificity concerns situations 
in which a predicate in the target analog must be filled in by a process of copying 
(with relevant substitutions of the arguments) from the corresponding predicates in 
the source analogs. In some multiple analogies, the corresponding predicates are all 
different, raising the issue of which one to select for copying, or whether to adopt 
some other strategy to specify what predicate to insert in the target analog. To 
judge from the archaeological examples, the preferred strategy is to insert in the 
target a predicate that is just abstract enough to subsume all the corresponding 
predicates in the sources. 
The problem of specificity occurs in the eye, ear, knife, and soul analogy dis- 
cussed in section 5.2. In that analogy, sight and audition represent the virtues of 
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the eyes and ears, respectively, when mapped to justice as the virtue of the soul. As 
noted above, there is no obvious virtue of pruning knives that subserves pruning as 
sight subserves seeing, for example. Whatever Plato may have had in mind in that 
instance (he does not state it explicitly), it cannot be taken in exactly the same 
sense as sight and audition. Therefore, the sense of justice subserving the soul as 
it goes about its living is vague; the analogy as a whole loses some specificity. This 
result may not be unwelcome since it is clear from the rest of the Republic that 
Plato would not wish justice to be considered a faculty of the soul exactly as sight 
may be considered a faculty of the eye. Therefore, it is likely that Plato introduced 
the knife analog in order not to imply that justice is some kind of innate sense of 
the soul. 
In other words, it appears that the lack of a predicate in a source analog may be 
treated much the same as the presence of a different predicate in a multiple analogy. 
In the MT account of andogies, the lack of a predicate would simply imply the 
absence of a supportive mapping from that predicate to the corresponding predicate 
in the target analog. The absence of such a mapping would mean, in turn, that 
the target predicate would not enjoy as much support from the source analogs. 
The analogy would simply be less coherent as a result. If the above analysis is 
correct, however, the coherence of the analogy may be redressed, at least partially, 
by understanding the target predicate to be less specific in meaning than any of 
the sources explicitly given. In the case of the eye, ear, knife, and soul analogy, the 
concept of justice is not understood as a faculty of the soul on the basis of two out 
of three source concepts. Rather, it is understood as a less specific accompaniment 
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of the soul on the basis of the concepts of sight and audition and the absence of a 
corresponding concept belonging to pruning knives. 
This situation is hinted at in the dialog where other differences between pruning 
knives on the one hand and eyes and ears on the other are drawn to  our attention. 
Recall from Socrates' statement (section 5.2) that you can see only with eyes and 
hear only with eaFs while you may prune not only with pruning knives but also with 
daggers or leather cut ters-but not as well. Thus, w hatever-it-is about pruning 
knives that corresponds to sight in eyes and audition in ears is not obvious but is 
rather abstract. The abstractness of this whatever-it-is then affects the meaning of 
justice to which it is mapped. In other words, justice is understood more abstractly 
in relation to  the soul than sight is to eyes or audition is to ears. This result suits 
Plato's purposes very well. 
Plato makes the most of this particular analogy. He concentrated on the eye and 
ear sources because these are quite familiar and would bring about quick recognition 
and consent from his readers (and Socrates' interlocutors). He included the pruning 
knife analog in order to  support his contention that the class of things with their 
own work is very general (universal, in fact) and also in order to  generalize the 
target concept of justice by omitting its counterpart in this source. In this way, 
Plato could avoid the unwanted implication that justice is a faculty of the soul. 
5.5.3 Supplementation 
Plato's condemnation of poets (section 5.4) provides an interesting example of s u p  
plementation. Recall from sections 2.5.4 and 4.5.3 that supplementation involves 
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the use of one source analog to revise or modify another. In this case, Plato first 
makes an analogy between poets and painters, and then brings in tragedians as an 
additional source analog to modify the painter analog. Plato makes this addition 
for two reasons. First, the tragedian source brings with it predicates that are de- 
sired but absent from the painter analog. The painter analog conveys the argument 
that painters are merely imitators of things, and that their paintings are therefore 
misrepresentations of the true nature of those things. This misrepresentation a p  
peals to the ordinary part of the soul, thus strengthening it with respect to the 
cdculat ing part. 
But Plato does not use the painter analog to spell out the consequences of this 
inappropriate strengthening, possibly because the claim that a few paintings would 
throw people's souls into severe disrepair would sound absurd. In the Sophist (233d- 
4b), for instance, the Eleatic stranger talks about a painter who paints images of 
gods, men, and animals and, by exhibiting them at a distance, deceives some of the 
younger and duller children into believing that he has actually created the objects 
depicted. In his response to this anecdote, Theodorus treats the situation as a kind 
of joke since no competent person would be so fooled. Obviously, Plato knew that 
no one would take such an argument very seriously, which explains why he avoids 
making it in the Republic. 
Rather, Plato changes to the tragedian analog. The tragedian matches the 
painter as an imitator in enough respects to make his inclusion coherent, but the 
tragedian also brings with him information suitable for association with the disre- 
pair of the soul. It is already acknowledged that, by strengthening the worst men 
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of cities, tragedians bring about the conditions whereby tyrants come to power and 
eliminate all the best men. Thus, by adding this analog in the horizontal direction, 
Plato is able to add crucial predicates in the vertical direction aad round out his 
condemnation of poets. 
The second reason Plato adds the tragedian is because tragedians are already 
a species of poet. The semantic closeness of tragedians and poets as concepts 
makes a comparison between the two all the more plausible. Although painters 
and poets are both artists, a painter's work is not performed as a poet's work 
is. Since Plato maintains that it is primarily the public performance of poetry in 
plays that brings about it's malignant effects on the soul, he would need to speak 
in terns of the public performance of paintings if he were to rely on the painter 
analog. This procedure would be an awkward one at least. It is easier and more 
effective to instead switch to a discussion of tragedians, whose works are performed 
in the required way. Thus, the idea that poets can destroy the calculating part 
of the  soul is better supported by mappings with someone whose works urge us 
to imitate tyrants rather than someone whose works urge us to imitate statues or 
garden scenes. 
In this case, as in general, supplementation is performed when a single source 
would be inadequate by itself to fulfill the purpose of the analogy. Here, the goal 
of condemning poets is broken down by Plato into two subgoals. The first subgoal 
is to suggest the generality of the condemnation by comparing poets with painters. 
If a.ll painters can be condemned as strengthening the ordinary part of the soul and 
damaging its calculating part, then all poets can be similarly condemned. Where 
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this subgoal cannot meet the overall goal, a second is introduced that will overcome 
the deficit. The second subgod is to display the potentially terrible consequences 
for the soul that arise specifically from poetry. With this supplementation, Plato 
suggests both the generality of his condemnat ion of poets, and its dire consequences 
in at least one special case. If not totally convincing, this supplementation comes 
very close to satisfying the overarching purpose of the analogy, by dividing that 
purpose into two parts and introducing a separate source analog for each part. 
5.6 Plato on multiple analogies 
Just as the study of multiple analogies in biology and archaeology informs us both 
about multiple analogies and about their place in those fields, so the study of mul- 
tiple analogies in Plato's Republic should inform us both about multiple analogies 
and about their place in Plato's philosophy. Having examined Plato's use of mul- 
tiple analogies, it is time to return to the topic of his view of multiple analogies as 
such. As indicated in section 1.2, Plato gives us no explicit or extended treatment 
of the subject. Nevertheless, the subject of multiple analogies does appear to be  
considered in at least one place in the Republic. 
As noted in section 5.1, Plato often uses the term image [ e i k h ]  to refer to an 
analogy. More generally, Plato often compares the use of analogies to the creation 
of physical images through painting. Of course, there is something odd in this com- 
parison, since Plato often condemns painters as people who mislead people's souls 
for profit while, at the same time, he approves of image making (i-e. ,  making anal* 
gies) among philosophers (Robinson, 1953, pp. 204-22). He compares philosophers 
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to painters, with approval, on no less than five separate occasions in the Republic 
(4.420~-d, 5.472d-e, 6.484~-d, 6.500elc, and 6.504d). Obviously, this apparent 
instance of self-contradiction demands some explanation. 
A defense of the use of analogies-and multiple analogies-among philosophers 
is given in a passage in which Socrates compares the explication of the ideal city to 
the painting of an image of the city. Socrates seems to hold that  image making by 
philosophers is defensible because, unlike actual painters, philosophers use not mere 
appearances but the truth or the divine pattern as their guide (Republic, 6.500e). 
Philosophers begin with a clean slate by drawing an outline of the of the ideal city 
a ~ d  ( Republic, 6.501b-c): 
[Socrates:] uAfter that, I suppose that in filling out their work they 
would look away frequently in both directions, towasd the just, fair, 
and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and, again, toward 
what is in human beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices 
as ingredients, they would produce the image of man, taking hints from 
exactly that phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called god- 
like and the image of god." 
[Adeimantus:] "Right ," he said. 
"And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another 
again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they 
admit of being." 
"The drawing," he said, "would at any rate be fairest that way." 
These philosopher-painters whom Socrates describes are making an image of the 
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laws of the ideal city in the likeness of both divine and earthly practices or dis- 
positions as taken from the form of justice itself and the nature of the just man 
(5.472~). Like these painters, Socrates asks rhetorically, "Weren't we, as we assert, 
also making a pattern in speech of a good city?" (5.472d-e). Their analogizing is 
legitimate because, as philosophers, they have the divine pattern to use as one of 
their sources. 
When Socrates describes the philosopher-painters as looking frequently in both 
directions, he indicates that the construction of a good analogy requires two source 
analogs, in this case at least. Elements of both human and divine likenesses are 
mixed and blended to form the target image, and the act of drawing is only accom- 
plished with many erasures and revisions. In terms of multiple analogies, Socrates 
seems to be saying that elements of the source analogs cannot simply be copied 
into the target, but must be selected and altered where they do not agree with 
each other. This description seems to match Plato's own practise of constructing 
multiple images as described above and indicates that Plato had considered the 
difficulties raised by multiple analogies, even if he did not set down any specific 
solutions to them. 
5.7 Summary 
Plato frequently uses analogies to support his position on issues of political philos- 
ophy in the Republic. Many scholars have investigated Plato's analogies, but, by 
analogy, they have generdy understood a conceptual structure akin to the vener- 
able proportional analogy. The application of newer theories such as the MT can 
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provide us with more comprehensive and detailed insight into Plato as an analogical 
thinker. Most especially, a better understanding of the nature of multiple analogies 
can inform us about Plato's use of those kind of analogies as well. 
In some respects, the multiple analogies found in Plato's Republic are similar to 
those found in the evolutionary and archaeological literat we. Plato uses multiple 
analogs where a single source analog is inadequate for the purpose (sections 5.2 and 
5.4). However, the multiple analogies discussed in this chapter reveal new things 
about them. Plato's use of complementary source analogs, as in the comparison of 
justice and injustice to health and sickness (section 5.3), constitutes a novel form 
of multiple analogy, one that is found in mythological literature as  well. Indeed, 
narrative representation of analogies appears to lend itself to the construction of 
this kind of multiple analogy. 
Plato's analogy between the eye, ear, knife, and soul suggests that the control 
of specificity of target predicates may be exercised by varying the contents of the 
source predicates, even to the point of omitting them altogether. Given enough 
complete source analogs, an appropriately abstract predicate may be Wed in where 
it is lacking in one source, thus creating a less specific understanding of the target. 
Plato presents an interesting example of supplementation wherein an additional 
source, namely tragedians, are brought in both to alter and to fW out the first 
source analog in his comparison between poets and painters. Plato's ability to 
create analogies that use multiple sources to fulfill several, interleaved goals presents 
a challenge to current theories of analogy construction and inference. 
Findy, it appears that Plato had some understanding of these issues concern- 
CHAPTER 5. MULTIPLE ANALOGIES IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC 
ing analogies. Specifically, in his comparison of analogizing to painting, Plato 
describes an activity that explicitly concerns the creation of a target in view of 
multiple sources. In fact, the use of a divine source in addition to an earthly source 
seems to distinguish the construct ion of philosophically legit imate analogies from 
the philosophically misleading analogies make in the likeness of a mortal source 
alone. Unfortunately, although Plato proceeds to describe how to access the divine 
realm of forms in some detail, he does not revisit the issue of exactly how the forms 
may be used in the construction of good, multiple analogies. 
But there is no doubt that multiple analogies were central to Plato's p h i b  
sophicd method as it is represented in the Republic. In the analogy of the cave 
(Republic, 7.514a-8b, 7.532a-3a), Plato compares his method to leading prisoners 
out of a cave in order to bring them face to face with the Good in the guise of the 
sun. Plato makes a similar remark concerning his inquiry into justice by analogy 
between health in bodies and justice in cities (4.435a; see section 5.3) 
Perhaps, considering them side by side and rubbing them together like 
sticks, we would make justice burst into flame, and once it's come to 
light, confirm it for ourselves. 
Constructing and understanding the multiple andogy bet ween health, sickness, 
virtue and vice, then, is a miniature version of the philosophical method expounded 
in the analogy of the cave. Both involve bringing about a direct confrontation with a 
h e  representing the concept of justice or the Good. Understanding Plato's multiple 
analogies, then, is not simply necessary for understanding one aspect of his way of 
thinking but is also necessary to understand his conception of philosophical inquiry 
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as it is described in the Republic. 
Chapter 6 
The very model of a multiple 
analogy 
Alas! my master is really the worst of all plagues. He was the most drunk of all the 
guests, and yet among them were Hippyllus, Antiphon, Lycon, Lysistratus, Theop h rastus 
and Phrynichus. But he was a hundred times more insolent than any. . . . Then he set 
to beating me with all his heart, shouting, "Slave! slave!" Lysistratus, as soon as he 
saw him, let fly this comparison at him. "Old fellow," said he, "you resemble one o f  
the scum assuming the airs of a rich man or a stupid ass that has broken loose from 
its stable." "As for you," bawled my master a t  the top of his voice, "you are like a 
grasshopper, whose cloak is worn to the thread, or like Sthenelus after his clothes had 
been sold." 
Xanthias, in Aristophanes' Wasps, 1298-1314. 
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6.1 Multiple analogies in perspective 
As indicated in chapter 1, philosophers have tended to overlook multiple analogies in 
their theoretical treatments of analogy and analogical reasoning, even though they 
tend to use multiple analogies in practise. There are several possible explanations 
for this omission. Multiple analogies seem to occur much less frequently than single 
analogies and might escape attention for that reason. Multiple analogies, then, may 
simply have been living in the shadow of single analogies, so to speak. Multiple 
analogies may not seem to be sufficiently similar to single analogies for the two 
to be treated in the same framework. The listing of several source analogs may 
seem more like a defective instance of induction by enumeration than like a proper 
instance of multiple comparisons. Philosophers, like most people, have a natural 
tendency to approach complex problems by reducing them to simpler ones. Perhaps 
the problem of multiple analogies has been passed over on the tacit assumption that 
an adequate theory of single analogies also counts as an adequate theory of multiple 
analogies. 
In the absence of any explicit statements by the philosophers whose views are 
discussed in chapter 1, there is no point in speculating on which of these reasons (or 
others) apply to which philosophers. But these explanations do raise issues central 
to any treatment of multiple analogies and their relationship to single analogies. 
Why do single analogies overshadow multiple analogies in practise? In what ways 
are single malopies different from multiple analogies? In what ways are they simi- 
lar? In short, what is the relationship between single analogies and multiple ones? 
The most obvious way to address this question is to  compare and contrast 
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independently developed theories of both these phenomena. But the current state of 
affairs makes this approach impractical. Because of the  long history of inquiry into 
single analogies, and the recent surge of interest in it within the field of cognitive 
science, much more is known about single analogies than about multiple ones. 
Rather than attempt to develop a theory of multiple analogies from scratch, then, 
it is better to inquire into the relationship between the two forms of analogy by 
extending a n  existing theory of single analogies to account for the multiple case. 
This project requires a suitable theory and a knowledge of the things that the 
theory must be modified to account for. If the extension is successful, then the 
comparison is made. 
In this dissertation, the Multiconstraint theory has been used as the theory of 
single analogies, while the desiderata for which the M~ulticonstraint theory must be 
modified have been taken from an examination of multiple analogies drawn from 
evolutionary biology, archaeology, and Plato's Republic. The result has shown 
up the similarities and differences between the two forms of comparison. Briefly 
stated, single and multiple analogies are similar in that they fulfill roughly the same 
purposes by means of structured comparison. In principle, there may be nothing 
that can be  accomplished by multiple analogies that cannot be accomplished by 
single analogies. In practise, however, no one existing source analog may in fact be 
adequate for any particular purpose. Single and multiple analogies are different in 
the sense that issues concerning the interaction of multiple source analogs simply 
do not arise in the case of single source analogs. 
This chapter presents a consolidation of t h e  results of inquiry obtained in the 
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chapters above. This consolidation comes in the form of an outline for a cognitive 
model adequate to account for the phenomena of multiple analogies. This model 
proceeds from the conclusion, drawn in previous chapters, that multiple analogies 
represent the general case of aaalogical thinking. In other words, this model is not 
a model of single analogies applied several times but a model of multiple analogies 
which aims to subsume single analogies as a special case. The place of different 
cognitive representations is also addressed, as is the variety of processes in which 
these representations participate during the construction of multiple analogies. 
The relation of purposes to multiple analogies has been emphasized in this 
dissertation. Since these purposes represent some of the professional goals of evolu- 
tionary biologists, archaeologists, and Plato, the examination of multiple analogies 
tells us something about the nature and aims of science and philosophy as these 
practitioners saw it. Therefore, this chapter also presents a summary of the lessons 
learned through multiple analogies regarding these fields of endeavor. 
Section 6.2 begins with a basic question in the specification of any cognitive 
model of multiple andogies, namely how are the cognitive representations 
to be parceled out and how do the parcels interact? 
Section 6.3 summarizes the role of purpose as it participates in multiple analogies; 
Sect ion 6.4 recapitulates the nature of the various representations discussed above, 
namely verbal, visual, and narrative; 
Section 6.5 reviews the kinds of processes that occur in the construction of multi- 
ple analogies, namely abstraction and exemplification, supplementation, and 
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specificity ; 
Section 6.6 revisits the significance of multiple analogies for issues in the philos- 
ophy of science, especially in evolutionary biology and archaeology; 
Section 6.7 presents some discussion of normative aspects of this research for mul- 
tiple analogies, in the form of five recommendations on how best to construct 
and use multiple analogies. 
Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.8. 
6.2 Breaking multiple analogies into parcels 
One basic problem that must be resolved in order to construct a cognitive model is 
to identify what parcels the cognitive representations should be distributed into and 
how those parcels should interact. Does the cognitive system consist of capsules of 
collected representations interacting with other capsules, or does each representa- 
tion independently iduence the entire process of multiple analogy construction? 
In terms of multiple analogies, this question comes down to the question of whet her 
the source analogs can see, as it were, or influence each other during analogy con- 
struction or not. The significance of this issue is best illuminated by approaching 
it from the standpoint of the principle of structural consistency. 
R e d  that the principle of structural consistency is a complex constraint placed 
on the syntax of predicates participating in an analogy (section 2.2). It prescribes 
that, ideally, (i) each predicate in the source is mapped to a unique predicate in 
CHAPTER 6. THE VERY MODEL OF A MULTlPLE ANALOGY 192 
the target and vice versa, and that (ii) when two predicates are mapped, their 
corresponding arguments, if any, are also mapped. 
The multiple analogies discussed in previous chapters raise an obvious problem 
for this principle (section 2.5.1). Multiple analogies routinely involve mapping two 
or more source predicates with a target predicate. For example, the predicates 
eye, ear, and h(ni/e are mapped with soul in one of Plato's analogies (table 5.1). 
Because this mapping is not one-bone, this situation violates condition i of the 
principle. An obvious approach to resolving this problem is to revise the principle 
into a condition on the process of analogy construction rather than on the structure 
of analogies. 
The best solution to this problem depends upon how stringently the principle 
of structural consistency is applied to analogical mapping. In Structure-mapping 
theory (Gentner, 1983), structural consistency is an absolute requirement, meaning 
that exceptions are not contemplated or, at least, do not qualify as analogies. 
An obvious way to accommodate multiple analogies in such a framework is to 
serialize the principle. In other words, revise condition i to read: (i') that each 
target predicate is mapped to one unique source predicate at a time. This solution 
effectively reduces multiple analogies to a chain of single ones. It also implies an 
encapsulated model of multiple analogies. 
To see what this implication means, consider the problem of accounting for the 
increased confidence found in inferences based on multiple analogies. For example, 
by using both Ruvettus and Centroscynznus as source analogs for comparison with 
the Coelacanth (section 2.4), Locket (1980) more confidently infers that the Coela- 
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canth inhabits deep ocean water than he might have inferred in light of only one 
source analog or the other. Under the serial revision of the principle of structural 
consistency, this increase in confidence might be accommodated by representing 
confidence as something associated with the target analog that may be incremented 
as successive comparisons are successfully made. In effect, the target may be al- 
lowed to see and remember multiple sources provided that the sources do not see 
or influence each other directly. 
This solution raises a further issue. In some of the multiple analogies discussed 
above, source analogs do appear to be able to see one another or influence one 
another directly. In cases of supplementation such as Haynes's use of modern 
elephant cullers in addition to wolves in comparison with Clovis mammoth hunters 
(section 4.4), the culler source seems to be employed specifically to modify the 
content of the wolf source. The readiest explanation of this situation is that the 
wolf source and its shortcomings influenced the selection of the culler source. Of 
course, like the representation of confidence, this influence could be modeled as an 
indirect one by further enriching the target with a representation of how completely 
the requirements of the target analog have been served by the sources considered so 
far. In effect, this would mean attaching to the representation of the target andog 
an explicit representation of the purpose of the analogy and how well it is satisfied 
in the light of the available source analogs. 
Similarly, as pointed out in section 2.5.1, the target will also have to remember 
enough about each of the active source analogs to ensure that they axe independent, 
i.e., that the various source analogs considered are not merely copies or rehashes of 
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each other. A certain amount of information about each analog must be represented 
in this way, although exactly how much is not clear. It must be enough, at any rate, 
to compare the source analogs with one another to ensure their mutud exclusivity. 
Put another way, the target must be associated with enough information to simulate 
a model in which source analogs are compared directly with one another. Of course, 
specifying a model which merely simulates another one seems wasteful, implying 
that it may be rejected on the grounds of parsimony. tn other words, it is odd 
that, in order to keep source analogs from influencing each other during analogy 
construction, facsimiles of those analogs are associated with the target in order to 
be compared with each other. Either way, it seems, the source analogs influence 
each other so they might as well do so directly. 
In a non-encapsulated model of multiple analogies, source analogs would in- 
fluence each other by means of constraints placed directly between them. This 
approach is a more natural extension of theories such as the M T  (Holyoak and Tha- 
gard, 1995) or Higher-level percept ion theory (Mitchell, 1993; Hofstadter, 1995) in 
which the principle of structural similarity is not regarded as an absolute constraint. 
In the MT, for example, structural consistency is a soft constraint: Analogies may 
deviate fiom perfect structural consistency, although their overall coherence suffers 
as a result. A good analogy need not be perfectly coherent, simply coherent enough. 
As noted in section 2.5.1, multiple analogies are less coherent than single ones 
according to  the MT because they fail to meet the one-to-one criterion for struc- 
tural consistency. Since this situation produces results cont ary to the observations 
about multiple analogies made in the preceding chapters, the principle of structural 
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Figure 6.1: An outline cognitive model of multiple analogies. 
consistency needs to be modified. In the non-encapsulated case, the principle may 
be revised to state simply: (i") that each target predicate is mapped to one unique 
source predicate for each independent source analog. This revision of the structural 
consistency principle is parallel, rather than serial, in the sense that it does not 
stipulate that source analogs need to be mapped one at a time. 
Any model of malogy that implements this parallel version of structural con- 
sistency is clearly non-encapsulated in the sense that it allows source analogs to 
directly influence one another in the process of analogy construction. This iduence 
would amount to strengthening the mappings among predicates from independent 
source analogs while weakening those from dependent sources. Thus, analogies con- 
structed with independent sources would be the most coherent ones in the usual 
sense of the MT. This parallel, non-encapsulated model of multiple analogies may 
be represented diagramaticdy as in figure 6.1. 
The non-encapsulated approach to the construction of multiple analogies also 
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implies the view that single analogies are a special case of multiple analogies. If only 
one source analog is used, then the structural consistency condition i" is identical 
to the condition i currently given in the MT. Independence only becomes an issue 
in cases where multiple sources are included in an analogy. 
It then remains to see how issues such as confidence are handled in the non- 
encapsulated model of multiple analogies. Confidence, and a. number of related 
issues, are best handled under the constraint of purpose, which is discussed below. 
6.3 Purpose and planning 
The constraint of purpose stipulates that the best analogies are the ones that solve 
the problem that faces the analogizer (section 2.2). This constraint primarily con- 
cerns the system mappings of an analogy. System mappings typically represent the 
higher-order relationships, such as causes, that obtain in the domains in question 
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, pp. 34-7). For example, Plato asserts that paintings 
appeal to the ordinary part of the soul because they misrepresent the true nature 
of what they purport to depict (section 5.4). By analogy, Plato claims that poetry 
has a similar appeal because it also appeals to the ordinary part of the soul. This 
claim is crucial to Plato's purpose of condemning poets since he goes on to claim 
that appealing to the ordinary part of the soul has dire consequences for a person's 
character. 
In single analogies, the fulfillment of purpose generally amounts to ensuring 
that an appropriate high-level predicate is present in the system mappings of the 
analogy. As has often been pointed out in the previous chapters, purpose in multiple 
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analogies is a more complex issue. For example, it may b e  the andogizer's purpose 
not only to establish a certain high-level predicate in an analogy, but to establish 
it with a suficient level of confidence. This purpose is apparent in the various 
examples of abstraction and exemplification discussed above. In Plato's eye, ear, 
knife, and soul analogy, for example, neither the eye nor the ear analogs increase 
the number or meaning of the system mappings because those analogs are almost 
indistinguishable from that point of view. There is nothing that can be said of one 
that cannot be said of the other. What both analogs together do accomplish is to 
suggest the generality of Plato's contention that everything has a specific work to 
which it is suited better than anything else. In other words, the inclusion of both 
analogs in the source serves the purpose of increasing confidence in the applicability 
of the target. 
In the MT, purpose is identified with one or more of the high-level predicates in 
the target of an analogy. Thus, the representation of purpose requires nothing in ad- 
dit ion to what is represented within the mappings themselves. However, confidence 
is not represented in Plato's eye, ear, knife, and soul analogy (table 5.1) or any 
other analogy examined above. In order to represent confidence, then, something 
must be added to the representation of the  analogy. The most obvious represen- 
tation to add is purpose, of which confidence is one possible component. It would 
be possible, then, for an analogy to fulfill the purpose of activating a particular, 
high-level predicate to a specified degree of confidence. See figure 6.1. 
The concept of purpose extends to more than the representation of confidence. 
In some cases, different analogs in a multiple analogy may serve different purposes 
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from one another. Consider Plato's use of tragedians to supplement painters in 
his comparison with poets (section 5.4). Painters make a good source for Plato's 
purpose of discussing how artists misrepresent things since the representational 
function of traditional painting is obvious and familiar. However, painters do not 
make a good source for the purpose of explicating the dire consequences of artistic 
endeavors. But tragedians make an excellent source for this purpose. In effect, 
each source analog can only adequately fulfill a part of Plato's overall purpose. So 
it is helpful to think of Plato's purpose as being decomposable into parts. In other 
words, Plato's purpose may be conceived as kind of multi-component plan. 
A great deal of research has been devoted to the concept of plans and planning. 
In artificial intelligence, a plan is typically represented as a series of steps which 
collectively fulfill a specified goal. So, for example, in the movie Goldfnger, Auric 
Goldfinger cooks up a plan ("Operation Grand Slamn) to become the richest bullion 
dealer in the world. The plan includes the following steps: 
1. stockpile vast quantities of gold; 
2. render much of the remaining gold, Le., in Fort Knox, useless by making it 
radioactive. 
Step 2 would make the gold obtained in step 1 scarcer and therefore more vdu- 
able, while making the U.S. Government much poorer. This situation would fulfill 
Goldfinger's purpose admirably, if it were not for the interference of James Bond. 
This view of plans may be applied to the representation of gods and subgoals in 
multiple analogies. The attachment of planning to the construct ion of multiple 
analogies raises a procedurd issue: Are such plans constructed before the analogy, 
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or are they constructed interactively with the other processes of analogy construc- 
t ion? 
There appear to be cases of both prior and interactive plan construction among 
the examples discussed above. In Locket's comparison of Coelacanth eye pigments 
with those of Ruuettus and Centroscyrnnus, for example, the properties of the 
source analogs appear to have been known in advance of the comparison with the 
Coelacanth (section 2.4). Thus, Locket had the plan or intention of making a 
multiple comparison in advance. In Taialay's comparison of Neolithic figurine legs, 
however, many of the source analogs appear to have been incorporated after the 
initial cornpaxison suggested itself (section 4.3). Thus, this plan was elaborated 
interactively with increases in the availability of further evidence. Talalay's plan, 
then, was probably not finalized in advance of her construction of the multiple 
analogy. Since interactive planning is required to explain some instances of multiple 
analogy construction and since it can subsume prior planning as a special case, it is 
reasonable to say that interactive planning is how the purpose of multiple analogies 
should be modeled in the general case. See figure 6.1. 
There has been controversy among researchers who study analogy as to the 
centrality of pragmatic considerations such as purpose on analogy construction (see 
Gentner, 1989, pp. 217-21). The model proposed here places much emphasis on 
purpose and planning for the generation and understanding of multiple analogies. 
In some computational models such as SME and Copycat, pragmatic influences 
on analogy construction are regarded as peripheral. In others, such as PRODIGY 
(Veloso and Carbonell, 1993), the separate representation of purpose as a plan is a 
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central element of the system design. Indeed, recent work by Veloso (1997) indicates 
how the PRODIGY system may be adapted to work with multiple analogs. Perhaps 
the apparent difference between these views may be reduced by noting that the 
importance of purpose and planning depends upon the situation and the caxefulness 
of the analogizer. The examples of multiple analogies discussed above were all 
produced by experts out to support a particular hypothesis or position. Multiple 
analogies are not always produced by such careful or expert thinkers. Consider the 
following multiple analogy given in a letter to the editor of the Nashvifle Tennessean, 
4 February 1925, regarding the progress in the State Legislature of the law against 
teaching evolution in schools, the law that later lead to the famous "Scopes-monkey 
trial" (quoted from Larsoa, 1997, pp. 51-2): 
I fear we will never stamp out the evolution theory, for old Bruno was 
burned and old Galileo thrown in prison, and yet the damnable round 
earth theory is still being taught. 
This analogy compares the state government's adoption of a law prohibiting the 
teaching of evolut ion with the Catholic Church's adoption of a policy prohibiting the 
endorsement of Copernican astronomy. Structurally and semantically, the analogy 
works well. Factually, however, the analogy founders because Galileo and Bruno 
were prosecuted for supporting the heliocentric theory of the solar system and not 
the round earth theory as the writer states. Of course, it might be said that a 
comparison with flabearth supporters better serves the purpose of heaping ridicule 
upon the Tennessee legislature, but the force of the analogy is greatly diminished 
once the mistake is realized. Either the purpose in this example was Mgue and 
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carelessly conceived or it was more carefully conceived but then carelessly satisfied. 
In either case, the writer's purpose exerted only an indefinite influence on the 
analogy that she finally constructed. 
A nuanced representation of purpose is not required for every example of mul- 
t iple analogies. But some examples, particularly those constructed by careful and 
expert thinkers such as those scientists and philosophers discussed in the previous 
chapters, do require some explicit and sophisticated representation of purpose. In- 
deed, producing good multiple analogies may require more attention to purpose 
and other pragmatic issues than is the case for single analogies. 
6.4 Represent at ions 
The issue of representation is probably the most contentious in current research 
on analogies. Computational models of analogy have used almost every form of 
representation that the field of artificial intelligence has to offer. Each form has 
advantages and disadvantages as a basis for modeling human analogy constmction, 
and a reasonable discussion of these points would require a book in itself. This 
section, therefore, does not present a discussion of every possible form of repre- 
sentation and its applicability (or lack of it) to multiple analogies. Instead, the 
representations already presented in previous chapters, namely verbal, visual and 
narrative, are discussed here in the light of current computational models of single 
analogies. 
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6.4.1 Verbal 
Verbal representation consists of the now familiar predicates-and-arguments struc- 
tures where the predicates and arguments are typically linguistic concepts or words. 
This form of representation is fundamental to such classic analogy models as the 
Structure Mapping Engine (SME) (Fdkenhainer et al., 1989) and the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME) (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989). This form of 
representation has many advantages: It is easily understood, has been fruitfully 
applied in the past on other projects, and makes it easy to apply the constraint 
of structural consistency. it also has a number of disadvantages: It may lead re- 
searchers to undervalue non-linguistic factors in analogy construction (Mitchell, 
1993), and presents difficulties in capturing perceptual similarity (such as visual 
resemblance). 
Although the model of multiple analogies described above places more empha- 
sis on the content of analogs (e-g., their independence) than previous models of 
single analogies, structure and structural consistency remain a central requirement. 
Multiple analogies are more or less coherent depending on how well the revised con- 
straint of structural consistency is met. Since verbal representation lends itself well 
to the fulfillment of this constraint, it assumes a similar role in multiple analogies 
to the one that it has in single analogies. 
6.4.2 Visual 
Visual mental imagery appears to have played an important role in the construction 
of several of the multiple analogies discussed above. Adjuncts to visual mental 
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imagery, e.g., pictures and diagrams, have also made a contribution. In some 
cases, simple resemblance was the important element. In Donnm's comparison 
of Peruvian pots (section 4.2), the resemblance of the marks on the inside of the  
Moche pots to the signdes of the modern potters appears to have been the whole 
contribution of visual imagery. The use of imagery, in other words, was confined to  
the recognition of similar attributes. Structural comparison a t  the relational and 
system levels seems to have been carried out using verb$ representation. 
In other analogies, the contribution of visual imagery was apparently much 
greater. In cases such as Farlow and Dodson's analogy between ceratopsians and 
modern animals (section 3.2) and Talalay's comparison of Neolithic figurine legs 
with other tokens (section 4.3), visual representation of act ions and perhaps their 
causes participated in analogy construction. Both involve the alignment of vivid 
events such as angry rhinos fencing for mating superiority and shady underworld 
figures ripping $1,000 bills in half to cement a deal. These scenes record a sequence 
of events that comprise a representation of objects, their spatial relations, and 
their effects on each other that may be termed mental movies. Aligning events 
from various mental movies is an important part of multiple analogy construction 
that operates not only at the attribute level, but also a t  the relational and system 
levels. 
The role of visual mental imagery in multiple analogy construction varies with 
the situation and with the analogizer. Visual mental imagery is more likely to  
be involved in multiple analogy construction if the situation concerns the visual 
properties and behavior of macroscopic objects and if the analogizer is a visual 
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thinker. This state of affairs suggests that a genera model of multiple analogies 
must accommodate the use of both verbal and visual representations (at least) and 
interactions between the two as circumstances warrant. 
The issue of visual representation is enjoying a resurgence of interest in com- 
putational modeling. The ANALOGY system developed by Evans (1968) used a 
predicate-and-argument style representation in which the predicates represent vi- 
sual relations such as inside(P1, P2), meaning that object PI sits inside object Pi?. 
But Evans's work was never followed up. Recently, however, researchers have modi- 
fied several computational models based on verbal representations to use visual r e p  
resentations instead. The Tabletop system (French and Hofstadter, 1991; French, 
1995) is a revision of Copycat that constructs analogies bet ween place settings based 
partly on their resemblance and spatial arrangement in a tabletop microdomain. 
The Visual Analogical Mapping (VAMP) system (Thagard et al., 1993) is based 
on ACME but uses visual representations to model human performance in the task 
of visual comparison of pairs of objects. The MAGI system (Fergusson, 1994) is a 
version of SME that uses a set of graphical primitives such as lines, arcs, and curves 
to represent visual information in comparing pairs of' diagrammatic line drawings. 
Like Evans's ANALOGY program, these systems stay close to predicate-and- 
argument represent ations to capture visual relations among objects or parts of 
objects. The systems do not represent visual attributes or system-level information 
in a visual way. Visual attributes could be represented in a visual way by applying 
current cognitive models of visual imagery (see section 4.5.1). The representation 
of visual system-level information, i. e., mental movies, might be accomplished by 
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the inclusion of a visual buffer to the model. In the model of visual mental im- 
agery described by Kosslyn (1994, the visual buffer is a chunk of memory used 
to mediate low-level visual perception, e.g., retinotopic maps, and high-level visual 
operations, e .g., object recognit ion and image transformat ion. In the model p r e  
posed here, a visual buffer would serve a similar purpose tha t  is, it would serve as 
a kind of movie screen or blackboard upon which different visual movies could be  
projected sequentially or perhaps simultaneously. See figure 6.1. Thus, similarities 
among episodes could be detected by observing significant superimpositions or j ux- 
tapositions of images as images from multiple sources are projected together. The 
picture in figure 3.5 of Santa Claus and a motorist both out of fuel may be taken 
as an example of a visual buffer (externalized) in which two images are projected 
so as to construct or assess a visual comparison. Also, the buffer could be used by 
other processes that convert such images into predicate-and-argument representa- 
tions (and the reverse) as required for structural consistency or even into verbd 
predicates to rerepresent system-level information for purposes of abstraction or 
interact ion with other sources of informat ion. 
6.4.3 Narrative 
The use of narrative to construct multiple analogies plays an important role in 
a number of the examples presented in the previous chapters. In some respects, 
the visual movies just discussed constitute a kind of narrative representation, since 
they consist of episodes which may be dgned in the mind's eye or on paper. Thus, 
the mental movie of rhinos clashing over a potential mate is a kind of story which 
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could also be represented as a verbal narrative. Not surprisingly, narrative more 
straight forwardly of the verbal kind occurs in the examples taken P lato's dialogs 
(chapter 5). 
The main advantage of narrative as a cognitive representation where the con- 
struction of multiple analogies is concerned is that it facilitates the use of several 
sources through simple concatenation. For example, Plato was able to talk about 
health and sickness in the body in comparison to justice and injustice in the state 
simply by claiming that the same causal relations apply to sickness and injustice 
that apply to  health and justice (section 5.3). This analogy is fairly complex, as 
can been seen from its representation in table 5.3, but it is easily understood in its 
narrative f o m .  
Several researchers have recently made strong claims for narrative as a funda- 
mental Form of cognitive representation. Schank and Abelson (1995) claim that 
much of our knowledge about the world comes in the form of stories based on our 
personal experiences. How experiences are remembered and recalled depends on 
how they fit into the stories we tell to ourselves and others. Turner (1996) argues 
that we posses a collection of story schemata or image schemas which we com- 
bine and project in order to represent sequences of events. Thus, when we say of 
someone that  "a machine took away her job", we combine schemata about an actor 
grasping a physical object and taking it away, and then project the machine ag 
the actor and job as the physical object. In both of these approaches, narratives 
are schemata in which certain information is supplied, such as someone grasps an 
object, and some is left to be filled in from context, such as the boldface words in 
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the grasp schema just given. 
In addition, narratives are useful because they relate a series of events to a 
theme. For example, Aesop's fable of Androcles and the lion relates a series of 
events to a moral, namely that good deeds do not go unrewarded (at least when the 
recipient of the good deeds is capable of gratitude). It may be the establishment of a 
relationship of events to a unifying theme that makes narratives easier to remember 
than a simple list of unrelated items. 
No current cognitive model of analogy uses narrative representation for anal- 
ogy construction. Narrative representation would seem to require the build-up of 
a schema from the sources of a multiple analogy along with a representation of 
their common theme or purpose (see Gick and Holyoak, 1983). Unlike the shared- 
abstraction theories of Plato and Aristotle, current models of analogy such as the 
MT are typically shared-structure theories and do not incorporate schemata, al- 
though shared-abstraction models have been used in analogy research in various 
fields of artificial intelligence (see Hall, 1989). However, Fauconnier (1997) presents 
a theoretical model of analogy which does rely on shared abstractions. In Faucon- 
nier's model, selected informat ion from source and target analogs are projected into 
a "blending spacen where they are combined and manipulated together. 
By analogy with the visud buffer proposed in section 6.4.2, narrative repre 
sentation may be incorporated into the current model of multiple andogies by 
providing a verbal buffer that acts somewhat Like Fauconnier's blending space to 
represent episodes of an ongoing narrative provided they are coherent with the 
theme of the multiple analogy. Similar or repeated episodic pat terns could then be 
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recognized and manipulated as part of the process of analogy construction. So, for 
example, the mapping of accord-with6 and contrary-tos with their counterparts in 
table 5.3 could be represented properly as a mapping between two pairs of opposite 
predicates instead of four arbitrarily organized predicates. 
6.5 Processes 
Multiple analogies are constructed through a number of different processes. In 
this dissertation, processes have been distinguished according to the different ways 
in which multiple source analogs serve their purposes. It is naturai to infer that 
because analogs serve different purposes, they are made to do so in different ways. 
That is to say, where a means-ends analysis is applied to the problem of multiple 
analogies, different ends are best explained as the products of different means. 
Furthermore, in cognitive modeling, processes are often realized as separate 
procedures for manipulating cognitive representations. In some models of analogy, 
however, this move from processes to procedures is explicitly denied, as in the 
Copycat model (Mitchell, 1993). In this model and its relatives, one procedure, 
namely the parall el terraced scan, is applied to all problems regardless of the purpose 
they might serve.' In fact, the success of Copycat as an analogy-building model is 
taken by its authors as a counterexample to the claim that cognitive models need to 
make the move from processes to procedures a t  all. Anyone proposing a cognitive 
model based on a means-end analysis must a t  least consider this issue. 
IStrictly speaking, Copycat is premised on the view that purpose is irrelevant to analogy 
construction. 
CHAPTER 6. THE VERY MODEL OF A MULTIPLE ANALOGY 
The position taken here is to sit firmly on the fence between the two extremes. 
The processes such as supplementation and extension characterized in this disser- 
tation are certainly processes apparent in the construction of multiple analogies, 
but it is not clear whether each is the product of a corresponding procedure or not. 
Thus, the discussion below is given strictly in terms of processes, leaving the exact 
nature of the cognitive procedures that underlie them to future investigation. 
6.5.1 Abstraction and exemplification 
Abstraction is a process whereby several analogs are represented by one alone. The 
several analogs in question are not an arbitrary assemblage but a group of items 
closely related under some description. For example, in the analogy concerning the 
depth of habitation of the Coelacanth (section 2.4), Centroscymnus was used to 
represent ail deep water sharks, while Ruvettvs was similarly used to represent all 
deep water teleosts. Any member of each class of fish would make a good ana- 
log for comparison with the Coelacanth and their total number would suggest the 
generality and importance of the adapt at ion of eye pigment being considered. But 
actually constructing such a large number of comparisons would be tedious and p* 
tentially confusing. Cognitively, it is just as convincing and much more economical 
to construct an analogy with the members of each class simply by constructing an 
analogy with a representative of each. The process of abstraction, then, reduces an 
intractable problem to a tractable one without losing informativeness. 
The issue of what to use as a representative of each class remains. Although 
use could conceivably be made of an idealized member or an average member, in 
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practise use is made of an exemplary member of each class. The Cen troscymnus and 
Ruvettus count as exemplary deep water sharks and teleosts, respectively, because 
each shares the relevant properties with the other members of its class, information 
about each is readily available, and the analogizer has some experience with each 
of them. 
In the Coelacanth example, an exemplary member of each class of fish involved 
satisfies the criteria for abstraction. It is not clear, however, that exemplification 
is always the best response to the needs of abstraction. In a study of analogies 
taken from newspaper articles (Thagard and Shelley, ip), it is found that source 
analogs are sometimes chosen not because they are exemplary but because they are 
stereotypical. Consider the comparison by Dr. William Catalona of the demand 
for Viagra with the demand for wrinkle cream2 
"It's like the  Fountain of Youth," said Catalona. 'Viagra is analogous 
to anti-wrinkle cream. This is something that will turn back the clock 
and make men the way they were when they were young." 
Wrinkle cream does not count as an exemplary "age fighting" item because Dr. 
Catalona has no personal experience with it. The same may be said of the Fountain 
of Youth. Rather, wrinkle cream is an item stereotypically used by women to look 
and feel young. Sometimes, then, stereotypes may be preferred to exemplars for 
the purposes of abstraction. 
From "Baby Boomers fight aging in a variety of ways", by P. B. Librach, 1 June 1998, Scripp 
Howard News Semce. 
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6,s. 2 Supplement at ion 
The process of abstraction is useful in situations in which many, mutually coherent 
or consistent analogs are available. Some situations, however, call for a process 
of repairing or correcting other analogs, and not simply agreeing with them. The 
process of using multiple sources to repair others may be called supplementation 
(Spiro et al., 1989). Examples of supplementation are given in each of chapters 2, 
3, 4 and 5. Clearly, supplementation is an important form of multiple analogy. 
Supplementation presents some special difficulties where cognitive models are 
concerned. Supplementary source analogs satisfy the following three criteria when 
they are mapped to existing analogies: (I)  they align with the previous source 
and target analogs as usual, and (2) revise or modify some of the predicates in 
the previous source analogs with which they are aligned, and (3) they may add 
mappings to the overall analogy. All three criteria may be problematic. 
The first criterion might present difficulties where predicates in the new source 
are meant to revise predicates in the old one(s). The principle of semantic similarity 
(section 32) suggests that where the analogs in an analogy line up, they should 
contain similar predicates. But since supplementary andogs are meant to revise 
other analogs, the supplementary analogs must be semantically different than their 
predecessors. Different predicates align less coherently, which would make the new 
analogy worse, not better, than the original version. Thus, the principle of semantic 
similarity would seem to insulate analogies against revision. In practise, fortunately, 
this problem does not seem to arise. The relational and system predicates in the 
supplementary sources of the examples reviewed in previous chapters are almost 
CHAPTER 6- THE VERY MODEL OF A MULTIPLE ANALOGY 212 
always identical with those already given in the old analogy. The one exception 
is in Plato's addition of tragedians to the painter-poet andogy (section 5 4 ,  in 
which praise is mapped to appeal-to, and appeal-top. In this case, the incoherent 
predicate is not too far removed from the others in the mapping and has very little 
effect on the target. Thus, in practise, it appears that supplementation can be 
accommodated within the principle of semantic similarity as currently given in the 
MT. 
If the new predicates are not different, how can they supplement the old ones? 
This quest ion pertains to the second criterion for supplementation listed above. 
The answer consists in noting that although the relational and system predicates 
of supplementary analogs are semantically similar, their attributes are not. In 
Haynes's analogy regarding Clovis mammoth hunters (section 4.4), the comparison 
of wolves to humans works well in terms of the alignment of relational and sys- 
tem predicates, but fails to entirely convince Haynes himself because comparisons 
between human and animal psychology are problematic in general. To overcome 
this disparity, Haynes adds a supplementary source that concerns human behavior 
towards elephants. This new source maps humans to humans and mammoths to 
elephants, which gives a much more satisfying and plausible result. Thomson adds 
the newt analog to the analogy between Hezanchus and Coelacaoth largelx to re- 
place claspers+organ reproductive attribute of Hezanchus with the ritud+gelatin 
attribute of the newt (section 2.4). In other words, attributes of supplementary 
source analogs tend to deactivate the attributes of previous source analogs when 
they are mapped with them. By the same token, they tend to increase the activation 
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of the corresponding attributes in the target analog. 
Plato's use of tragedians to supplement his painterjpoet analogy (section 5.4) 
introduces some new mappings into the previous analogy. Thus, for example, the 
predicates c o m p t  and rulel must be placed in new rows in table 5.4. This kind of 
supplementation initially presents a difficult problem in the sense that the addition 
of predicates appears trickier than the revision of predicates discussed above. In 
the latter case, predicates in the supplementary source all align normally with 
predicates in the target, but in the former case, this condition does not hold. There 
is no semantic or syntactic information in the analogs to distinguish which kind 
of supplementation is most appropriate. As noted in section 5.5.3, the difficulty 
may be overcome by attending to the purpose of the analogy, which appears to 
comprise a twestep plan for presenting poets as worthy of banishment. The trick 
for generating or understanding this kind of supplementation, then, is to connect 
each source analog with a step involved in the overall plan of the analogy. Probably, 
this way of constructing or interpreting a multiple analogy is a method of last resort, 
since the chances of confusing addition of mappings with revision of mappings is 
fairly high. In a cognitive model, an addition of mappings may be contemplated 
when a revision proves inadequate and thus represents a case in which the purpose 
of an analogy affects its structure and meaning interactively. 
6.5.3 Specificity 
The relationship between sources and target can obviously become quite compli- 
cated in multiple analogies. Another instance of this complexity arises in cases 
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where predicates in the target are filled in or inferred from predicates in the source 
analog. In cognitive models of single analogies, the usual strategy is copy with sub- 
stitution, in which a predicate from the source analog is copied into the target and 
the appropriate arguments are substituted in to the copy (see footnote Holyoak 
and Thagard, 1995, p. 30). This strategy runs into a difficulty in multiple analogies 
because different sources sometimes have different predicates within a mapping. 
Simple copying is not possible in such a situation. 
This difficulty arises in Donnan's analogy concerning Peruvian pots (section 4.2), 
Talalay 's analogy concerning Neolithic figurine legs (section 4.3), and Plato's eye, 
ear, knife, and soul analogy (section 5.3). In each of these cases, the strategy 
was adopted of substituting not a copy of a source predicate but the most specific 
predicate that subsumed the meanings of all the source predicates. In other words, 
the target predicate is a compromise amongst the sources, rather than a copy of 
one of them. 
There are two things to note about this compromise strategy. First, it implies a 
trade-off between the number of source analogs and the specificity of the target, at 
least where the source analogs are not completely similar semantically. Second, it 
subsumes the copy with substitution strategy applied in the case of single analogies. 
In the case of the Moche pots, Doman avoids any dissimilar predicates in his 
analogy, even though he had the opportunity to do so. In other words, Donnan 
could have compared the stay-at-home and travelling potter's practises to those 
practises of the Moche potters. It appears that Doman set himself strictly to the 
task of explaining the marks on the Moche pots and not the doings of the potters 
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because the former task produced the most specific results. Bearing in mind the 
controversy in archaeology over the use of analogy (section 4.6), his conservatism 
is understandable. 
Talalay and Plato set themselves the task of supporting a fairly nonspecific 
target predicate and could therefore accept the lack of specificity involved in their 
use of several source analogs. In exchange for this lack of specificity in the relevant 
target predicate, both authors increased confidence in its generality. In all three 
cases discussed here, specificity describes the way in which source analogs and target 
predicates are selected in order to best serve the purpose of the analogy. Specificity 
is thus another way in which purpose and target interact. 
It should also be noted that, as with the revised principle of structural consis- 
tency (section 6.2), the process of specifying a target predicate as described here 
subsumes the process of copy with substitution which occurs in the single analogy 
case. That is to say, copy with substitution may be  viewed as a special case of 
specification where only one source predicate is available. When only one predicate 
is available as the basis for specifying a target predicate, then simply copying that 
predicate is the only way to proceed. When, in the general case, several diverse 
predicates are available, then specificity becomes a more complex process. 
6.6 Philosophy of science 
One advantage of studying any cognitive phenomenon through actual examples is 
that a better appreciation is gained not only of the phenomenon itself but also of the  
areas from which the examples are drawn. This advantage applies no less to multiple 
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analogies than any other subject . In this dissertation, multiple analogies were taken 
from the fields of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and Plato's Republic. The 
implications of this study for the cognitive modeling of multiple analogies have 
been discussed in sections 6.2 through 6.5. In this section, the implications of this 
study for the philosophy of evolutionary biology and archaeology is discussed. 
6.6.1 Disanalogy and extension 
As noted in section 2.5.5, the social behavior of Coelacanth biologists conforms to 
Polemarchus' ethical dictum "help your friends and hurt your enemies". In other 
words, these biologists tend to extend or point out further positive andogies appli- 
cable to the comparisons of their professional compatriots, and tend to point out 
disanalogies lurking in the comparisons of their professional cornpet i tors. Although 
disanalogies and extensions are not inherently social phenomena, they happen to 
lend themselves well to the social goals of scientists as  described by Polemarchus 
and therefore occur when these goals are operative. 
The relationship of the scientific community to scientific knowledge has become 
an important issue in the philosophy of science, with philosophers and sociologists 
taking up a variety of positions on the subject (for a brief overview, see Thagard, 
1994). Some have claimed that there is no distinction between scientific theories 
and the gods of the scientists who endorse them (e.g., Latour and Woolgar, 1986). 
But cognitive models of social groups indicate that the content of theories and the 
goals of scientists both likely play a role in the growth of scientific knowledge. 
For example, Hutchins (1995) has described the navigation of a U.S. Marine 
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Corps aircraft carrier in terms of the social distribution of cognitive tasks and 
representations among its navigational crew. Different crew members acquire and 
communicate various sorts of information, e.g., location fixes, in order to navigate 
the vessel and ensure that it remains on course. The hierarchical, authority-driven 
nature of the crew command structure ensures that the relevant tasks have high 
priority, while the flexibility granted to trusted crew members ensures that decisions 
are not taken in the absence of unexpected but important information that may 
come to their attention, such as the presence of a sailboat directly in the path of 
the aircraft carrier. 
A roughly similar situation holds in the scientific community. Groups of like- 
minded scientists support each other's positions in their various institutions, jour- 
nals, and conferences, while arguing against the positions of others. As is the case 
with a navigational crew, the distribution of power and influence in the scientific 
community constrains how knowledge is generated, but information that does not 
fit accepted theories also constrains this process. In other words, cognitive repre- 
sentations and processes are distributed throughout the scientific community just 
as they a.re in any other community. 
6.6.2 Fecundity and theory change 
The ways in which the content of multiple analogies interact with the socid organi- 
zation of scientists may be examined from another angle by considering the issues 
of fecundity md theory change. 
On the model of Goldman's principles of the epistemic benefits of the social 
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practises of scientists (sect ion 3.4.4), the fecundity of an analogy may be defined as 
its ability to lead to more analogies for many analogizers. The extension of analogies 
into multiple ones by the addition of source analogs at tests to the fecundity of the 
original analogy on this definition. Thus, for example, the fecundity of Farlow 
and Dodson's ungulate/ceratopsian analogy is attested to by Molnar's proposed 
extension of it from sexual cornpet it ion to habitat preference. The fecundity of the 
original analogy tends to increase confidence in its application. By pointing out its 
fecundity, Molnar is also satisfying his social goal of endorsing Farlow and Dodson7s 
theory that ceratopsian horns and frills served the needs of sexual selection, and 
also his personal goal of writing a publishable paper on the subject. This example 
indicates that epistemic and social aspects of multiple analogies are complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive. 
Farlow and Dodson's work lead to a change in the dominant theory concerning 
ceratopsian horns. Previously, it had been widely held that the fancy headgear 
of ceratopsians was for defense against predators. Since then, the explanation via 
sexual selection has become the dominant theory (Dodson, 1996). The analogy of 
ceratopsians with modern ungulates, although it did not fit the prevailing view, 
proved to be convincing once it was brought to the attention of the paleontological 
community. 
However, in the case of the Archaeopteryz (section 3.3), the presence of multiple 
analogies supporting both the arboreal and cursorial theories has helped to prevent 
the relevant c o m x n ~ t y  from reaching agreement on which theory to adopt (see 
also Shipman, 1998). In both of these cases, multiple analogies have had a definite 
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influence o n  scientific theory change in virtue of both the epistemic support they 
lend to one hypothesis or the other and the influence of the scientists who put them 
forward. 
6.6.3 Evolutionary scenarios 
Also of philosophical interest is the importance of multiple analogies to the con- 
struction of evolutionary scenarios (section 3.4.2). Analogies are important to this 
process because the plausibility of a reconstruct ion of some extinct organism relies 
heavily on comparison with modern organisms that have been studied by b i o b  
gists. Multiple analogies tend to increase confidence in such reconst ructions. Fur- 
thermore, multiple analogies, especially supplementations, are important in cases 
where the reconstructed organism does not compare too readily with any one mod- 
ern animal and must therefore be compared with a conglomeration or chimaera 
of modem organisms. As Padian states, the problem of how best to make such 
multiple comparisons is one of the hardest that faces biologists interested in the 
nature of extinct animals. 
A related issue in the philosophy of biology concerns the nature of the schemata 
used to generate evolutionary explanations. Some philosophers such as Kitcher 
favor argumentative schemata in which evolutionary explanations resemble deduc- 
tions derived from first principles. Such schemata consist of statements, proceeding 
from the general to the specific, that follow from each other by connectives like 
therefore. Other philosophers such as Darden propose schemata which measure the 
degree of fit between particular facts and the theory of evolution. The schemata for 
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scenario construction proposed in section 3.4.2 is of the latter type. This type of 
schema better matches the practise of biologists since they do use multiple analo- 
gies to show the coherence of their reconstructions with observations of modem 
organisms. Analogies of any kind simply do not figure in the argumentative type 
of schema, which therefore misses this aspect of evolutionary explanation. 
6.6.4 Archaeological scenarios 
A similar issue has occupied archaeologists who havequestioned the place of analogy 
and analogical inference in their discipline (section 4.6). As Wylie puts it, there 
has been a "reaction against analogy" in modern archaeology, especially the New 
archaeology of the 1960s. This reaction consisted in a rejection of the sometimes 
sloppy analogy construction of previous archaeologists combined with a questioning 
of basic aims of archaeology as a science. Is the aim of archaeology to reconstruct 
past cultures and practises or to infer general laws of culture? 
The reconstruct ion of past cultures typically proceeds through analogical com- 
parisons with modern cultures. Thus, archaeologists who argue in favor of recon- 
struction typically argue in favor of using analogies. Archaeologists who argue for 
the inference of general laws of culture typically argue against using analogies. One 
of the arguments offered against the use of analogies is that the modern cultures 
available for comparison exhibit as many differences as similarities with bygone 
cultures (section 4.1). Thae may not be any one modern culture upon which an 
adequately convincing analogy can be built for any particular purpose. 
This objection loses some of its force when the possibility of multiple analo- 
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gies is raised. In particular, the supplementation of one analog by another, as in 
Haynes's analogy concerning Clovis mammoth hunters (section 4 4 ,  offers at least 
the possibility of overcoming this difficulty. This point supports reconstruction as 
an aim of archaeology as a science and also motivates further research into rnult iple 
analogies as they may be applied in this pursuit. 
6.6.5 Discovery versus justification 
Some of the impetus for discounting analogies and promoting the inference of gen- 
eral laws as the aim of archaeology came from logical positivist emphasis on deduc- 
tion in science (section 4.6). Another component of the logical positivist philosophy 
of science that affected archaeology (and evolutionary biology; see section 3.4.4) was 
the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Scientific inquiry was viewed as occurring in two distinct and independent phases, 
namely discovery in which hypotheses are generated and justfiation in which hy- 
pot heses are confirmed or rejected. 
Because the two phases were held to be independent, data used in the discovery 
of a hypothesis could not be used in its confirmation or rejection. Clearly, however, 
some of the multiple analogies presented in this dissertation do not conform to the 
division of phases. Tdalay's multiple analogy concerning figurine legs (section 4.3), 
for example, was generated in view of some of the source analogs and then justified 
by the addition of new source analogs dug up by a deliberate search. Either this 
practise must be rejected as illegitimate, or the strict division of phases of discovery 
and justification must be so rejected. The cognitive model of multiple analogies 
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proposed above indicates that confidence in a multiple analogy depends on its 
components and how well they serve their purpose and not on when or in what order 
they are put to use. If confidence, as it is employed here, is an acceptable source of 
support for scientific hypotheses, then the discovery/j ustification distinct ion cannot 
be accepted as is. If the distinction is to be maintained, then some reason must be 
found to reject confidence as a relevant source of support for scientific hypotheses. 
No such reason is readily apparent. 
6.7 Normative aspects of multiple analogies 
The primary focus of this dissertation has been to elucidate the nature of multiple 
analogies and their contributions to thought in various fields. This focus has neces- 
sarily meant an emphasis on descriptive assessment of multiple analogies, resulting 
in a cognitive model. Of course, important normative points have also been raised 
as the opportunity arose, particularly on the implications for multiple analogies 
for the philosophy of science. However, it would be useful here to devote some 
additional space to a broader consideration of the normative aspects of multiple 
analogies. In other words, some of the value of this work should come in the form 
of recommendations on what distinguishes good multiple analogies from bad ones. 
The recommendations presented below should be useful for anyone concerned with 
critical thinking and nature and role of analogies in science. 
Work out multiple analogies explicitly. Perhaps the greatest advantage of 
modern theories of analogy such as the Mufticonstraint theory is their richness of 
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represen tat ion and perspicacity of structure. Their richness comes from the large 
number of relations that they allow to be put to use in analogy construction. In 
the proportional theory, relations are represented by ambiguous constructions such 
as a colon U:" or Uis ton. In the MT and other shared-structure theories, relations 
are represented explicitly by predicates such as praise, inside-of, or cause. These 
predicates answer fairly well to the concepts that are active in analogy construc- 
tion. Working out explicitly which predicates to use in describing an analogy is an 
excellent method of clarifying for yourself what relations are actually present in an 
analogy. Explicitness is especially helpful when considering multiple analogies in 
which several concepts must be aligned together. Concepts that seem very similar 
at first glance may not turn out to be so similar upon further consideration. 
The perspicacity of shared-structure theories like the MT derives from the way 
in which mappings and the syntax of predicates represent the systematic structure 
of good analogies. Mappings represent the alignment of concepts in an analogy and 
can be worked out fairly rigorously by constructing tables of the kind presented in 
this dissertation. The use of table rows to represent mappings, as presented above, 
captures the alignment of concepts very well. Table rows also capture the multiple 
mappings of multiple analogies quite nicely by the simple addition of columns to 
the table. The rows and columns of the tablular representation, e.g., tables 2.3,3.1, 
4.1, and 5.1, are thus well suited to the purpose of working out multiple analogies. 
Working out multiple andogies explicitly in this way is good both for the pur- 
poses of constructing multiple analogies and for understanding and criticizing mul- 
tiple analogies proposed by others. 
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Define your purpose carefully. The importance of purpose to the construc- 
t ion and understanding multiple analogies has been emphasized a great deal in this 
dissertation. Although multiple analogies may sometimes be used simply to add 
color to a story or argument, they otherwise reflect a more-or-less deliberate plan 
beneath their construct ion. And these plans are not necessarily simple ones. Recall 
from section 1.6 that Polya stipulated that the purpose of multiple analogies is to 
construct the most general target analog possible. The examples of multiple analo 
gies analyzed in this dissertation clearly show that the situation is not so simple. 
Multiple analogies may be used to adjust or further constrain the interpretation of 
the target analog instead of generalizing it. The purpose of multiple analogies may 
be fairly complex, with each source analog fulfilling its own part of the overall plan. 
When constructing a multiple analogy, it is important to define the purpose of the 
analogy carefully and break it down into components if necessary. If no one source 
analog can fulfill the requirements, then it may be time to look into using multiple 
analogs. Each analog should have a specific purpose, perhaps to add confidence in 
the construction of the target, to revise the failings of previous sources, or to avoid 
considering aspects of one analog that would weaken confidence in the construction 
of the target. 
The system mappings are particularly important to the purpose of any analogy. 
These mappings show how relations and attributes of analogs fit together to form 
an explanation, a plan, or a prediction. In some areas, such as evolutionary biology, 
groups of system predicates come already assembled in the form of schemata that 
derive from a general theory. In other areas, there is more freedom or less constraint 
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on which system predicates are used in which combinations. In either case, the 
system predicates in the target analog of an analogy must fit together properly to 
form a coherent synopsis of the whole analog. The multiple analogies presented in 
this dissertation have typically been explicated or summarized simply by rendering 
their system predicates into plain English. When a target analog can be thus 
read off as a satisfactory explanation, scheme, or prediction, then it can be more 
confidently judged to  have fulfilled its purpose. If the system predicates of a target 
cannot be read off in this way, then different and/or additional source analogs 
should be considered. 
Do not multiply source analogs beyond necessity. Copi and Burgess-Jackson 
(1992, p. 195) state that the first criterion by which the quality of an analogical 
argument may be judged is the number of source analogs that it includes. This 
advice is justified by claiming that the greater the number of source analogs, the 
higher the probability of the correctness of the conclusion. This advice is based 
on their version of Mill's shared-attribute theory and is obviously flawed for that 
reason. 
Because the shared-attribute theory lacks any explicit representation of higher- 
level relations such as causal relations, the best or only way to think about the 
"probabilityn of a conclusion based on analogy is that it is proportional to the 
number of analogs. On a shared-struct ure theory, causal relations are explicitly 
considered and can thus be assessed directly rather than through the intermediary 
of probability. 
Consider the example given by Copi and Burgess-Jackson (1992, p. 195): 
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If I advise you not to send your shirts to such and such a laundry be- 
cause I sent one there once and it came back ruined, you might caution 
me against jumping to conclusions and urge that they ought perhaps 
to be given another chance. On the other hand, if I give you the same 
advice and justify it by recounting four occasions on which unsatis- 
factory work was done by them, and report further that our mutual 
friends Jones and Smith have patronized them repeatedly with similar 
unhappy results, these premisses serve to establish the conclusion with 
much higher probability than did the first argument, which cited only 
a single instance. 
This argument seems to be aimed at establishing, with high probability, the gener- 
alization (x)(shirt  (x)&launder( Laundry, x )  -t ruin( Laundry, x)), or, in English, 
if x is a shirt and the Laundry launders it, then they ruin the shirt. On the Multi- 
constmint theory, the analogy would be construed as a causal explanation, which is 
more typicdly how people treat this kind of situtation . In other words, the analogy 
should be construed as support for the proposition that the Laundry ruins shirts 
(ruin) due to some factor f such that cawe(f, ruin). To construct the analogy that 
best supports this conclusion, it would be better not to multiply source analogs 
but to seek out source analogs that provide some indication of what f is. In this 
example, it would be better to provide evidence that the Laundry typically uses a 
bleach that causes colon to run, if that is indeed the root of the problem. 
On the theory discussed in this dissertation, the number of source andogs re- 
quired for an analogy is just the number required to establish in the target the 
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desired system predicates with the desired specificity and confidence, and no more. 
This is not to say that there is an obvious, optimal number of analogs for any 
given analogy; extensions or even contractions may be made as more analogs are 
considered. But simple and unguided addition of analogs should be avoided. 
Counter disanalogies with supplementary sources. Bonner (section 2.5.5) 
notes that biologists sometimes cringe when offering analogies in anticipation of the 
faults and disanalogies that their collegues will point out. One way to deal with this 
situation is to construct analogies for which no disanalogies exist. However, it may 
not always be possible to find source analogs that satisfy this constraint. It is best, 
then, when constructing analogies to anticipate objections and look for disanalogies 
that arise from the analogies that you propose. Where these disanalogies cannot 
be avoided, they may be overcome, at least on some occasions, by giving supple- 
mentary analogs. In effect, this advice amounts to pointing out that the process 
of supplementation may be preferable to giving up on an analogy (see Spiro et al., 
1989). 
Of course, a good supplementation is one that fulfills the purpose of the original 
analogy. But there do not seem to be any general rules for deciding whether a 
supplementary analog is adequate for its purpose. In other words, the criteria for 
deciding on the adequacy of supplementary analogs appears to vary from situation 
to situation. Exploring and clarifying this problem is an important direction for fu- 
ture research on multiple analogies. In the meantime, the best advice is to consider 
supplementary analogs carefully and try to generate criteria for deciding on their 
adequacy for the overall purpose of the analogy. This process may suggest criteria 
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that can be applied more generally. 
Think in terms of different representational media. The role of verbal, 
visual, and narrative representations in multiple analogy construction has been dis- 
cussed in this dissertation. One point that may be pursued here is the tendency of 
thinking in one medium to proceed in that medium. In other words, once analogy 
construction begins using visual mental imagery, say, it tends to continue in that 
medium. This inertial quality of representation has its advantages and disadvan- 
t ages. 
The main advantage for current purposes is that analogs similar in representa- 
tion to the one under consideration at any given moment will suggest themselves. 
For example, the mental movie of two ceratopsians fighting over a mate may remind 
you of the movie of two rhinos fighting over a mate, which may remind you of two 
elk fighting over a mate, and so on. These sorts of similarity-based remindings may 
suggest several analogs that could be useful for a given purpose. 
This same inertial quality of representation may be a disadvantage if the relevaat 
analogs are not encoded in the same representation as the one currently under 
consideration. So, for example, thinking in t e rns  of a mental movie will tend to 
inhibit any reminding of an analog that is represented in verbal fashion. 
The advice that follows from these considerations is that you should think about 
the problem at  hand in different forms of representation and thus prompt the rec- 
ollection of as many source analogs as possible. The best solution to some problem 
may be suggested by a multiple analogy with sources represented both verbally and 
visually. It would be  a pity to miss solutions in such cases by simply failing t o  take 
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into account the diversity of mental representations. 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
As noted in chapter 1, an adequate cognitive theory of analogy must address a 
wide variety of issues. Analogical thinking, after dl, encompasses a fair variety of 
activities, one of which is the construction of multiple analogies-that is, analogies 
with multiple source analogs. Philosophers as astute as Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, 
and Mill have used multiple analogies in the course of their work, but have not 
examined them as such. 
In this dissertation, I have presented an examination of multiple analogies as 
such, an examination based on analysis of instances of multiple analogies taken from 
the works of sophisticated and expert thinkers. This analysis reveals a number of 
issues concerning analogy and analogical reasoning which simply do not arise in 
the study of single analogies, e.g., the processes by which multiple analogies are 
constructed by individual thinkers and by communities of thinkers acting together 
or in competition. This analysis raises the fundamental issue of whet her to regard 
single or multiple analogies as the basic form of analogical reasoning. Although 
single analogies are more frequent, parsimony indicates that they should be treated 
as special cases of multiple analogies for the purposes of cognitive modeling. 
This analysis also shows the importance of multiple forms of representation to 
multiple analogies. Cognitive representations of the verbal, predicate-and-ugumentfi 
sort are appropriate for many instances of multiple analogies, but visual and narra- 
tive representations also come into play and must therefore be part of any general 
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cognitive model. Different thinkers vary in their abilities to employ one form of 
representation or another, and one thinker may vary in his or her use of cognitive 
representations in the process of constructing any one multiple analogy. In the 
cognitive model proposed here, visual and verbal buffers are proposed to allow for 
such variation in performance. 
This analysis has also served to emphasize the importance of purpose to analogy 
construction. In some cases, multiple analogies may arise by some process of simple 
association of one source analog with another, but, in the cases examined above, 
multiple source analogs are used for specific reasons. Without an understanding 
of these reasons and how they relate a thinker's analogs to his or her goals, the 
occurrence of these multiple analogies might seem merely idle or perverse. 
Finally, this analysis reveals the importance of multiple analogies to the epis- 
temic goals of scientists and philosophers dike. Multiple analogies make important 
contributions to the conduct of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and philosophy. 
Improving our understanding of multiple analogies therefore allows us to improve 
our understanding of the aims and methods of sophisticated thinkers in these fields 
of inquiry. No doubt, analysis of multiple analogies in other fields of research would 
be equally revealing. 
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